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Disasters are calamitous events that severely affect the life conditions of an entire 
community, being the disasters either nature-based (e.g., earthquake) or man-made (e.g., 
terroristic attack). Disaster-related issues are usually dealt with according to the Disaster 
Operations Management (DOM) framework, which is composed of four phases: mitigation 
and preparedness, which address pre-disaster issues, and response and recovery, which 
tackle problems arising after the occurrence of a disaster. The ultimate scope of this 
dissertation is to present novel optimization models and algorithms aimed at improving 
operations belonging to the mitigation and response phases of the DOM. 
On the mitigation side, this thesis focuses on the protection of Critical Information 
Infrastructures (CII), which are commonly deemed to include communication and 
information networks. The majority of all the other Critical Infrastructures (CI), such as 
electricity, fuel and water supply as well as transportation systems, are crucially dependent 
on CII. Therefore, problems associated with CII that disrupt the services they are able to 
provide (whether to a single end-user or to another CI) are of increasing interest. This 
dissertation reviews several issues emerging in the Critical Information Infrastructures 
Protection (CIIP), field such as: how to identify the most critical components of a 
communication network whose disruption would affect the overall system functioning; how 
to mitigate the consequences of such calamitous events through protection strategies; and 
how to design a system which is intrinsically able to hedge against disruptions. To this end, 
this thesis provides a description of the seminal optimization models that have been 
developed to address the aforementioned issues in the general field of Critical 
Infrastructures Protection (CIP). Models are grouped in three categories which address the 
aforementioned issues: survivability-oriented interdiction, resource allocation strategy, and 
survivable design models; existing models are reviewed and possible extensions are 
proposed. In fact, some models have already been developed for CII (i.e., survivability-
interdiction and design models), while others have been adapted from the literature on 
other CI (i.e., resource allocation strategy models). The main gap emerging in the CII field is 
that CII protection has been quite overlooked which has led to review optimization models 
that have been developed for the protection of other CI. Hence, this dissertation contributes 
to the literature in the field by also providing a survey of the multi-level programs that have 
been developed for protecting supply chains, transportation systems (e.g., railway 
infrastructures), and utility networks (e.g., power and water supply systems), in order to 
adapt them for CII protection. Based on the review outcomes, this thesis proposes a novel 
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linear bi-level program for CIIP to mitigate worst-case disruptions through protection 
investments entailing network design operations, namely the Critical Node Detection 
Problem with Fortification (CNDPF), which integrates network survivability assessment, 
resource allocation strategies and design operations. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first bi-level program developed for CIIP. The model is solved through a Super Valid 
Inequalities (SVI) decomposition approach and a Greedy Constructive and Local Search (GCLS) 
heuristic. Computational results are reported for real communication networks and for 
different levels of both disaster magnitude and protection resources.  
On the response side, this thesis identifies the current challenges in devising realistic 
and applicable optimization models in the shelter location and evacuation routing context 
and outlines a roadmap for future research in this topical area. A shelter is a facility where 
people belonging to a community hit by a disaster are provided with different kinds of 
services (e.g., medical assistance, food). The role of a shelter is fundamental for two 
categories of people: those who are unable to make arrangements to other safe places (e.g., 
family or friends are too far), and those who belong to special-needs populations (e.g., 
disabled, elderly). People move towards shelter sites, or alternative safe destinations, when 
they either face or are going to face perilous circumstances. The process of leaving their own 
houses to seek refuge in safe zones goes under the name of evacuation. Two main types of 
evacuation can be identified: self-evacuation (or car-based evacuation) where individuals 
move towards safe sites autonomously, without receiving any kind of assistance from the 
responder community, and supported evacuation where special-needs populations (e.g., 
disabled, elderly) require support from emergency services and public authorities to reach 
some shelter facilities. This dissertation aims at identifying the central issues that should be 
addressed in a comprehensive shelter location/evacuation routing model. This is achieved 
by a novel meta-analysis that entail: (1) analysing existing disaster management surveys, (2) 
reviewing optimization models tackling shelter location and evacuation routing operations, 
either separately or in an integrated manner, (3) performing a critical analysis of existing 
papers combining shelter location and evacuation routing, concurrently with the responses 
of their authors, and (4) comparing the findings of the analysis of the papers with the findings 
of the existing disaster management surveys. The thesis also provides a discussion on the 
emergent challenges of shelter location and evacuation routing in optimization such as the 
need for future optimization models to involve stakeholders, include evacuee as well as 
system behaviour, be application-oriented rather than theoretical or model-driven, and 
interdisciplinary and, eventually, outlines a roadmap for future research. Based on the 
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identified challenges, this thesis presents a novel scenario-based mixed-integer program 
which integrates shelter location, self-evacuation and supported-evacuation decisions, 
namely the Scenario-Indexed Shelter Location and Evacuation Routing (SISLER) problem. To 
the best of my knowledges, this is the second model including shelter location, self-
evacuation and supported-evacuation however, SISLER deals with them based on the 
provided meta-analysis. The model is solved through a Branch-and-Cut algorithm of an off-
the-shelf software, enriched with valid inequalities adapted from the literature. 
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This chapter describes the context where this doctoral activity has been set, specifies the 
topics that have been investigated, illustrates the research questions that have been posed, 
details the contributions to knowledge that have been produced and, finally, outlines the 
structure of this dissertation.   
 
1.1 Research background 
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) defines a 
disaster as the sudden occurrence of an hazardous event that severely affects the members 
of an entire community, leading to various unfavourable consequences (e.g., life-threatening 
circumstances, economic losses) that the community cannot tackle on its own  (IFRC 2017).  
A disaster can be classified as either natural or man-made (Van Wassenhove 2006). 
Examples of natural disasters are earthquakes (Italy, 2017), hurricanes (US, 2017), floods 
(Central Europe, 2015), and bushfires (Australia, 2009), while terroristic attacks (UK, 2005) 
are examples of man-made disasters. The upward trend of disaster occurrence, as displayed 
in Figure 1, puts a lot of strain onto the humanitarian system, leading to an increased focus 
on Disaster Management (DM) issues. 
 
Figure 1. Relevant natural loss events worldwide 1980 – 2017 (MunichRe 2018) 
 
Figure 1 shows the rise in number for four different natural disaster categories over the 
time range 1980 – 2017: geophysical events (in red), such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and 
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volcanic activity; meteorological events (in green), such as tropical cyclones, extratropical, 
convective or local storms; hydrological events (in blue), such as flood and mass movement; 
and climatological events (in orange), such as extreme temperatures, droughts, and forest 
fires. Both geophysical events and meteorological events have nearly doubled, climatological 
events have increased threefold, and hydrological events have almost registered a sevenfold 
rise. The variegated nature of disasters highlights the importance of sensing/forecasting 
algorithms, in fact, disasters like hurricanes can be predicted. However, the fact that a 
disaster can be predicted is not enough and prompts issue related to the accuracy of the 
prediction itself. Nevertheless, forecast data can be deployed to inform decision-makers 
prior to the occurrence of a disaster and take relevant actions (e.g., preventive evacuation). 
The occurrence of disasters is exacerbated by climate change given that, ofte , li ate 
change acts mainly through adding new dimensions and complications to sometimes 
lo gsta di g halle ges  (Barros 2014), already present in the disaster-affected regions. 
Hence, these data undoubtedly warrant further investigation to improve DM practices. 
Disaster operations are usually categorized according to the Disaster Operations 
Management (DOM) framework (Altay and Green 2006), which is composed of four 
programmatic phases, as illustrated in Figure 2: 1) mitigation, which includes activities to 
prevent the onset of a disaster or reduce its impact (e.g., risk assessment procedures, 
protection planning); 2) preparedness, which include plans to handle an emergency (e.g., 
personnel training, communication system development, emergency supply stocking); 3) 
response, which is about the implementation of plans, policies and strategies developed in 
the preparedness phase (e.g., to put into action an evacuation plan); and 4) recovery, which 
involves long-term planning actions to bring the life conditions of a community back to 
normality (e.g., debris removal, infrastructure restoration).  
 
Figure 2. Disaster Operations Management (DOM) framework 
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The former two phases focus on pre-disaster issues while the latter two deal with post-
disaster ones. The operations embedded within each one of the DOM phases correspond to 
different actions to be taken and, more specifically, to different levels of decision-making: 
strategic (i.e., set in the long-term), tactical (i.e., set in the medium-term), and operational 
(i.e., set in the short-term) decisions. Table 1 provides a more detailed explanation of DOM 
from a decision-making perspective. 
 
Table 1. Decision-making levels and DOM phases 







































Specifically, on the rows, the three different decision-making levels are depicted (i.e., 
strategic, tactical, and operational) while, on the columns, the four different DOM phases 
(i.e., mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) are considered. Despite examples 
are provided for each possible combination (decision-making level, DOM phase), it has to be 
clear that DM operations are extremely interrelated. For example, the zoning procedure 
(strategic, mitigation) is propaedeutic to shelter opening (tactical, response) and evacuation 
routing (operational, response).  
This thesis aims at improving specific operations belonging to the mitigation and response 
phases of the DOM, which are infrastructure protection and evacuation planning, 
respectively, as it is described in a more in-depth way in the next section (Section 1.2). On 
one side, infrastructure protection investment planning aims at mitigating disastrous 
circumstances, including climate change-driven ones, and eventually, make infrastructures 
more resilient to withstand disruptive events. On the other side, evacuation planning aims 
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at responding to calamitous circumstances so as to improve 1community resilience after the 
occurrence of a disaster. Hence, this research activity is in line with the philosophy 
underpinning the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which is to promote and to 
progress towards the achievement of sustainable development for all the communities 
around the world. In particular, this thesis proposes research which can contribute to the 
implementation of three out of the seventeen United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which are illustrated in Figure 3: SDG 9 (industry, innovation, and 
infrastructure); SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities); and SDG 13 (climate action). 
Specifically, this dissertation touches upon lines of research dealing with infrastructure-
based systems such as communication and transportation networks (SDG 9) which can be 
potentially affected by either man-made or climate-prompted disasters (such as floods). The 
contribution of this dissertation is to provide mathematical tools to mitigate the effects of 
such disastrous circumstances (SDG 13) through approaches aimed at increasing systems 
resilience (e.g., network design, disruptive scenarios evaluation) so as to make them more 
sustainable (SDG 11) while hedging against disruptions. 
 
Figure 3. United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations) 
                                                          
1The IFRC defi es esilie e as the a ility of i di iduals, o u ities, o ga izatio s o  
countries exposed to disasters, crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, prepare 
for, reduce the impact of, cope with and recover from the effects of shocks and stresses 
without compromising their long-te  p ospe ts  IFRC F a e o k fo  Co u ity 
Resilience 2014).  
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1.2 Research topics 
This thesis deals with operations belonging to the mitigation and response phases of the 
DOM. In particular, on the mitigation side, the attention is devoted to the protection of 
Critical Information Infrastructures (CII), which are a specific category of Critical 
Infrastructures (CI).  On the response side, the focus is on two key evacuation planning 
operations, which are shelter location and evacuation of endangered populations. The 
motivations underpinning the need to investigate these specific topics are the following: 
- Over time, various optimization models tackling Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(CIP) issues have been developed. These models, which are multi-level programs, 
have been designed for CI such as: supply chains (Scaparra and Church 2008); 
transportation systems (Cappanera and Scaparra 2011), including railway systems 
(Scaparra, Starita and Sterle 2015); and utility networks, such as electricity (Brown, 
Carlyle, Salmeron and Wood 2006) and water supply (Jiang and Liu 2018) systems. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, no multi-level program has been yet 
proposed to tackle Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP).  
- Over the years, optimization has tried to capture some of the issues related to DM 
problems, including the ones within the specific context of shelter location and 
evacuation routing. Traditionally, these problems have been addressed separately 
and only recently researchers have started to propose combined models. However, 
despite these first attempts, the optimization models that have been proposed are 
still far from being fully comprehensive and, most importantly, their application in 
the real world is still scarce (Van Wassenhove and Besiou 2013; Pedraza-Martinez 
and Van Wassenhove 2016).  
To redress these two gaps in the literature, some background information on these two 
topics, i.e., CIIP as well as shelter location and evacuation routing, is provided in Sections 
1.2.1 and 1.2.2, respectively. 
1.2.1 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
Critical Infrastructures are those physical and virtual assets, networks and systems whose 
disruption would have a debilitating impact on vital societal functions, thus affecting a 
atio ’s se u ity, e o o y, a d pu li  health a d safety (Nickolov 2006). The nature of these 
infrastructures, along with the potential threats arising from disasters, whether nature-
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based or man-made, has prompted a significant amount of research into what is referred to 
as Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
This thesis focuses on a specific category of CI, namely the Critical Information 
Infrastructures, and reviews recent developments in the optimization field aimed at 
addressing Critical Information Infrastructure Protection issues. CIIP is defined as those plans 
and strategies developed by network operators, infrastructure owners and others, aimed at 
keeping the service level of CII above a pre-determined threshold, despite the occurrence of 
disruptive events of various natures (Suter and Brunner 2008). CII, such as the public 
telephone network, Internet, terrestrial and satellite wireless networks (Patterson and 
Personick 2003), are those systems, belonging to the information and communications 
technology (ICT), whose correct functioning is fundamental not only for the services they 
provide but also for other kinds of CI which either rely or are based on them. Examples of CII 
are backbone networks that ensure connectivity among distributed systems in order to allow 
remote monitoring, access control, data sharing as well as payment services. Network nodes 
are either servers, routers or switches whose main tasks are to regulate network traffic and 
manage data transmission over the network arcs. Network components (i.e., nodes and arcs) 
are prone to either physical or cyber-attacks.  
It is clear that CII are key elements in production and service systems. Even a local failure 
at the single CII level (e.g., shut down servers, interrupted cable connections, etc.) may 
prompt far-reaching adverse effects on the CI relying on it. Bigger disruptions may have even 
more catastrophic cascading consequences. For example, the 2001 World Trade Center 
attacks crippled communications by destroying telephone and Internet lines, electric circuits 
and cellular towers (G u esi , O’Kelly a d Mu ay , Murray 2013). This caused a cascade 
of disruptions at all levels, from fuel shortages, to transportation and financial services 
interruptions. Kwasinski (2011) reports the catastrophic effects that some notable natural 
disasters have produced on communication networks. For example, the storm surge of 
Hurricane Katrina of 2005 halted 2.5 million of conventional public switched telephone 
network (PSTN) lines which, eventually, led to loss of service in wireless networks due to 
system interdependency. Another example is the Great East Japan earthquake of 2011 as 
well as the resulting tsunami. In fact, the occurrence of this calamitous event affected all the 
CI in the country: 1.5 million households were reported not to have access to their water 
supply, 4.4 million households were left without electricity, nuclear power plants were 
affected by explosions and radioactive leakage, all railway services were suspended, and 
communications were interrupted. In particular, 1.5 million PSTN lines were not able to 
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provide service due to power outages as well as severed transmission links, in fact, the 
tsunami destroyed many bridges where the fibre optic transmission cables were installed 
(Kwasinski 2011). These events claim that more research is needed towards CIIP. 
1.2.2 Shelter location and evacuation routing 
Diverse types of disasters require a different evacuation process. For example, hurricanes 
and wildfires allow for preventive evacuation while earthquakes and floods demand 
immediate evacuation. Inefficient evacuation plans can have severe consequences such as 
life losses, or evacuees suffering from psychological harm and feeling resentment towards 
governmental organizations (Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster 
2014).  
This thesis focuses on shelter location and evacuation routing operations, which lie on 
the boundary between disaster preparedness and disaster response. The specific DOM phase 
these operations fit into may differ, as highlighted by Gama, Santos and Scaparra (2016), also 
depending on the type of disaster. However, in line with the framework proposed by Altay 
and Green (2006), it is assumed that shelter opening and evacuation routing are disaster 
response operations. 
A shelter is a facility where people belonging to a community hit by a disaster are provided 
with different kinds of services (e.g., medical assistance, food). The role of a shelter is 
fundamental for two categories of people: those who are unable to make arrangements to 
other safe places (e.g., family or friends are too far), and those who belong to special-needs 
populations. These include transit-dependent and vulnerable people, such as those ith 
disabilities, the elderly, the medically homebound, and poor or immigrants who are 
depe de t o  t a sit fo  t a spo t  (Transportation Research Board 2008, p. 52). London 
Resilience Team (2014) identifies three types of shelters: Emergency Evacuation Centres 
(EEC), Short Term Shelters (STS), and Emergency Rest Centres (ERC).  These three types of 
shelters differ in terms of size, services provided to the evacuees and opening times. An EEC 
offers immediate, basic shelter to a large number of people for a maximum staying of about 
12 hours; services at an EEC include basic sanitation and drinkable water, but exclude beds 
and food. An STS can accommodate evacuees coming from either an EEC or who need to be 
directed to an ERC or an alternative safe destination; in addition to EEC services, an STS can 
provide also food for up to 48 hours. An ERC provides dormitory facilities, on top of STS 
services, to accommodate those people without any other alternative. An ERC can be kept 
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open up to the transition to the recovery phase or even during that phase, depending on the 
specific circumstances.  
People move towards shelter sites, or alternative safe destinations, when they either face 
or are going to face perilous circumstances. The process of leaving their own houses to seek 
refuge in safe zones goes under the name of evacuation. London Resilience Team (2014) 
identifies three types of evacuation: self-evacuation: individuals move towards safe sites 
(either a shelter or not) autonomously, without receiving any kind of assistance from the 
responder community; assisted evacuation: individuals arrange their own transportation 
towards shelters, but require some advice from public authorities (e.g., directions); 
supported evacuation: special-needs populations (e.g., disabled, elderly) require support 
from emergency services and public authorities to reach some shelter facilities. An 
evacuation process may deploy different transportation modes: this goes under the name of 
multimodal evacuation. For example, under flood circumstances, evacuation may be carried 
out using a combination of land (buses), water (boats) and air (helicopters) transport. Figure 
4 summarizes what has been described in terms of both shelter and evacuation types. 
Therefore, it is paramount to plan for efficient evacuation procedures. 
 
Figure 4. Shelter and evacuation types (London Resilience Team 2014, p. 22) 
 
Despite Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and Shelter Location and 
Evacuation Routing belong to two different DOM phases, mitigation and response, 
respectively, they are extremely intertwined. As an example, a potential failure in 
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(tele-)communication networks could prompt a failure in a Decision Support System (DSS) 
for evacuation planning based on a GIS interface, real-time data evaluation and optimization 
thus affecting disaster response procedures. Another reason why mitigation and response 
operations could also be addressed together is that, during a disaster, the dissemination of 
warning signals and the evacuation itself heavily rely on critical infrastructures (e.g., 
communication and transport systems). Damage to these infrastructures may have direct 
effe ts o  the affe ted populatio s’ a ility to e a uate. He e, odels to e aluate the 
impact of critical infrastructure protection (mitigation) on the evacuation process itself 
(response) could be developed. Obviously, each area shall be investigated as separate first, 
as in this dissertation, prior to put forward the potential integration of these different 
operations. This, eventually, would not only lead to advances in the OR discipline towards 
the challenging and interdisciplinary nature of DM problems but also help to bridge the gap 
between theory and practice. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
The research questions that are posed in this thesis are firstly introduced within the CIIP field 
and, subsequently, within the context of shelter location and evacuation routing operations. 
Research questions emerging in the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection field 
are as follows: 
CIIP.1. What are the most critical elements of a system that, if disrupted, would 
i te upt o  sig ifi a tly deg ade the syste ’s o al fu tioning?  
CIIP.2. How can such an interruption be prevented or mitigated by resource 
allocation plans aimed at hardening system elements?  
CIIP.3. Is it possible and worthwhile to design and establish infrastructures that are 
intrinsically able to resist service failure when a disruptive event occurs?  
 
Research questions emerging in the shelter location and evacuation routing context 
(abbreviated as SLER to categorize the questions) are as follows: 
SLER.1. What are the current challenges emerging in the shelter location and 
evacuation routing field from an optimization-based perspective? 
SLER.2. When planning for efficient evacuation plans: 
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a. How many shelters should be opened and where should they be 
located?  
b. How should self-evacuation be addressed in the planning framework? 
c. How should supported-evacuation be organized in order to assist 
people belonging to sensitive categories (e.g., disabled, elderly)? 
 
1.4 Research contributions 
The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to research on mitigation and response 
operations for DM. In particular, novel optimization models are developed to shed light on 
aspects that have not been fully considered or neglected in the existing literature.  
Research contributions related to the Critical Information Infrastructure Protection arena, 
aimed at answering the research questions that have been detailed in the previous section 
(Section 1.3), are as follows: 
- Optimization models to assess CII survivability are reviewed and summarized in three 
categories: survivability-oriented interdiction models, resource allocation strategy 
models, and survivable design models. The first class of models is aimed at identifying 
interdiction scenarios of CII and quantifying the consequences deriving from 
potential losses of system critical components in terms of ability to provide service. 
The second class of models is aimed at optimizing the allocation of resources (i.e., 
budget) among the components of already existent systems in order to protect 
them. The third class of models is aimed at planning new CII which are able to meet 
survivability criteria when disruptive events occur. This thesis provides a description 
of the seminal models in each of the aforementioned categories thus answering 
questions CIIP.1, CIIP.2, and CIIP.3. In fact: survivability-oriented interdiction models 
allow to identify the most critical components of a system whose disruption would 
compromise its correct functioning (CIIP.1); resource allocation strategy models 
individuate how protection means should be distributed among the components of 
an existing system thus representing a viable tactic to withstand disruptive 
circumstances (CIIP.2); and survivable design models outline how to create a system 
which is intrinsically able to hedge against disastrous events (CIIP.3). Based on the 
analysis, among the three research spheres, resource allocation strategy models for 
CII seems to have been overlooked during the years, while, on the contrary, it has 
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been quite a prolific research area when it comes to other CI (e.g., supply chains, 
transportation systems, and utility networks).  
- Based on the findings of the previous analysis, an attempt at filling the current gap 
in resource allocation strategy models for CII consists in proposing a novel protection 
optimization model, namely the Critical Node Detection Problem with Fortification 
(CNDPF). In this case, system nodes are vulnerable to disruptions however, instead 
of protecting nodes through the installation of security measures (e.g., alarms, 
motion detectors, biometric scanners, badge swipes, access codes, and human and 
electronic surveillance such as Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS) and 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) (Nickolov 2006)) the adopted approach consists in 
altering the infrastructure design by augmenting the network with additional arcs. In 
fact, this type of defense strategy would increase the network redundancy, and its 
resilience to a greater extent, thus allowing the system to maintain a certain level of 
service and withstand disruptive circumstances. This approach is based on the inner 
characteristics of ICT network-based systems. Nodes usually store algorithms, 
databases and network management tools whose failure can severely compromise 
the correct system functioning, while arcs are transmission cables that allow to 
transfer data from a node to another but do not store any sensitive information. 
Hence, additional arcs could alter the configuration of the most critical network 
nodes and permit to preserve a certain level of service despite disaster occurrence. 
More specifically, the problem addressed in this thesis is the following: within a 
limited amount of budgetary resources, a connectivity augmentation problem needs 
to be solved (Eswaran and Tarjan 1976) in order to minimize the negative impact on 
connectivity due to worst-case scenario losses affecting the network nodes. The 
introduction of the CNDPF permits to build a novel model which combines 
survivability assessment, protection strategies, and survivable design, thus providing 
an integrated answer to questions CIIP.1, CIIP.2, and CIIP.3. 
- The CNDPF is modeled through a bi-level program which is solved through a 
decomposition method based on Super Valid Inequalities (SVI) (Wood 1993; 
O’Ha ley a d Chu h ; Losada, “ apa a a d O’Ha ley ; “ta ita a d 
Scaparra 2016) and through a Greedy Constructive and Local Search (GCLS) heuristic. 
Computational results are reported for real communication networks and for 
different levels of both disaster magnitude and protection resources. 
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Research contributions related to the shelter location and evacuation routing arena, 
aimed at answering the research questions that have been detailed in the previous section 
(Section 1.3), are as follows: 
- DM surveys paying specific attention to how operations research, and optimization 
in particular, has contributed to the shelter location and evacuation routing field are 
analyzed and compared. The most recent optimization models combining the 
aforementioned operations are reviewed and, to clarify some ambiguities arising 
from the analysis of existent models and gather additional insights, an ad-hoc 
questionnaire was sent to the authors of these papers and the responses, included 
in this thesis, are critically examined. This process has led to identify the current 
challenges in this research field which are discussed together with further research 
directions, linking the emerging findings with those arising from previous surveys, 
thus answering question SLER.1.  
- Based on the findings of the previous analysis, an attempt at filling some gaps in the 
literature consists in proposing a novel scenario-based flow-location-allocation-
routing model to optimize evacuation planning decisions, including where and how 
many shelters to open and how to route both car-based evacuees (i.e., self-
evacuees) and bus-based evacuees (i.e., supported-evacuees) to them, across 
different network disruption scenarios, namely the Scenario-Indexed Shelter 
Location and Evacuation Routing (SISLER) problem. The definition of this new model 
answers question SLER.2 in each aspect (a, b, and c). In fact, it is clear that shelter 
location, self-evacuation and supported-evacuation are highly interconnected and 
must be addressed simultaneously. In fact, self-evacuees and supported-evacuees 
must share the same resources (e.g., capacitated shelters, evacuation routes, etc.). 
Moreover, the scenarios are used to capture the uncertainty characterizing road 
conditions in the aftermath of a disaster. Although both shelter location and 
evacuation routing operations belong to the disaster response phase, shelters must 
often be set up and equipped with personnel and relief supplies when the disaster 
is still evolving and road conditions are uncertain or subject to changes. Therefore, 
it is paramount to identify shelter locations which are easily accessible in different 





The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of survivability-oriented interdiction, resource allocation 
strategy, and survivable design optimization models for CIIP. It also offers an outlook on how 
multi-level programming has been deployed to develop protection models for CIP, in the 
context of supply chains, transportation systems (e.g., railway infrastructures), and utility 
networks (e.g., electric and water supply), so as to lay the foundations for future work within 
the CIIP field.  
Chapter 3 introduces the Critical Node Detection Problem with Fortification, describes 
the model formulation as well as the solution methodologies that have been developed to 
solve it, which are a SVI decomposition algorithm and a heuristic approach (GCLS), and 
provides computational results on real communication networks. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the emergent challenges of shelter location and evacuation routing 
in optimization by reviewing DM-specific survey papers, discussing optimization models 
tackling shelter location and evacuation routing operations, either separately or in an 
integrated manner, and reporting the results of the critical analysis of existing papers 
combining shelter location and evacuation routing, concurrently with the responses of their 
authors. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the challenges that have been identified, 
leading to a roadmap for future research. 
Chapter 5 presents the Scenario-Indexed Shelter Location and Evacuation Routing 
problem, details the model formulation, and offers experimental results on both testbed 
instances and a realistic case study.  





2 A synthesis of optimization approaches for tackling Critical 
Information Infrastructure survivability 
This chapter discusses several issues emerging in the CIIP field such as: how to identify the 
most critical components of a communication network whose disruption would affect the 
overall system functioning; how to mitigate the consequences of such calamitous events 
through protection strategies; and how to design a system which is intrinsically able to hedge 
against disruptions. This chapter provides a description of the seminal optimization models 
that have been developed to address the aforementioned issues in the general field of CIP. 
Models are grouped in three categories: survivability-oriented interdiction, resource 
allocation strategy, and survivable design models; existing models are reviewed and possible 
extensions are proposed. In fact, some models have already been developed for CII (i.e., 
survivability-interdiction and design models), while others have been adapted from the 
literature on other CI (i.e., resource allocation strategy models). Hence, the main gap 
emerging in the CII field is that CII protection has been quite overlooked which has led to 
review optimization models that have been developed for the protection of other CI. Hence, 
this chapter provides also a survey of the multi-level programs that have been developed for 
protecting supply chains, transportation systems (e.g., railway infrastructures), and utility 
networks (e.g., power and water supply systems), in order to adapt them for CII protection. 
 
2.1 Identifying critical network components: survivability-oriented 
interdiction models 
The identification of critical components in network-based systems can be traced back to a 
few decades ago in the context of transportation infrastructures for military purposes 
(Wollmer 1964). More recently, Church, Scaparra and Middleton (2004) introduced 
optimization models for identifying critical facilities in service and supply systems.  
Interdiction models, as referred to in the literature, identify network components which 
are the most critical, i.e., the ones that, if disrupted, inflict the most serious damage to the 
system. The importance of these kinds of models is easily understandable: they not only shed 
light o  a syste ’s ajo  ul e a ilities, ut also help fo  the asis fo  de elopi g 
protection and/or recovery plans.  
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Interdiction models are driven by specified criteria (also called impact metrics). When 
dealing with CII, such as communication and information networks, the two important 
criteria are network reliability and network survivability. In (Soni, Gupta and Pirkul 1999), 
network reliability is defined as the probability measure that a network functions according 
to a predefined specification; whereas, network survivability is defined as the ability of a 
network to maintain its communication capabilities in the face of equipment failure. 
Moreover, according to Soni, Gupta and Pirkul (1999), it is possible to subdivide network 
survivability into two categories: physical survivability and logical survivability. A network is 
physically survivable if after the physical failure of some nodes or arcs, a path connecting all 
the nodes still exists. Logical survivability is about survivability at higher levels of the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model and assumes that the underlying physical network is 
survivable.   
The focus of this section is on evaluating how dis upti e e e ts i pa t a et o k’s 
physical survivability by identifying its critical components, which can be nodes and/or arcs. 
In the case of communication and information networks, nodes can be switches, multiplexers, 
cross-connects, routers; arcs represent connections among them (Soni, Gupta and Pirkul 
1999; Soni and Pirkul 2002). 
Murray (2013) identifies four metrics to evaluate network physical survivability: maximal 
flow (Wollmer 1964), shortest path (Corley and David 1982), connectivity (Lin et al. 2011; 
Soni, Gupta and Pirkul 1999), and system flow (Myung and Kim 2004; Murray, Matisziw and 
Grubesic 2007). Here an example of an optimization model designed to ascertain the 
survivability of system flow is provided. This model is a variation of the model introduced in 
(Myung and Kim 2004) and later extended and streamlined in (Murray, Matisziw and 
Grubesic 2007). It identifies the r most vital components of a network, i.e., those components 
which, if disrupted, maximize the amount of flow that can no longer be routed over the 
network. In the specific case of CII, the flow represents data and information. In the following, 
this model will be referred to as the Survivability Interdiction Model (SIM).   
2Given a network , , where  is the set of nodes and  is the set of arcs, let � be 
the set of origin nodes, indexed by ; H the set of elements (nodes/arcs) that can be 
disrupted, indexed by ℎ; � the set of destination nodes, indexed by ;  the set of paths, 
                                                          
2 For the sake of clarity, the reader is informed that the mathematical notations hereby 
introduced are for this specific chapter and do not relate with those introduced in other 
chapters of this dissertation. 
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indexed by ;  the set of paths enabling flow between an origin-destination pair − ; �  the set of components belonging to path ;  the flow routed between an o-d pair; and 
 the number of components to be disabled. The decision variables are: ℎ equal to 1 if 
component ℎ is disrupted, 0 otherwise; and �  equal to 1 if flow cannot be routed between 
a pair − , 0 otherwise. The mathematical formulation is: 
  =  ∑ ∑ ���    (1) 
s.t.         ∑ ℎℎ �� �   ∀ �, �,  (2)       ∑ ℎℎ =                                               (3)       ℎ { , }  ∀ h  (4)       � { , } ∀ �, � (5) 
 
The objective function (1) maximizes the total flow disrupted (or interdicted). Constraints 
(2) state that the flow between an −  pair can be considered lost (X = , only if every 
path connecting nodes  and  is affected by the disruption (i.e., at least one of its arc is 
disrupted). Constraint (3) is a typical cardinality constraint which stipulates that exactly  
arcs/nodes are to be disrupted. Finally, constraints (4) and (5) represent the binary 
restrictions on the interdiction and flow variables, respectively. 
The original SIM in (Myung and Kim 2004) only considers arc disruption. It was later 
modified to address node disruption in (Murray, Matisziw and Grubesic 2007). This work also 
presents a variant of SIM which identifies lower bounds to the flow loss caused by the 
disruption of  nodes, thus allowing the assessment of both best-case and worst-case 
scenario losses. This kind of analysis is useful to build the so-called reliability envelope, a 
diagram originally developed in O’Kelly a d Kim 2007) to depict possible outcomes for the 
failure of communication systems. In (Murray, Matisziw and Grubesic 2007), SIM was applied 
to the Abilene network, an Internet-2 backbone with 11 routers and 14 linkages connecting 
US institutions. The analysis shows that the worst-case interdiction of one node (Washington, 
D.C.) can cause a data flow decrease of over 37%; a two-node interdiction scenario 
(Washington, D.C. and Indianapolis) a decrease of over 73%. 
One arguable aspect of existing interdiction models such as SIM is that the number of 
components to be disrupted is fixed to a specific and known value . This assumption is made 
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to capture the possible extents of disruptive events: large values of  mimic large disruptions 
involving the simultaneous loss of several components, while small values are used to model 
minor disruptions (Losada et al. 2012). In practice, it is difficult to anticipate the extent of a 
disruption and therefore select a suitable  value. In addition, the critical components 
identified for a small  value are not necessarily a subset of the critical components identified 
for larger values. Consequently, these models are usually run for several values of  so as to 
identify the most vital components across disruption scenarios of different magnitude 
(Murray, Matisziw and Grubesic 2007).  
Another aspect worth mentioning is that the use of cardinality constraints like (3) is useful 
for identifying worst-case scenario losses caused by natural disasters. However, in case of 
malicious attacks, models must capture the fact that different amount and type of resources 
(e.g., human, financial, etc.) may be needed in a concerted attack to fully disable network 
components and cause maximum damage (Scaparra and Church 2015). F o  a  atta ke ’s 
perspective, in fact, resources may vary significantly according to the target. This is 
particularly true within the context of physical survivability as opposed to logical survivability. 
For example, a physical attack on a relatively small number of major switching centers for 
long-distance telecommunications may require considerably more resources than launching 
a logic denial-of-service attack on the Internet. However, the former type of attack may 
cause much longer lasting damage (Lin, Patterson and Hennessy 2003).  
This aspect can be captured by either replacing (3) with a budget constraint (see (Aksen, 
Piyade and Aras 2010) and (Losada et al. 2012) in the context of distribution systems) or by 
developing models that directly minimize the attacker expenditure to achieve a given level 
of disruption.  Examples of the latter can be found in (Lin et al. 2011). This work presents 
some mixed integer programming models which minimize the cost incurred by an attacker 
to disconnect the network according to different survivability metrics (e.g., degree of 
disconnectivity). These attacker models are then used to assess the robustness of two 
protection resource allocation strategies: a uniform allocation (the defense budget is 
distributed equally among the nodes) and a degree-based allocation (the budget is 
distributed among the nodes proportionally to their degree of connectivity). As it will be 
discussed in the next section, this approach, where protection decisions are not tackled 
explicitly within a mathematical model but are only assessed and/or developed on the basis 




Another aspect that interdiction models must capture is the fact that the outcome of an 
attack is highly uncertain.  When dealing with malicious disruptions, this is a crucial issue as 
attackers, such as terrorists or hackers, aim at allocating their offensive resources so as to 
maximize their probability of success. Clearly, there is a correlation between the amount of 
offensive resources invested and the probability of success of an attack: the more the former, 
the higher the latter. Church and Scaparra (2007a) introduce an interdiction model for 
distribution systems where an interdiction is successful with a given probability and the 
objective is to maximize the expected disruption of an attack on  facilities. Losada et al. 
(2012) further extend this model by assuming that the probability of success of an 
interdiction attempt is dependent on the magnitude/intensity of the disruption. Similar 
extensions could be developed for SIM to assess the survivability of physical networks to 
attacks with uncertain outcomes. 
To summarize, survivability-oriented interdiction models have been reviewed in this 
section. Specifically, SIM identifies the r most vital components of a network which, if 
disrupted, maximize the amount of information flow that can no longer be routed over the 
network. Moreover, a discussion of potential limitations introduced by the assumptions 
underpinning SIM has been provided, together with possible lines of research for variants of 
SIM. For example: (1) usage of either a cardinality-like constraint or budget-like constraint to 
mimic interdiction resources availability based on the disastrous circumstances to be 
addressed: natural disasters and malicious attacks, respectively; (2) do not assume a 
deterministic outcome for an attack but account for uncertainty: the amount of interdiction 
resources to be invested on a specific target shall be linked to the probability of success of 
the interdiction itself. 
 
2.2 Enhancing critical network survivability: resource allocation 
strategy models 
Optimization approaches can be used to improve CII survivability by optimizing investments 
in protection measures. CII protection measures may be divided into three different 
categories: technical (e.g., security administration), management (e.g., security awareness, 
technical training) and operational (e.g., physical security) (see (Viduto et al. 2012)).  The 
interest of this chapter lies in the last category. Examples of physical security measures 
include: alarms, motion detectors, biometric scanners, badge swipes, access codes, and 
human and electronic surveillance, e.g., Perimeter Intruder Detection Systems (PIDS) and 
19 
 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) (Nickolov 2006). In a broader sense, protection strategies 
may include increasing redundancy and diversity (Sterbenz et al. 2010a). Redundancy 
consists in creating one or more copies of the same network element/content and is key to 
tackle random uncorrelated failures. Diversity aims at avoiding components of a system to 
undergo the same kind of failure and is used to tackle correlated failures.  
Although interdiction models like SIM are instrumental for the identification of the most 
critical CII components, protection resource allocation approaches which solely rely on this 
information to prioritize protection investments often result in suboptimal defensive 
strategies (Cappanera and Scaparra 2011;Church and Scaparra 2007). This is due to the fact 
that when a component (e.g., the most critical) is protected, the criticality of the other 
components may change. Protections and interdictions decisions must therefore be 
addressed in an integrated way.  This is typically done by using bi-level optimization programs 
(Dempe 2002). These programs are hierarchical optimization models which emulate the 
game between two players, referred to as leader and follower. In the CIIP context, the leader 
is the network operator or infrastructure owner, who decides which system components to 
protect; the follower represents a saboteur (hacker or terrorist) who tries to inflict maximum 
damage to the system by disabling some of its components. The defender decisions are 
modeled in the upper level program, whereas the lower level program models the attacker 
decisions and, therefore, computes worst-case scenario losses in response to the protection 
strategy identified in the upper level.  
A bi-level program for CIIP is presented below, which embeds SIM in the lower level, and 
is referred to as the Survivability Protection Problem (SPP). In addition to the parameters and 
variables defined in Section 2.1, SPP uses the following notation:  is the total budget 
available for protection; ℎ  is the unit cost for protecting component ℎ; ℎ  is a decision 
variable equal to 1 if component ℎ is protected, 0 otherwise.  
SPP can be formulated as follows: 
    (6) 
s.t.         ∑ ℎ ℎℎ    (7)       ℎ { , }  ∀ h    (8)       =   ∑ ∑ ���    (9) 
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      s.t.   
           (2) - (5)              ℎ − ℎ    ∀ h  (10) 
 
The upper level model identifies which network components to protect given limited 
budgetary resources (7) so as to minimize a function, , which represents the highest 
flow loss (6) resulting from the interdiction of  components. The lower level model is the 
SIM with the additional set of constraints (10) which guarantee that if a component is 
protected, it cannot be attacked. 
Protection models like SPP can be extended in a number of ways. For example, protection 
investments over time could be considered, given that funds for enhancing CI security usually 
become available at different times. An example of bi-level protection model that considers 
dynamic investments can be found in (Starita and Scaparra 2016) within the context of 
transportation infrastructures. Probabilistic extensions of SPP should also be considered, 
where the protection of an element does not completely prevent its interdiction, but may 
reduce its probability of failure. Other issues that should be captured are the uncertainty in 
the number of simultaneous losses of components (see for example Liberatore, Scaparra and 
Daskin 2011a), and the correlation among components failures (Liberatore, Scaparra and 
Daskin 2012).  
Obviously, there are other approaches other than bi-level programming which can be 
used to optimize protection strategies. For example, Viduto et al. (2012) combine a risk 
assessment procedure for the identification of system risks with a multi-objective 
optimization model for the selection of protection countermeasures. To mitigate cyber-
threats, Sawik (2013) uses mixed integer models in conjunction with a conditional value-at-
risk approach to identify optimal protection countermeasure portfolios under different risk 
preferences of the decision maker (risk-adverse vs. risk-neutral).   
To summarize, a potential survivability protection model has been introduced in this 
section. Specifically, SPP is a bi-level program where the defender aims at minimizing the 
negative impact of an attacker, modelled through SIM. Additionally, features to be included 
for potential variants of SPP have been outlined. For example: (1) protection investments 
over time could be considered, given that funds usually become available at different periods 
in time; (2) the protection of an element could not completely prevent its interdiction, but 
21 
 
may reduce its probability of failure; (3) uncertainty in the number of simultaneous losses of 
components and/or correlation among components failures could be addressed.  
 
2.3 Planning survivable networks: design models  
Given the crucial importance of CII to the vast majority of economic activities and services, 
telecommunication and information systems are designed in such a way that they are 
intrinsically survivable, i.e. they satisfy some more or less stringent connectivity criteria. The 
design of survivable network is a well-studied problem in the optimization field. For an early 
survey, the interested reader can refer to (Soni, Gupta and Pirkul 1999). A comprehensive 
review of survivable network design models would be outside the scope of this thesis. To 
provide a complete treatment of survivability related optimization problems, one of the 
earliest and most studied models, namely the Survivable Network Design (SND) model found 
in (Soni and Pirkul 2002), is discussed in the following. 
Given an undirected graph , , where  is the set of nodes and  is the set of 
undirected edges ( , ), each pair of communicating nodes is identified as a commodity  
(being  the set of the commodities), whose origin and destination are labeled as  and 
, respectively. Let  be the design cost of edge ( , , and  the number of node disjoint 
paths required for all the commodities (so the system will be able to face −  failures at 
most). The decision variables are:  equal to 1 if edge ( , ) is included in the design, 0 
otherwise; and �  equal to 1 if commodity  uses edge ( , , 0 otherwise. The formulation 
is the following:  =  ∑ ,    (11) 
s.t.   




The objective function (11) minimizes the cost of the topological network design. 
Constraints (12) guarantee network flow conservation. Constraints (13) and (14) stipulate 
that flow can traverse an edge only if the edge is included in the design. The combined use 
of constraints (12), (13) and (14) enforce the edge-disjoint paths over the network. 
Constraints (15) guarantee that at most one unit of flow can traverse a node that is neither 
a commodity origin nor destination, thus ensuring the correct number of node-disjoint paths 
in the network. Finally, constraints (16) and (17) represent the binary restrictions on the 
variables. 
Many other survivable network design models can be found in the literature which differ 
in terms of underlying network (wired vs. wireless), network topology (e.g., ring, mesh, star, 
line, tree, etc.), connectivity requirements (e.g., edge and/or vertex-connectivity), path-
length restrictions (e.g., hop limits (Orlowski and Wessäly 2006)), cost minimization 
(Orlowski and Wessäly 2005), and dedicated settings (e.g., path protection, link and path 
restoration (Orlowski and Wessäly 2006)).  
Note that recent survivability design models embed interdiction models to ascertain 
components criticality (Smith, Lim and Sudargho 2007; Chen, Cohn and Pinar 2011). Such 
models are able to identify cost-effective CII configurations which are inherently survivable 
without the need to specify the number of disjoint paths required between each pair of 
communicating nodes, like in SND. 
To summarize, the most well-known survivability design model has been introduced in 
this section. Specifically, SND aims at minimizing the total design expenditure. SND, and 
design models in general, are well-established in the literature. However, potential variants 
could be prompted by the need to address different underlying networks (wired vs. wireless), 
network topology (e.g., ring, mesh, star, line, tree, etc.), connectivity requirements (e.g., 
edge and/or vertex-connectivity) and/or path-length restrictions.  
Among the three aforementioned lines of research, the one that has been so far 
overlooked is the development of resource allocation strategy models to tackle CIIP issues. 
In the following section, an overview of the principal bi-level programs is provided and, in 
some specific cases, multi-level programs that have been developed for the protection of 




2.4 Multi-level programming for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Bi-level programming, and multi-level programming more in general, has been widely 
deployed for CIP. Relevant studies are categorized according to the type of underlying CI: 
supply chains, transportation systems (such as railway networks), and utility networks (such 
as power and water supply systems). Eventually, an overview of CII is provided along with 
what makes them different from other kinds of CI. 
2.4.1 Supply chains 
A supply chain system is usually represented by a network whose nodes are grouped into 
two categories: demand points (or customers) and service points (or facilities), where the 
former require a certain amount of either a product or a service that should be supplied by 
the latter. A failure in a supply chain may prompt adverse effects such as inability to satisfy 
customer demands and bring either production or service provision to a halt. Hence, 
protection of supply chains has been investigated in-depth over the years. Bi-level, and multi-
level, programs have accounted for several aspects that can be classified in two main groups: 
interdiction-related features, such as deterministic or stochastic interdiction, full or partial 
disruption, and single or multiple kinds of attacks, and supply chain-related features, such as 
a hierarchical or decentralized structure and facility capacity backups, as described in the 
following. 
Scaparra and Church (2008) propose a bi-level program for the R-Interdiction Median 
problem with Fortification (RIMF), initially introduced as an integer linear program by Church 
and Scaparra (2007).  The aim of the RIMF is to identify the optimal distribution of limited 
resources among existing facilities of a vulnerable system so as to minimize the effect of 
worst-case disruptions arising from the loss of  unprotected facilities. The effect of such 
disruptions is evaluated as the total demand-weighted distance between non-interdicted 
facilities and customers. The RIMF is solved through an Implicit Enumeration (IE) algorithm. 
Aksen, Piyade and Aras (2010) define the Budget Constrained R-Interdiction Median 
problem with Capacity Expansion (BCRIMF-CE). BCRIMF-CE differs from RIMF because of: (1) 
the facility protection cardinality constraint is replaced with a budget constraint; and (2) 
facilities capacity can be expanded, subject to a certain expense, to withstand the aftermath 
of facility interdiction. An IE algorithm, similar to the one proposed in Scaparra and Church 
(2008), is deployed.  
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Liberatore, Scaparra, and Daskin (2011a) and Liberatore and Scaparra (2011b) provide the 
Stochastic R-Interdiction Median Problem with Fortification (S-RIMF) where the defender 
aims at finding the optimal allocation of hardening resources under uncertain circumstances 
regarding the system components to be disrupted. Liberatore, Scaparra, and Daskin (2011a) 
introduce expected cost-based models while Liberatore and Scaparra (2011b) describe 
regret-based models. Liberatore, Scaparra, and Daskin (2011a) reformulate the proposed 
model according to a max-covering formulation and solve it according to a heuristic 
concentration-based approach while Liberatore and Scaparra (2011b) deploy a commercial 
optimization software. 
Losada, “ apa a a d O’Ha ley  define the Fortification and R-Interdiction Median 
problem with facility recovery Time and frequent disruptions (FRIMT). Main assumptions 
underpinning FRIMT are: (1) the same facility can be disrupted more than once during 
different time periods; and (ii) a facility, once interdicted, is fully inoperative only during its 
recovery time. Hence, the allocation of protective resources is twofold: to withstand 
disruptions and to improve system resilience. A Benders decomposition, a SVI decomposition 
approach, and a hybridization of the previous two methods are used to solve the FRIMT 
model. 
Aksen and Aras (2012) extend the BCRIMF-CE by proposing the Bi-level Fixed Charge 
Location Problem (BFCLP), which addresses conjunctively fixed charge facility location, 
interdiction and protection. The authors identify two sets of costs the system planner incurs, 
those prior and those after an interdiction. Two heuristic methods are proposed to solve the 
BFCLP: a Tabu Search (TS) and a Sequential Solution Method (SSM). Aksen, Aras and Piyade 
(2013) propose the Bi-level p-median problem for the Planning and Protection of Critical 
Facilities (BPPCF), similar to the BFCLP, and solve it through an exhaustive search algorithm 
as well as TS and SSM approaches. 
Zhu, Zheng, Zhang, and Cai (2013) formulate a non-linear bi-level mixed-integer program 
to model the R-Interdiction Median problem with Probabilistic protection (RIMP) where it is 
assumed that facilities, once protected, can still be interdicted to a certain extent. The 
authors also propose the RIMP with Multiple Interdictors (RIMP-MI) where it is assumed that 
a facility can be stricken by multiple attackers at the same time. An iterated greedy search 
heuristic is proposed to solve both RIMP and RIMP-MI. 
Aksen, Akca, and Aras (2014) introduce the Bi-level Partial Facility Interdiction Problem 
(BPFIP), which addresses partial interdiction for median-based systems with capacitated 
25 
 
facilities and demand outsourcing. Partial interdiction is modelled through facility capacity 
reduction: if a facility is attacked, it may still be able to serve customers but with reduced 
capacity. A Progressive Grid Search (PGS) and a Multi-start revised Simplex Search heuristic 
(MSS) are deployed to solve the BPFIP.  
Zhang, Zheng, Zhu, and Cai (2014) present the Fortification Median problem for 
disruptions caused by Mixed types of Attacks (FMMA) as a non-linear bi-level program. 
FMMA represents an all-hazards approach because it accounts for different proportions of 
both worst-case and random attacks thus providing a more trustworthy protection scheme. 
The authors solve the FMMA through an extension of the IE algorithm proposed in Scaparra 
and Church (2008). 
Aliakbarian, Dehghanian and Salari (2015) extend the RIMF to hierarchical CI (e.g., oil 
refineries, food warehouses) and solve it with three different methodologies: (i) a Variable 
Neighbourhood Search-based approach (VDNS), (ii) a Simulated Annealing-based approach 
(SA), and (iii) a hybrid version of the aforementioned approaches (SA-VDNS). 
Cheng, Lai, Yang, and Zhu (2016) develop three hybrid heuristics to tackle the RIMF. The 
p oposed f a e o k add esses the leade ’s p o le  ith a etaheu isti  to e hose  
a o g a T“, “A, o  a Ge eti  Algo ith  GA  hile the follo e ’s p o le  is sol ed th ough 
an off-the-shelf optimization software. 
Akbari-Jafarabadi, Tavakkoli-Moghaddam, Mahmoodjanloo, and Rahimi (2017) define 
the Tri-level Facility Location R-Interdiction Median (TFLRIM) problem where the defender 
aim is to minimize the total costs prior to and following an interdiction. A TS and Rain-Fall 
Optimization (RFO) approaches are used to solve the TFLRIM. 
Parajuli, Kuzgunkaya, and Vidyarthi (2017) extend the work of Aksen, Piyade and Aras 
(2010), by introducing a tri-level program which assumes protection through capacity 
backups subject to gradual availability. The model is solved through an extension of the IE 
algorithm of Scaparra and Church (2008).  
Fard and Hajiaghaei-Keshteli (2018) extend the work of Aksen, Akca, and Aras (2014) by 
introducing a non-linear bi-level program to model partial interdiction of supply chain 
systems where the defender has two objectives to pursue: (1) to minimize the cost of 
deploying different defensive schemes, and (2) to minimize the total system cost. The 
authors produce two hybrid metaheuristics to solve the proposed model: the former 
combines Water Wave Optimization (WWO) and a GA while the latter combines a Whale 
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Optimization Algorithm (WHA) and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), which are all 
evolutionary-based solution methods. 
Khanduzi and Maleki (2018) produce a dynamic variant of the RIMF, namely the Multi-
period Interdiction problem with Fortification (MIF). The MIF is solved through an exact 
method (Benders decomposition) and three hybrid metaheuristics (the upper level model is 
solved through three possible population-based algorithms including a GA, a Teaching 
Learning Based Optimization (TLBO) algorithm, or a Dragonfly Algorithm (DA) while the lower 
level model is solved through a commercial optimization software).  
Zhang, Zheng and Cai (2018) propose the R-Interdiction Median problem with 
Fortification for Decentralized supply systems (D-RIMF). The authors devise a bi-level multi-
agent framework where each facility and each customer act as an independent agent. D-
RIMF is solved through both exact (Scaparra and Church (2008)’s IE algo ith  a d heu isti  
approaches (q-round algorithm). 
2.4.2 Transportation systems 
Transportation systems allow the movement of people and goods from an initial origin to a 
final destination. They are deemed to include infrastructures such as railway networks and 
multi-modal systems. Network nodes and arcs mimic train stations and network tracks in 
railway systems, while they represent terminals and connections among them, in multi-
modal systems, respectively. Despite being less investigated than supply chains, various bi-
level as well as multi-level programs have been developed for both railway networks and 
multi-modal systems, as described in the following. 
Cappanera and Scaparra (2011) define a generic tri-level defender-attacker-user model, 
namely the Shortest-Path interdiction Problem with Fortification (SPIF) for shortest-path 
networks. SPIF aims at optimally distributing fortification resources across network arcs so 
to minimize the length of the shortest path connecting a supply and a demand node after 
worst-case disruptions affecting some unprotected network connections. SPIF is solved 
through Scaparra and Church (2008)’s IE algo ith  afte  ollapsi g the i-level attacker-user 
model into a single-level attacker model thus reducing the initial tri-level program to a bi-
level program through dualization. Sadeghi, Seifi and Azizi (2017) provide an extension of the 




A few papers have introduced protection models within the specific domain of railway 
networks protection. For example, Jin, Lu, Sun and Yin (2015) propose a tri-level model 
whose objective is to fortify vulnerable train stations so as to minimize the travel delay 
resulting from targeted attacks while assigning railway system users to alternative accessible 
paths. The authors account for several offensive strategies differing for their intensity and 
model a multiple origin-destination commuter flow. The proposed model is solved through 
a nested variable neighbourhood search algorithm. 
Scaparra, Starita and Sterle (2015) introduce the Railway Protection Investment problem 
(RPI), a bi-level model whose aim is to identify the allocation of protective resources that 
minimizes the disruption of passenger flow due to worst-case interdictions affecting railway 
system components (i.e., either stations or tracks). The authors solve the RPI through SVI 
decomposition. Starita and Scaparra (2016) extend the RPI by assuming that protective 
resources are available over time thus adding the time perspective to the RPI and defining 
the Dynamic Network Protection (DNP) model. The DNP is solved through Benders 
decomposition and SVI decomposition. Starita and Scaparra (2018) further expand the two 
aforementioned works by introducing the Network Protection Problem with Variable 
Demand Loss (NPVDL), which considers the post-disruption passenger behaviour. Namely, 
the post-disruption passenger demand depends on the travelling times of the available 
alternative paths. The authors solve the NPVDL through an exact (SVI decomposition) and a 
heuristic approach (SA). 
Within the context of multi-modal systems and, more specifically, those addressing a 
combination of rail and truck based transportations, the following contributions have been 
produced. Sarhadi, Tulett and Verma (2015) propose a tri-level model for the protection of 
a rail intermodal terminal network. The objective is to determine the optimal investment 
strategy aimed at fortifying some rail-truck intermodal terminals so to withstand system 
inefficiencies due to targeted attacks. The authors use three different solution techniques to 
solve the proposed optimization model: complete enumeration, Scaparra and Church 
’s IE algo ith , a d a t affi -based heuristic. Sarhadi, Tulett and Verma (2017) extend 
this work by approaching the tri-level model with a two-stage solution method: the IE 
algorithm of Scaparra and Church (2008) is deployed at the first stage to break the tri-level 





2.4.3 Utility networks 
Utility networks account for power and water supply systems. Network nodes and arcs mimic 
generators and buses as well as transmission lines in power supply systems, while they 
represent water storage facilities, treatment plants, and junctions, as well as pumps, valves, 
and pipes in water supply systems, respectively. Several multi-level programs have been 
developed for electric grids, which seem to be the power supply systems whose protection 
has been mostly investigated, while bi-level programming has been deployed only recently 
for water supply system protection, as described in the following. 
Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron and Wood (2006) introduce a generic tri-level defender-
attacker-defender (DAD) model for the protection of electric power grids. The objective is to 
identify the most effective transmission line hardening plan so as to minimize the damages 
resulting from possible outages due to a malicious attacker. The authors solve the model 
with Benders decomposition.  
Yao, Edmunds, Papageorgiou and Alvarez (2007) develop a tri-level DAD model specific 
for power systems protection. The objective is to minimize the power generation costs and 
the level of unmet demand so as to withstand worst-case outages due to an attack on some 
unprotected network components (e.g., power lines, buses, and substations). The tri-level 
model is decomposed into smaller bi-level programs, each of them solved according to the 
set covering decomposition scheme reported in Israeli and Wood (2002). 
Alguacil, Delgadillo and Arroyo (2014) propose another tri-level model for electric grid 
defence planning, based on the same principles of the one of Brown, Carlyle, Salmeron and 
Wood (2006). The tri-level model is collapsed into a bi-level program which is solved through 
the IE algorithm of Scaparra and Church (2008). Yuan, Zhao and Zeng (2014) basically solve 
the same model of Alguacil, Delgadillo and Arroyo (2014), where budget constraints 
substitute cardinality constraints for both defender and attacker decisions, through a 
Column-and-Constraint-Generation (C&CG) algorithm. Wu and Conejo (2017) solve the 
model of Alguacil, Delgadillo and Arroyo (2014) through Benders decomposition with primal 
uts a d o pa e the esults ith the appli atio  of “ apa a a d Chu h ’s IE 
algorithm. Xiang and Wang (2018) extend Alguacil, Delgadillo and Arroyo (2014)’s t i-level 
model by defining the Multiple-Attack-Scenario (MAS) DAD model. The MAS accounts for 
multiple offensive circumstances that are mimicked through multiple attacker scenarios 
which are represented through many middle-levels of the tri-level program. The model is 
solved through a C&CG algorithm. 
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Fang and Sansavini (2017) propose a novel tri-level model for electric systems protection 
that, differently from the previous contributions that are focused on power system defence 
planning, combines transmission expansion planning and transmission switching. 
Transmission expansion planning deals with the installation of additional network 
components while transmission switching consists in changing the system topology by 
switching either on or off some pre-existing system components. Hence, both transmission 
expansion planning and transmission switching perform network design operations. 
However, the former installs new components while the latter rearranges pre-existing ones. 
The aim of the model is to minimize the total investment cost, accounting for both 
transmission expansion planning and transmission switching measures, together with the 
system performance level so to withstand the aftermath of worst-case targeted attacks on 
the power network. The authors solve the proposed tri-level model through a cutting plane 
strategy based on primal cuts. 
On the other side, Jiang and Liu (2018) are the first to propose a bi-level program to 
address water supply network protection. The authors introduce a multi-objective defender-
attacker model where the defender aims at maximizing the expected network satisfaction 
rate along with the protection investments while the attacker aims at minimizing the 
expected network performance as well as the offensive resource expenditure. The authors 
solve the proposed model through a three step algorithm which comprises the deployment 
of different solution techniques: a nested heuristic GA, a heuristic GA, and a minimax regret 
approach. 
2.4.4 Critical Information Infrastructures 
Critical Information Infrastructures, such as the public telephone network, Internet, 
terrestrial and satellite wireless networks (Patterson and Personick 2003), are those systems, 
belonging to the information and communications technology (ICT), whose correct 
functioning is fundamental not only for the services they provide but also for other kinds of 
CI which either rely or are based on them. Examples of CII are backbone networks that ensure 
connectivity among distributed systems in order to allow remote monitoring, access control, 
data sharing as well as payment services. Network nodes are either servers, routers or 
switches whose main tasks are to regulate network traffic and manage data transmission 
over the network arcs. Network components (i.e., nodes and arcs) are prone to either 
physical or cyber-attacks.  
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However, the above features, make CII different from other CI thus requiring a novel bi-
level program addressing them. Firstly, in case of supply chains, transportation 
infrastructures and utility networks, interdiction targets are also protection targets, e.g., if a 
node is to be attacked, the protection strategy will entail to fortify the node so as to make it 
less vulnerable and eventually hedge against the interdictor strategy. Differently, in the case 
of CII, given that nodes are more sensitive targets than arcs, it would be more sensible to 
deploy as a protection strategy the construction of additional connections so as to mitigate 
the loss of some nodes by increasing system redundancy and maintaining its functioning. The 
choice of the aforementioned protection strategy is also linked to the impact of disruptions. 
In fact, once a communication network has been severely damaged without the chance to 
keep its service, this may have not just an immediate negative effect but also a far-reaching 
adverse one due to the inoperability of other infrastructures (such as utility networks, 
dispatching framework of supply chain systems) linked to it, thus requiring longer recovery 
times and leading to large economical losses. Differently, the set-up of a protection strategy 
based on design will increase system resilience and redundancy thus allowing to mitigate 
negative crippling effects. Secondly, from a modelling perspective, typical objective functions 
for other CI involve system flow (e.g., flow of goods for supply chain systems, passenger flow 
for transportation infrastructures, power units for utility networks) while, despite 
information flows are routed over CII networks, the main objective would be to keep the 
network (and its components) connected the most so as to allow information to circulate. 
Hence, CII are different from other CI thus requiring a specific protection framework to 
account for their protection. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the research activities conducted over recent years in the general field 
of CIP aimed at mitigating the effects of physical attacks against CII components from an 
optimization-based perspective. This chapter has investigated three main lines of research: 
survivability assessment models, resource allocation strategy models, and survivable design 
models. Each model category has been designed to identify different crucial aspects: under 
what circumstances the infrastructure is still able to provide its service; how resources should 
be allocated in order to protect the infrastructure; and how a new infrastructure should be 
designed in order to be naturally survivable.  
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The survivability optimization models discussed in this paper are basic models that can 
be extended in a number of ways. For example, interdiction and protection models could be 
extended to tackle both physical and logical survivability issues by incorporating routing and 
link capacity assignment decisions. In addition, most of the optimization models developed 
so far are deterministic. However, failures and disruptions are random events, often difficult 
to predict. The probabilistic behaviour of complex CII under disruptions would be better 
modelled by using stochastic models, including uncertain parameters (e.g., uncertainty on 
arc/node availability, extent of a disruption, etc.). Alternatively, the uncertainty 
characterizing disruptions could be captured in scenario-based models which incorporate 
robustness measures for the identification of solutions which perform well across different 
disruption scenarios.  Future models could even combine the optimization of protection and 
restoration strategies in a unified framework so as to distribute resources efficiently across 
the different stages of the disaster management cycle (protection plans belong to the pre-
disaster stage while recovery plans refer to the post-disaster stage). Other resource 
allocation models could consider identifying trade-off investments in physical protection and 
cyber-security to mitigate the impact of both physical and logical attacks. Models which 
address design and protection issues conjunctively also deserve further investigation. The 
models discussed in this paper have been solved by using a variety of optimization algorithms, 
including exact methods (e.g., decomposition) and heuristics (e.g., evolutionary algorithms). 
Obviously, the development of more complex models would necessarily require additional 
research into the development of more sophisticated solution techniques, possibly 
integrating exact and heuristic methodologies.  
Some models were already present in the CIIP literature (i.e., survivability-oriented 
interdiction and survivable design models) while others have been adapted from application 
to other CI (i.e., resource allocation strategy models). In particular, what emerged is that the 
development of protection models for CII has been so far overlooked. This has prompted to 
review what has been done for the protection of other CI (e.g., supply chains, transportation 
systems, and utility networks), which has laid the foundation for the novel bi-level program 




3. Optimizing resource allocation investments for Critical 
Information Infrastructure Protection: a connectivity 
augmentation-based approach 
This chapter presents a novel linear bi-level program for the protection of CII, which 
integrates network survivability assessment, resource allocation strategies and design 
operations, namely the Critical Node Detection Problem with Fortification. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first bi-level program devised to tackle CII protection issues. The model 
is solved through a SVI decomposition approach and a heuristic approach (GCLS). 
Computational results are reported for real communication networks and for different levels 
of both disaster magnitude and protection resources. 
 
3.1 The Critical Node Detection Problem with Fortification 
Information infrastructure security can be improved through the optimal allocation of 
protective resources among system components. To mitigate the risk of disruption, 
infrastructure elements whose failure would worsen the system functioning the most are to 
be identified and protection measures are to be implemented. Examples of protection 
measures are efficient investment of resources to either fortify the system most critical 
components or entail network design operations aimed at increasing system redundancy (as 
in this work). 
Various approaches towards the identification of the most critical components of a 
system have been developed over the years. Starita, Esposito Amideo and Scaparra (2018) 
describe and compare two different methods: vulnerability metrics and interdiction models. 
Vulnerability metrics are indices that provide a criticality ranking of all the system 
components prior to the occurrence of an attack. Examples are robustness metrics, which 
Rueda, Calle and Marzo (2017) classify in three main categories: (1) structural measures, such 
as average nodal degree and vertex (edge) connectivity; (2) centrality measures, such as 
node degree and node betweenness; and (3) functional measures, such as elasticity and 
endurance. On the other side, interdiction models, as described in Section 2.1, are 
mathematical programs that optimally identify those network elements whose unavailability 
would disrupt the system the most. Interdiction models account for the existing 
interdependency among system components under different disastrous circumstances, an 
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aspect that is entirely neglected by a vulnerability metric-based approach, eventually 
yielding more accurate results. Interdiction models have been largely used for network 
problems (e.g., shortest path (Wollmer 1964; Wood 1993), maximal flow problems (Myung 
and Kim 2004), and location problems (e.g., median and covering (Church, Scaparra and 
Middleton 2004)). 
The identification of network criticalities is a prerequisite for the definition of optimal 
protection strategies. To this end, either a sequential or an integrated approach can be 
adopted. A sequential approach is composed of two stages: network criticalities are 
identified at the former stage, through either vulnerability metrics or interdiction models, 
and the results are used to prioritize the allocation of protective resources. This approach 
has been proven to lead to sub-optimal protection decisions because it fails to capture the 
changes in the component criticality when some components are protected over others 
(Cappanera and Scaparra 2011). This pitfall can be overcome with the adoption of an 
integrated approach that deploys bi-level optimization models. Bi-level programs (Dempe 
2002), also known as defender-attacker models, mimic a game between two players: a 
defender (e.g., the infrastructure owner) and an attacker (e.g., a terrorist, a hacker, or a 
disaster). The upper level program models the defender decisions who aims at optimally 
distributing protective resources over the network while minimizing the impact of worst-
case disruptions due to the attacker. The lower level program models the attacker actions 
whose target is to maximize the damage inflicted on the network. Hence, bi-level programs 
entail a series of subsequent defense/attack moves that allow to model the dynamic 
interaction of different players. 
3.1.1 Model assumptions 
The CNDPF problem is formulated as a bi-level linear mixed-integer program. The 
assumptions underpinning the model are as follows. 
1. A limited budget is available to protect the network; similarly, interdiction resources 
are also assumed to be limited. The reason being that, from a practical perspective, 
the defender is the network operator who has to strategically allocate a portion of 
its finances to invest in infrastructure protection while the attacker is a malicious 
individual who can affect the network through limited opportunities. In fact, if either 
the attacker or the defender had unlimited resources, the problem under analysis 
could not be posed given that either the network would be fully unavailable (i.e., 
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attacker with unlimited resources) or the network would be immune to attacks (i.e., 
defender with unlimited budget). 
2. Only network nodes can be disrupted and, as such, become inoperative; however, 
all the arcs that are incident in an interdicted node are considered to become 
inoperative as well and, as such, are removed from the network. Specifically, in the 
case of CII, network nodes are either servers, routers or switches whose main tasks 
are to regulate network traffic and manage data transmission while network arcs are 
mere connection among nodes. Hence, network nodes store critical information thus 
making them more prone to attacks than arcs. Also, when a node becomes 
inoperable, it means that at least one of the terminal points of the corresponding arc 
is not functioning anymore which, eventually, makes the arc unable to fulfill its data 
transmission function. Consequently, if a node is inoperable, incident arcs are 
inoperable as well thus yielding more damage to the infrastructure. 
3. Protection measures consist in building additional arcs to mitigate worst-case 
scenario losses of network nodes, the reason being to aim to increase system 
redundancy despite potential malicious attacks so as to keep the functioning 
standard of the infrastructure as high as possible. 
4. The amount of resources needed to disrupt network nodes as well as installing 
additional arcs is known. 
5. The upper level objective is to maximize the lowest network connectivity, resulting 
from worst-case scenario disruptions of network nodes modeled at the lower level, 
through the installation of additional arcs within a limited budget. 
3.1.2 Model formulation 
3The bi-level program for CNDPF deploys the following notation. 
 
Sets, indices and parameters , : connected network 
: set of network nodes, indexed by , , or  
: set of network arcs 
                                                          
3 For the sake of clarity, the reader is informed that the mathematical notations hereby 
introduced are for this specific chapter and do not relate with those introduced in other 
chapters of this dissertation. 
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̅: set of potential arcs (i.e., all the possible arcs ,  such that ,  ≠ , , ) to 
be added for protection , , : indices used for nodes 
: amount of disruption resources available 
: amount of protection resources available 
: amount of resources needed to disrupt node  
: amount of resources needed to install arc , ̅ 
 
Decision variables 
: 1 if node  is disrupted, 0 otherwise 
: 1 if arc , ̅ is installed, 0 otherwise 
: 1 if there is connectivity between nodes  and , 0 otherwise 
 
CNDPF is formulated as follows: 
 
[CNDPF]  �   (18) 
                s.t.   
 
                      ∑ , ̅    (19) 
                      { , }  ∀ , ̅ (20) 
                      where � =  ∑ ∑   (21) 
                      s.t.  
  
                                 + +   ∀ ,  (22) 
                                 + −   ∀ , ,  (23) 
                                 ∑    (24) 
                                 + + − −   ∀ , ̅ (25) 
                                 { , }  ∀  (26) 
                                 { , }  ∀ ,  (27) 
 
The upper level model aims at protecting the network through the installation of 
additional arcs within a limited budget (19) so as to maximize (18) a function, � , which 
represents the lowest network connectivity (21) resulting from node disruptions (24). 
Constraints (20) are binary restrictions on the protection variables. Constraints (22) state 
that, for each arc , , nodes  and  must be connected ( = ) unless either  or  are 
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disrupted ( = = ). Constraints (23) guarantee that if nodes  and  as well as nodes 
 and  are connected ( = = ), then nodes   and  must also be connected 
( = ). Constraints (24) state that nodes can be disrupted within limited interdiction 
resources equal to . Constraints (25) connect the upper and lower level variables. 
Specifically, if a link is installed between nodes  and  ( = ), then  and  must be 
connected ( = ) unless either  or  are interdicted ( = = ). Finally, constraints 
(26) and (27) are binary restrictions on the interdiction and connectivity variables, 
respectively. 
Note that the lower level model is a variant of the CNP (Arulselvan et al. 2009) with a 
change to the circular constraints thereby defined, resulting in the new set of constraints (23) 
and the addition of constraints (25) that link the upper and the lower levels of the program. 
In fact, CNP can only be used for undirected network, while CNDPF is more general given 
that, real communication networks, based on the type of data transmission, are either 
undirected or directed. More specifically, given a transportation line, if information flows in 
both directions a full-duplex scheme is deployed, thus modeled as an undirected network, 
while if information is allowed through only one direction, a half-duplex scheme is used, thus 
modeled as a directed network (Fertin and Raspaud 1998).   
 
3.2 Solution Methodology 
Several solution techniques, either exact or heuristic, have been developed over the years to 
solve bi-level programs; some examples are provided as follows.  
Depending on the type of decisional variables (e.g., continuous, integer, binary), different 
exact methods can be deployed. If none of the lower level variables are constrained to be 
integer, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions can be applied: in fact, in such case, the lower 
level model is dualized thus providing a single model to be solved (Bard 1998). However, 
when variables are constrained to be binary, IE algorithms and decomposition methods, such 
as Benders decomposition (Benders 1962) and SVI decomposition (Israeli and Wood 2002), 
are to be deployed. As emerges in Section 2.4, among the ten bi-level programs solved 
through exact methods, an IE algorithm (Scaparra and Church 2008; Aksen, Piyade and Aras 
2010; Zhang, Zheng, Zhu, and Cai 2014; Zhang, Zheng and Cai 2018); a SVI decomposition 
approach (Losada, “ apa a a d O’Ha ley 2012; Scaparra, Starita and Sterle 2015; Starita and 
Scaparra 2016; Starita and Scaparra 2018); Benders decomposition (Losada, Scaparra and 
O’Ha ley 2012; Starita and Scaparra 2016; Khanduzi and Maleki 2018); and a PGS method 
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(Aksen, Akca, and Aras 2014) were used. This shows that IE algorithms and SVI 
decomposition have been quite deployed over time. 
Section 2.4 allowed also to appreciate a variety of heuristic approaches that have been 
devised to solve bi-level programs. These include: iterated greedy search (Zhu, Zheng, Zhang, 
and Cai 2013); MSS (Aksen, Akca, and Aras 2014); SSM (Aksen and Aras 2012; Aksen, Aras 
and Piyade 2013); metaheuristics such as SA (Aliakbarian, Dehghanian and Salari 2015; Cheng, 
Lai, Yang, and Zhu 2016; Starita and Scaparra 2018), TS (Aksen and Aras 2012; Aksen, Aras 
and Piyade 2013; Cheng, Lai, Yang, and Zhu 2016), and VNS (Aliakbarian, Dehghanian and 
Salari 2015); and evolutionary algorithms, such as DA (Khanduzi and Maleki 2018), GA (Cheng, 
Lai, Yang, and Zhu 2016; Fard and Hajiaghaei-Keshteli 2018; Jiang and Liu 201; Khanduzi and 
Maleki 2018), PSO (Fard and Hajiaghaei-Keshteli 2018), TLBO (Khanduzi and Maleki 2018), 
WHA (Fard and Hajiaghaei-Keshteli 2018), and WWO (Fard and Hajiaghaei-Keshteli 2018).  
Based on the literature findings and the structure of the CNDPF, two solution approaches, 
both exact and heuristic, are proposed to solve model (18) – (27): a SVI decomposition 
algorithm and a heuristic approach (GCLS) composed of two phases (i.e., a greedy 
constructive search and a local search), which are described in the following. 
3.2.1 SVI decomposition algorithm for the CNDPF 
The proposed SVI algorithm is a decomposition approach (Israeli and Wood 2002). Similarly 
to standard Benders decomposition approaches, SVI algorithms partition the initial bi-level 
program into an upper level and a lower level problems, usually named the Relaxed Master 
Problem (RMP) and the Sub-Problem (SP), respectively. Once the RMP and SP for the specific 
problem under consideration have been formulated, both problems are solved sequentially 
at each iteration. The solutions obtained from SP are then used to generate SVIs, which are 
subsequently appended to the RMP to be re-solved. 
The main difference between Benders and SVI decomposition methods is that the RMP 
of the latter is a feasibility seeking problem. Hence, as stated by Losada, Scaparra and 
O’Ha ley ), Benders decomposition algorithms usually require a relatively small 
number of iterations that are quite computationally expensive. Differently, SVI 
decomposition algorithms usually require a more significant number of iterations that are 
less computationally expensive. However, the SVI decomposition method has proven to 
perform better than the Benders when solving bi-level programs O’Ha ley a d Church 2011; 
Losada, “ apa a a d O’Ha ley ; “ta ita a d “ apa a . Therefore, despite both SVI 
and Benders decomposition have been quite used for solving bi-level programs, as stated in 
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the preface to this section, the performance aspect has led to prefer SVI over Benders for 
the CNDPF.  
 
The SVI decomposition algorithm for CNDPF is now described in terms of RMP, SP, and 
SVIs. The RMP is a feasibility seeking problem (i.e., there is no objective function), which is 
composed of a set of SVIs and constraints (19) and (20). At each iteration, RMP returns a 
feasible protection strategy �̂. Subsequently, SP is solved to obtain the best interdiction plan ̂  in correspondence of �̂. Hence, SP corresponds to the lower level [CNDPF] where the 
protection variables have been fixed. We name it AP and formulate it as follows: 
 
[AP(�̂)] � = ∑ ∑   (28) 
              s.t.    
 
 
                      + + − − ̂   ∀ , ̅ (29) 
                      (22) – (24); (26) – (27)   
 
AP yields a feasible solution �̂, ̂, ̂  and a lower bound ( �̂) to CNDPF. The obtained ̂ and ̂ is then deployed to generate SVIs that are subsequently appended to the RMP. The 
constraints adopted as SVIs are described in the following proposition, where are also proven 
to be supervalid. In particular, an inequality is supervalid if the two following conditions are 
satisfied O’Ha ley a d Chu h : (1) the incumbent solution is infeasible once the 
inequality is appended; and (2) the inequality does not discard any optimal solution unless 
the current incumbent is optimal. 
 
Proposition 1. Given a feasible lower bound  for [CNDPF] and connectivity value ̂ 
following an interdiction, let ̅  be a subset of the potential arcs to be added at iteration  
where each arc , ̅  satisfies the following three conditions at each iteration : (i) = , (ii) = , and (iii) = . Namely, ̅  includes all the arcs with the following 
features: the arc should link nodes that are not already connected (i) and neither the initial 
(ii) nor the terminal (iii) nodes of the arc are disrupted. If ̂ , the following inequality 
is supervalid for RMP     
∑ , ̅    (SVI-1) 
(i.e., at least one arc in ̅  must be added). 
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Proof. At iteration , ∑ , ̅   yields to the selection of one arc , ̅  , , ∗. 
At iteration + , , ∗ o ’t satisfy at least o e of the th ee o ditio s i.e., i  = , 
(ii) = , and (iii) = ). Hence, the current incumbent solution is removed through (SVI-
1), which satisfies the first condition to be supervalid. If the current incumbent solution �,̂ ̂, ̂  is optimal, (SVI-1) is supervalid by default. Let us assume that �,̂ ̂, ̂  with 
objective value ̂  is not optimal and that an optimal solution �̃, ̃, ̃  with objective 
value ̃ >  exists. If no arc , ̅  is added at iteration , ̃ ̂, since no additional 
protection has been provided; hence, ̃ ̂ , which would be a contradiction. Hence, 
this satisfies also the second condition for (SVI-  to e supe alid. □ 
The SVI decomposition algorithm stops when, due to budgetary limitations, the addition 
of further arcs causes the RMP to be unfeasible: this guarantees that the algorithm produces 
a solution in a finite numbers of steps. For completeness, the pseudo-code of the SVI 
decomposition algorithm is reported in Figure 5. 
 
Algorithm1 SVI decomposition algorithm � = −∞, �̂ ← , ��� ←    
    Do 
          Solve ( ̂)   ̂, ̂,  ̂  
                 if < ̂ then 
                    = ̂ and ��� ← �̂ 
                  end if 
             Add (̂, ̂)   
             Solve RMP 
          while              
return ��� ,  
Figure 5. Pseudo-code of the SVI decomposition algorithm 
 
3.2.2 Heuristic approach (GCLS) for the CNDPF  
The Greedy Constructive and Local Search heuristic is composed of two sequential phases: 
(1) a greedy constructive algorithm to obtain a first feasible solution; and (2) a local search 
where the neighbourhood of the current solution is explored in order to enhance the greedy 
constructive procedure and eventually find potential better solutions. In addition to AP(�̂), 
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the heuristic uses DP(�̂, ̂), which is the defender model and computes the system value (i.e., 
connectivity) for a given pair of protection and disruption plans (�̂, ̂). DP(�̂, ̂) is defined as 
follows. 
 
[DP(�̂, ̂)] � = ∑ ∑   (30) 
                  s.t. + ̂ + ̂   ∀ ,  (31) 
                        + ̂ + ̂ − − ̂  ∀ , ̅ (32) 
                        (23); (27)   
 
3.2.2.1 Greedy constructive algorithm 
This phase of GCLS aims at building a first feasible solution. This stage starts by identifying 
the importance of each network node according to the attacker. The importance of node 
, � , is defined as follows  
 � =  
 
where  is the value of the outdegree of node  and  is the amount of resources 
needed to disrupt node . �  is used as a proxy to estimate the likelihood that node  will 
appear in an interdiction plan. Network nodes can then be ordered according to descending 
values of � , thus yielding a criticality ranking of all the network nodes. The choice of the 
outdegree to define a node importance is twofold. Firstly, the degree of a node is a 
connectivity-based metric commonly used to evaluate the centrality (i.e., the importance) of 
a node. Secondly, if we consider a directed network, it is not possible to talk about degree 
but either indegree or outdegree. Hence, given the context of communication infrastructures 
where the importance is to disseminate information, we opted for the outdegree rather than 
the indegree. However, when dealing with undirected networks, we will simply refer to the 
value of the degree.  
To identify a first feasible defense strategy, it is necessary to devise an arc ranking. To this 
end, the following additional notation is introduced: 
-  = index used for network arcs where = , ̅, 
- �̂  = protection plan where only arc ̅ is added, 
- ̂  = disruption plan where only node  is interdicted. 
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Next we define an arc-node matrix whose rows are arcs ̅ and whose columns are 
nodes . The generic element ,  of this matrix is DP(�̂  , ̂ ), which is the value of the 
objective function of DP when arc ̅ is added and node  is interdicted. We then 
introduce a new parameter � , for each arc ̅, defined as follows 
 � = ∑ , ∗ �  | |=  
 
where the numerator is divided by the cost required to install arc ̅ thus representing 
the network connectivity benefit per unit cost. Arcs are then ranked in descending order of �  (in the following we refer to �  as � ).  
 
A first feasible defense strategy can then be constructed. We introduce the following 
additional notation: 
- ̅  = set of non-disrupted nodes at each iteration , defined as \  where  is the 
set of the optimal disrupted nodes obtained by solving AP at each iteration  
- ̅  = set ̅ ordered by descending values of �  
- ̅  = subset of ̅ at iteration  where arcs are ordered by descending values of �  
and ,  is such that , ̅  
- �� = greedy protection plan  
- � = cost of the greedy solution �� 
-  = boolean variable identifying if an arc to build the protection strategy has 
been found 
- � = objective value of AP corresponding to the greedy solution ��, i.e., � = ��  
The greedy constructive (GC) procedure provides a first feasible protection plan by adding 
arcs ranked according to � . The procedure terminates when no more arcs can be added 
without violating the defender budget constraint. The pseudo-code of the GC procedure is 




Algorithm2 GC procedure �� ← ∅, � =          =    
             for , ̅  do 
              � = , � = �+  
                    if     <   
                     =   +    
                    end if   
                    else exit for   
             end for 
       =   
     while  do 
            Solve ��  to get � 
             =   
            for , ̅  do 
                    if    � +     
                    = , � = , � = �+ , � = � 
                           if    =     
                           exit for   
                     end if   
            end for 
      end while 
return ��, �, �  
Figure 6. Pseudo-code of the GC procedure 
 
3.2.2.2 Local search  
This phase of GCLS aims at exploring the neighbourhood of the solution obtained from the 
greedy constructive algorithm. Two swap policies have been identified that define the 
neighbourhood: a one-to-one swap policy (i.e., LS1: for one arc that is removed, only one arc 
is swapped in) and a two-to-two swap policy (i.e., LS2: for two arcs that are removed, only 
two arcs are swapped in). The following additional notation is introduced: 
- ̅ −  = ̅  where  =  −  and  is the last iteration of the greedy constructive 
algorithm 
- ��� = local search protection plan 
-  = cost of the local search protection plan ���. 
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The local search (LS) procedure analyses the arcs that have been added in the current 
solution and tries to swap them out. To reduce the computational effort, only those arcs 
whose �  is below a certain threshold � � are considered for the swap. The pseudo-code 
of the LS procedure implementing the one-to-one swap policy (i.e., LS1) is reported in Figure 
7. 
 
Algorithm3 LS1 ��� ← ��, = �, = �  
     =   
     while  do 
         =  
        for , ̅ −  do 
              ��� ← ��� , =   
              if ==  and � < � �  then 
              = , =  
              , −  
              if    =     
              exit for 
              end if 
         end for 
      end while 
return ��� ,  
Figure 7. Pseudo-code of the LS1 procedure 
 
The routine  that appears in the LS examines all the possible combinations of arcs 
that can be swapped in. Each time a feasible move is identified, the objective value of the 
new corresponding solution is computed, which is accomplished by solving AP. A threshold � , similar to � �, is used to reduce the computational effort. Only those arcs whose �  is higher than �  are considered to be swapped in. The pseudo-codes of the  
procedure is reported in Figure 8. Similarly, the pseudo-code of the LS procedure 
implementing the two-to-two swap policy (i.e., LS2) and the pseudocode of the  




   for , ̅ −  do 
       if ==  and � > �   and +   then 
        =  
         ���  to get  � 
        if � >   then 
        ��� ← ���, = + , = �   
        end if 
        = +   
        , ,   
        end if 
   end for 
Figure 8. Pseudo-code for the swap1 procedure 
 
Algorithm5 LS2 ��� ← ��, = �, = �  
     =    
    while  do 
         =   
        for , ̅ −  do 
             for , ̅ −  do 
                  ��� ← ��� , =   
                  if ==  and � < � �  and ==  and � < � �  then 
                  = , = , =  
                  , − −  
                  if    =     
                  exit for 
                  end if 
              end for 
         end for 
      end while 
return ��� ,  




   for , ̅ −  do 
       for , ̅ −  do 
              if ==  and � > �  and  +  and ==  and � > �           
and +   then 
               =  and =  
                ���  to get  �  
                    if � >   then 
                    ��� ← ��� , = + + , = �   
                    end if 
                = + +   
                , , , ,   
                end if 
         end for 
   end for 
Figure 10. Pseudo-code for the swap2 procedure 
 
3.3 Experimental Results 
In this section, the two solution methodologies (i.e., SVI and GCLS) are tested and compared 
on real telecommunication networks. Two real networks belonging to the Sterbenz et al. 
(2010b) repository, which contains different kinds of real telecommunication networks such 
as national computer, global-scale optical, and international wide-area networks, have been 
considered for experimentation. Table 2 summarizes the main topological properties of the 
selected networks, which are undirected: network name (NETWORK); number of nodes (|N|); 
number of arcs (|A|); minimum, average, and maximum node degree (MINDEG, AVGDEG, 
and MAXDEG, respectively); and minimum, average, and maximum geographical distance 
(MINDIST, AVGDIST, and MAXDIST, respectively) measured in kilometers.  
 
Table 2. Summary of the topological features of the case study networks 
Network |N| |A| MINDIST AVGDIST MAXDIST MINDEG AVGDEG MAXDEG 
HiberniaCanada 10 20 22.2 139 364 1 2 3 




3.3.1 Model parameters settings 
The model parameters are generated as follows: 
1. The amount of resources needed to disrupt node , , depends on its degree, 
. This assumption is based on the fact that the higher the node degree, the 
more important the node itself which, consequently, requires more resources to be 
interdicted (Motter 2004; Yehezkel and Cohen 2012; Lu and Li 2016). Namely, 
network nodes have been classified in three degree-based categories such as low, 
medium, and high importance nodes which, respectively, require 2, 4, and 6 units of 
disruption resources to be fully interdicted. Categories have been identified as 
follows: low importance nodes are those for which [ ; − / [; medium importance nodes are those for 
which [ − / ; + / [; and high 
importance nodes are those for which [ + /; � [. As such,  is a non-decreasing step-function of  . 
2. The amount of resources needed to install arc , ̅, , depends on its length, , . This assumption is because the bigger the distance among nodes, the 
more expensive the installation of the arc connecting them (Kahng, Liu and 
Mǎa doiu . Namely, potential arcs have been classified in three length-based 
categories such as small, medium, and large length arcs which, respectively, require 
2, 4, and 6 units of the defender budget to be installed. Categories have been 
identified as follows: small length arcs are those for which ,[ ; − / [; average length arcs are those for which , [ − / ; + / [;  and large 
length arcs are those for which , [ + /; � [. As such,  is a non-decreasing step-function of , . 
3. The interdictor budget, , is defined as a percentage of , which is the sum of the 
resources needed to disrupt all network nodes (i.e., =  ∑| |= ). Hence, = . In our experiments  assumes the following values: 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 
0.25, and 0.30. To guarantee  integrality, it has been rounded up to the nearest 
integer value. 
4. The defender budget, , is defined as a percentage of , which is the sum of the 
costs of all the arcs that can be potentially installed (i.e., =  ∑ , ̅ ). Hence, =   where  assumes the following values: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05. 
To guarantee  integrality, it has been rounded up to the nearest integer value. 
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3.3.2 Solution methodologies settings 
Both SVI and GCLS approaches are implemented using CPLEX 12.6.2 embedded in a C++ 
program (i.e., CPLEX Callable Libraries deployed through Microsoft Visual Studio Professional 
2012). Experiments have been run on a compute  ith a  I tel® Co e™ i -5200U CPU @ 
2.20GHz and 8.00 GB of RAM. The SVI algorithm uses CPLEX default parameters while the 
GCLS parameters have been chosen empirically after a calibration phase. With reference to 
the greedy construction algorithm, the values of  (i.e., the number of elements to initialize 
the greedy solution �� , which depend on both network size (i.e., | |, | |) and defender 
budget (i.e., ), are chosen as displayed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Values of  for different combination of networks and protection budget 
  Network 
B HiberniaCanada GtsRomania 
0.01 2 2 
0.02 2 4 
0.03 4 4 
0.04 4 6 
0.05 4 8 
 
The settings of the local search parameters are as follows: 
- � =  ⌊ (� ) − � � (� )⌋ ;                                                                                
- � � =  ⌈ (� )⌉. 
 
3.3.3 HiberniaCanada network results 
The HiberniaCanada network is composed of 10 nodes and 20 arcs and connects several 
points between Canada and US. Table 4 shows the names of the locations corresponding to 




Table 4. HiberniaCanada network – Node details 
 
Network node Place 












Figure 11. Hibernia Canada network (adapted from Google Maps) 
 
The SVI algorithm was able to solve all the instances within the given CPU time 
threshold, in particular, given the reduced dimensions of the HiberniaCanada network, 
instances were solved in a matter of a few seconds. Table 5 and Table 6 report the objective 
function values and the CPU time values, respectively, for all the possible combination of  
(i.e., interdiction budget) and  (i.e., protection budget) and for the two solution 
approaches (i.e., SVI decomposition algorithm and GCLS1). Due to the reduced dimensions 





Table 5. HiberniaCanada network results – Objective function values 
Objective Function 
 α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  
α1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 
0.05 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
0.1 36 36 36 36 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
0.15 26 26 26 26 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
0.2 18 18 18 18 30 30 32 32 42 42 42 42 
0.25 14 14 14 14 18 18 22 22 26 26 26 26 
0.3 10 10 10 10 12 12 14 14 16 16 16 16 
AVG 29.33 29.33 29.33 29.33 38.33 38.33 39.67 39.67 42.33 42.33 42.33 42.33 
 
Table 6. HiberniaCanada network results – CPU time values 
CPU Time 
 α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  
α1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 SVI GCLS1 
0.05 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.6 
0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.3 1.4 0.2 1.4 
0.15 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.1 
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.2 2.3 2.3 
0.25 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.0 2.1 2.8 3.7 1.7 4.1 2.7 
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.9 1.8 2.0 2.3 1.7 2.2 2.1 




Several observations can be drawn from the analysis of Table 5. Results are first 
commented based on the outcome of the SVI algorithm. For example, for  = 0.1, when  
rises from 0.01 to 0.02, the value of network connectivity improves by around 56% (from 36 
to 56). Similarly, for  = 0.15, when  increases from 0.01 to 0.02, the value of network 
connectivity improves by around 62% (from 26 to 42). Further examples where, for a fixed 
interdiction budget level, an improvement in network connectivity can be appreciated across 
different levels of protection resources are described as follows: 
- for  = 0.2, the value of network connectivity increases by nearly 67% (from 18 to 
30), 78% (from 18 to 32), and 133% (from 18 to 42) when  rises from 0.01 to 0.02, 
0.03, and 0.04, respectively; 
- for  = 0.25, the value of network connectivity improves by around 29% (from 14 
to 18), 57% (from 14 to 22), and 86% (from 14 to 26) when  rises from 0.01 to 0.02, 
0.03, and 0.04, respectively; 
- for  = 0.3, the value of network connectivity increases by nearly 20% (from 10 to 
12), 40% (from 10 to 14), and 60% (from 10 to 16) when  rises from 0.01 to 0.02, 
0.03, and 0.04, respectively. 
The same results can be appreciated from the application of GCLS1. Further 
observations can be drawn from a computational perspective. From the analysis of Table 6, 
looking at specific single instances, it can be said that SVI and GCLS1 have comparable CPU 
times (i.e., matter of a few seconds) and, in majority of the cases, SVI solve instances to 
optimality faster than GCLS1 however, there are some cases where GCLS1 is faster than SVI.  
 Figure 12 displays the value of network connectivity for each interdiction budget level 
across the different levels of protection resources (results are reported based on the SVI 




Figure 12. HiberniaCanada network results – Network connectivity VS protection resources 
 
Figure 12 allows to appreciate the importance of deploying protection resources to 
increase network connectivity under disruptive circumstances. In fact, in absence of any kind 
of protection (i.e.,  = 0), the higher the interdiction budget level, the higher the loss in 
network connectivity. In particular, network connectivity drops by around 50% (from 72 to 
36), 64% (from 72 to 26), 75% (from 72 to 18), 81% (from 72 to 14), and 86% (from 72 to 10) 
when  raises from 0.05 to 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, and 0.3, respectively. However, it can be 
observed that an investment of 2% of the total protection budget already allows to improve 
network connectivity. In fact, if solutions are compared for  = 0 and  = 0.02, there is an 
increase in network connectivity by around 56% (from 36 to 56), 62% (from 26 to 42), 67% 
(from 18 to 30), 29% (from 14 to 18), and 20% (from 10 to 12) when  is equal to 0.1, 0.15, 
0.2, 0.25, and 0.3, respectively. Further improvements can be appreciated for higher 
amounts of protection resources. 
Overall, in the specific case of the HiberniaCanada network, it can be stated that the SVI 
performs best, in terms of both objective function values and CPU time values however, in 
the absence of this exact method, GCLS1 is able to find the optimal solution for each problem 
instance with CPU times comparable to those of SVI. Hence, GCLS1 seems to be a promising 
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3.3.4 GtsRomania network results 
The GtsRomania network is composed of 19 nodes and 44 arcs and connects several points 
within Romania. Table 7 shows the names of the locations corresponding to each node while 
Figure 13 displays the network itself. 
Table 7. GtsRomania network – Node details 
 
























Figure 13. GtsRomania network (adapted from Google Maps) 
 
The SVI algorithm was not able to solve all the instances within the given CPU time 
threshold set equal to 28800 seconds (i.e., 8 hours), while GCLS1 and GCLS2 were able to 
obtain a solution in fewer time, and in particular, GCLS2 was able to match the solution found 
by SVI in 8 hours in matters of minutes. Given the larger network dimensions, compared to 
those of the HiberniaCanada, an upper bound on the max number of iterations was set for 
both GCLS1 and GCLS2. This upper bound (i.e, MAXITER) has been identified based on 
combinations of  and . Table 8 and Table 9 reports the objective function values and the 
CPU time values, respectively, for all the possible combinations of  and  and for the 
three solution approaches (SVI, GCLS1, and GCLS2), respectively. Given that the GtsRomania 











Table 8. GtsRomania network results – Objective function values 
Objective Function 
 α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  
α1 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 
0.05 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
0.1 112 112 112 210 210 210 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
0.15 50 50 50 116 116 116 182 162 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
0.2 16 16 16 72 72 72 132 110 132 138 134 134 156 156 156 156 156 156 
0.25 8 8 8 24 24 22 42 42 42 58 62 62 72 78 78 76 78 78 
0.3 2 2 2 10 10 10 20 20 20 28 24 28 32 30 32 48 32 32 
AVG 76.7 76.7 76.7 117.3 117.3 117.0 148.0 141.0 148.0 153.0 152.3 153.0 159.0 159.7 160.0 162.3 160.0 160.0 
 
Table 9. GtsRomania network results – CPU time values 
CPU Time 
 α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  α  = .  
α1 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 SVI GCLS1 GCLS2 
0.05 1.1 0.6 0.6 1.5 29.8 81.4 1.0 47.6 272.3 0.8 46.8 15.6 0.9 38.8 16.7 1.1 21.7 24.3 
0.1 1.1 0.7 0.7 67.0 22.2 166.7 46.5 61.4 604.7 10.0 110.7 26.8 9.3 98.9 26.5 11.0 21.7 147.3 
0.15 0.9 0.5 0.5 137.1 35.3 219.3 958.1 30.9 711.6 954.8 107.4 60.0 351.7 108.4 165.8 123.7 36.3 148.4 
0.2 0.8 0.2 0.2 517.5 22.6 273.6 28800* 24.6 406.8 28800* 64.9 806.3 9326.4 67.9 1572.5 905.8 30.5 171.1 
0.25 0.6 0.2 0.2 183.5 39.3 229.8 28800* 53.9 756.8 28800* 38.9 836.6 28800* 43.0 1167.5 28800* 17.3 142.6 
0.3 0.6 0.1 0.1 79.6 18.3 265.6 20236.6 54.3 692.0 28800* 27.6 575.9 28800* 31.1 771.4 28800* 26.5 148.2 
AVG 0.8 0.4 0.4 164.4 27.9 206.1 13140.4 45.4 574.0 14560.9 66.0 386.9 11214.7 64.7 620.1 9773.6 25.7 130.3 
Legend: * = not solved to optimality within the pre-fixed time limit of 28800 seconds
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Several observations can be drawn from the analysis of Table 8. Results are first 
commented based on the outcome of the SVI algorithm. Examples where, for a fixed 
interdiction budget level, an improvement in network connectivity can be appreciated across 
different levels of protection resources are described as follows: 
- for  = 0.1, the value of network connectivity increases by nearly 88% (from 112 to 
210) and 114% (from 112 to 240) when  rises from 0 to 0.01, and 0.02, 
respectively; 
- for  = 0.15, the value of network connectivity improves by around 132% (from 50 
to 116) and 264% (from 50 to 182) when  increases from 0 to 0.01, and 0.02, 
respectively; 
- for  = 0.2, the value of network connectivity increases by nearly 350% (from 16 to 
72), 725% (from 16 to 132), 763% (from 16 to 138), and 875% (from 16 to 156) when 
 rises from 0 to 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, and 0.04, respectively; 
- for  = 0.25, the value of network connectivity improves by around 200% (from 8 
to 24), 425% (from 8 to 42), 625% (from 8 to 58), 800% (from 8 to 72), and 850% 
(from 8 to 76) when  increases from 0 to 0.01 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05, 
respectively; 
- for  = 0.3, the value of network connectivity increases by nearly 400% (from 2 to 
10), 900% (from 2 to 20), 1300% (from 2 to 28), 1500% (from 2 to 32)and 2300% 
(from 2 to 48), when  rises from 0 to 0.01 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05, respectively. 
Slightly different results can be observed from the application of GCLS1 and GCLS2. 
Specifically, GCLS1 is not able to obtain the same objective value returned by SVI in 9 cases 
out of 36 (i.e., for  = 0.02, when  = 0.15 and 0.2; for  = 0.03, when  = 0.2, 0.25 and 
0.3; and for  = 0.04 and 0.05, when  = 0.25 and 0.3), while GCLS2 fails to do so in three 
cases (i.e., for  = 0.01, when  = 0.25; for  = 0.03, when  = 0.2; and for  = 0.05, 
when  = 0.3). Figure 14 displays the value of network connectivity for each interdiction 
budget level across the different levels of protection resources (results are reported based 





Figure 14. GtsRomania network results – Network connectivity VS protection resources 
 
Figure 14 allows to appreciate the importance of deploying protection resources to 
increase network connectivity under disruptive circumstances. In fact, in absence of any kind 
of protection (i.e.,  = 0), the higher the interdiction budget level, the higher the loss in 
network connectivity. In particular, network connectivity drops by around 59% (from 272 to 
112), 82% (from 272 to 50), 94% (from 272 to 16), 97% (from 272 to 8), and 99% (from 272 
to 2) when  raises from 0.05 to 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, and 0.3, respectively. However, it can 
be observed that an investment of 1% of the total protection budget already allows to 
improve network connectivity. In fact, if solutions are compared for  = 0 and  = 0.01, 
there is an increase in network connectivity by around 88% (from 112 to 210), 132% (from 
50 to 116), 350% (from 16 to 72), 200% (from 8 to 24), and 400% (from 2 to 10) when  is 
equal to 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, and 0.3, respectively. Further improvements can be appreciated 
for higher amounts of protection resources. 
From the analysis of Table 9, it seems that GCLS2 performs better than GCLS1. In 
particular, despite fo  si ple i sta es  i.e.,  = 0.05 and 0.10 whichever  is) GCLS2 
finds the same objective function value of SVI but in longer time, when it comes to instances 
that have not been solved to optimality, GCLS2 is able to match the objective function value 
found by SVI in matter of minutes. On the other side, GCLS1 looks inefficient. Although 
sometimes it matches the objective function values by SVI even in shorter time than GCLS2, 
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higher as well as the gap between the obtained solutions (as it can be observed from Table 
8). Figure 15 displays the interdiction budget level-average values of CPU time across 
different level of protection resources for the three solution approaches (these figures are 
explicitly reported in correspondence of row AVG of Table 9).  
 
 
Figure 15. GtsRomania network results – CPU time VS protection resources 
 
Figure 15 reports that, on average, for  = 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, and 0.05, GCLS1 (in orange) 
and GCLS2 (in grey) are faster than SVI (blue), in fact, the three solution methods require: 
45, 574 and 13140.4 seconds when  = 0.02; 66, 386.9, and 14560.9 seconds when  = 
0.03; 64.7, 620.1 and 11241.7 seconds when  = 0.04; and 25.7, 130.3, and 9773.6 seconds 
when  = 0.05, respectively.  
Overall, in the specific case of the GtsRomania network, it can be stated that the SVI 
finds difficulties in closing many instances hence, the need for a heuristic approach is more 
evident. In particular, GCLS2 performs better than GCLS1 in terms of objective function 
values, while the inverse phenomenon can be observed when it comes to computational 
performance. However, based on the obtained results, GCLS2 seems like the most promising 
method to solve larger instances. 
Finally, in order to provide an idea on how, for a fixed interdiction budget level, different 
solutions (in terms of network connectivity, disrupted nodes and added arcs) are obtained 
in correspondence of different amount of protection resources, Figure 16, 17, and 18 report 
the solutions obtained for the GtsRomania network through the application of the SVI 


















Figure 16. GtsRomania network results - CNDPF solution for �  = 0.20 and �  = 0.01 
 
 






Figure 18. GtsRomania network results - CNDPF solution for �  = 0.20 and �  = 0.05 
 
Network nodes and arcs are identified with black round shapes and black straight lines, 
respectively, while network nodes that have been disrupted and arcs that have been added 
are represented by red crossed round shapes and green straight lines, respectively. From the 
combined analysis of Figure 16, 17, and 18, it can be observed that different nodes have been 
disrupted in the three reported solution: 6 and 17 in Figure 16 and 18 while 6, 9 and 19 in 
Figure 17. The disruption of different nodes is paired with different arcs being selected for 
addition: (3,8), (12,13), and (15,16) in Figure 16; (2,3), (3,4), (3,8), (7,8), (8,19), (9,16), and 
(13,14) in Figure 17; and (1,7), (1,8), (2,3), (2,4), (2,5), (2,8), (3,4), (3,7), (3,9), and (3,10) in 
Figure 18. Also, given that more protection resources correspond to more arcs that can be 
added, this has led to appreciate an increase in network connectivity from 72 (α  = 0.20 and α  = 0.01, Figure 16) to 138 (α  = 0.20 and α  = 0.03, Figure 17) to 156 (α  = 0.20 and α  = 
0.05, Figure 18). 
 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced a novel bi-level program (CNDPF) to optimize CII protection by 
integrating network vulnerability assessment, resource allocation strategies and design 
operations. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first bi-level program devised for CIIP. In 






the network connectivity, resulting from worst-case disruptions due to a generic interdictor 
modelled at the lower level, by increasing system redundancy through the installation of 
additional arcs. CNDPF differs significantly from bi-level programs that have been developed 
for other kinds of CI. As a matter of fact, different infrastructures yield to different targets to 
be considered. For example, while a railway system aims at maximizing the amount of 
passenger flow despite malicious attacks, telecommunications networks prioritize network 
connectivity so as to guarantee its basic functioning. From a modelling perspective, 
differences can also be appreciated in terms of adopted constraints: while bi-level programs 
for railway infrastructure protection entail flow conservation and/or shortest path 
constraints, CNDPF accounts for connectivity conservation constraints. The CNDPF has been 
solved through a SVI decomposition approach and a heuristic approach (GCLS). In particular, 
the heuristic approach has been tested according to two different swap policies thus yielding 
to two different algorithms (GCLS1 and GCLS2). Computational results have been reported 
for real communication networks and for different levels of both disaster magnitude and 
protection resources. Experimentation has proven that SVI is a quite successful exact method 
however, it can encounter difficulties when problem dimensions increase, which motivates 
the need to develop an alternative (or auxiliary) heuristic approach. GCLS1 has proven to be 
more successful on a small network while GCLS2 has proven to perform better on a larger 
network. Nevertheless, results have reported that a reasonable expenditure of protection 
resources can yield to a significant improvement in the network connectivity.  
However, CNDPF is not exempt from limitations based on its underpinning assumptions. 
For example, CNDPF is a deterministic model because assumes that both interdiction (i.e., 
how costly to disrupt a node is) and protection (i.e., how costly to build an additional arc is) 
resources are known. However, both interdiction and protection resources could be 
uncertain and based on the probability of success of the attack/defense strategy thus 
requiring a stochastic programming formulation. Another assumption that could be revised 
and lead to different models is the one related to the adopted objective function. In fact, 
currently, the defender aims at maximizing the network connectivity while minimizing the 
damage inflicted by the attacker. Nevertheless, the objective of the defender could be to 
minimize the protection investment expenditure while guaranteeing a minimum 
connectivity threshold. Hence, despite the successful and encouraging results so far 




4 Optimizing shelter location and evacuation routing 
operations: the critical issues 
This chapter focuses on two specific operations of the DOM response phase: shelter location 
and evacuation routing. Specifically, this chapter aims at identifying the central issues that 
should be addressed in a comprehensive shelter location/evacuation routing model. This is 
achieved by: (1) analysing existing DM surveys, (2) reviewing optimization models tackling 
shelter location and evacuation routing operations, either separately or in an integrated 
manner, (3) performing a critical analysis of existing papers combining shelter location and 
evacuation routing, concurrently with the responses of their authors, and (4) comparing the 
findings of the analysis of the papers (i.e., (3)) with the findings of the existing DM surveys 
(i.e., (1)). The chapter concludes with a discussion on the emergent challenges of shelter 
location and evacuation routing in optimization and outlines a roadmap for future research.  
 
4.1 Analysis of existing Disaster Management surveys 
Operations Research, and optimization in particular, has been applied to DM since the early 
1980s (Altay and Green 2006; Simpson and Hancock 2009). A variety of problems, pertaining 
to different DOM stages, have been modelled through optimization techniques as reported 
in the surveys by (Simpson and Hancock 2009; Caunhye, Nie and Pokharel 2012; Galindo and 
Batta 2013; Hoyos, Morales and Akhavan-Tabatabaei 2015; Özdamar and Ertem 2015; 
Bayram 2016). In the following, these seven surveys are briefly reviewed, which deal with 
either DM in general or evacuation planning operations, and compare them in terms of 
research area, journal outlets, state-of-the-art and their proposed research directions. The 
discussion does not include surveys that do not explicitly discuss shelter location and 
evacuation planning problems such as De La Torre, Dolinskaya and Smilowitz (2012) and Çelik 
(2016), which focus only on disaster relief routing and disaster recovery, respectively. 
Surveys that are limited in scope (Grass and Fischer 2016), only offer a qualitative outlook 
Ja ou  et al.  a d tuto ials Ka a a d “a aşe   are also excluded. The seven 





Table 10.  Survey Review Summary  
Survey Research Area 
Journal Outlets and  
Timeframe 
State-of-the-art Future Research Directions 
Altay and 
Green (2006) 
OR/MS applied to 
DM 
Outlets: Both non-traditional OR 
and OR journals; top three OR 
journals: EJOR, JORS, MS 
Timeframe: 1980-2004 
Methodology: Mathematical Programming 
(Most used) / Soft OR (Least used) 
DOM phase research ranking: Mitigation, 
Response, Preparedness, Recovery 
Research aim ranking: Model, Theory, 
Application 
Development of hierarchical and multi-
objective approaches, deployment of Soft OR 
methodologies, focus on recovery issues, and 








traditional OR and OR journals; 
top three OR journals for disaster 
services: EJOR, JORS, MS 
Timeframe: 1965-2007 
EOR categories: Urban services, Emergency 
Management Services, Disaster services, 
General emergency 
Methodology: Mathematical Programming 
(Most used) / Soft OR (Least used) 
Deployment of Soft OR approaches, 
development of ad-hoc DSS, inclusion of multi-







Outlets: TRE, EJOR, MS (mostly) 
Timeframe: 1976-2011 
Review of optimization models for facility 
location, stock- prepositioning, evacuation, 
relief distribution, and casualty 
transportation operations 
Development of combined and multi-objective 
models, advanced algorithms, research effort 
towards recovery operations, definition of 




OR/MS applied to 
DM 
Outlets: Both non-traditional OR 
and OR outlets; top three OR 
journals: JORS, EJOR, COR 
Timeframe: 2005-2010 
Methodology: Mathematical Programming 
(Most used) / Soft OR (Least used) 
DOM phase research ranking: Response, 
Preparedness, Mitigation, Recovery 
Research aim ranking: Model, Theory, 
Application 
Stakeholder involvement, development of 
cutting-edge technologies, (more) realistic 
modelling assumptions, combination of 
different methodologies, deployment of Soft OR 
approaches, and definition of specific efficiency 
criteria 
 
Legend: COR = Computers & Operations Research; EJOR = European Journal of Operational Research; JORS = Journal of the Operational Research Society; MS = Management 
Science; OR = Operations Research; SEPS = Socio-Economic Planning Sciences; SS = Safety Science; TRB = Transportation Research Part B; TRE = Transportation Research Part 




 Table 10.  Survey Review Summary (Continued) 
Survey Research Area 
Journal Outlets and  
Timeframe 






OR applied to DM Outlets: EJOR, SEPS, TS, SS 
(mostly) 
Timeframe: 2006-2012 
Methodology: Mathematical Programming 
(Most used) / Queuing Theory (Least used) 
DOM phase research ranking: Response, 
Mitigation, Preparedness, Recovery 
 
Better understanding of specific disaster-
related features, combination of different 
methodologies, usage of multi-period models, 
research effort towards inventory, evacuation 
planning, casualty transportation, and recovery 
activities, investigation into information 
systems, critical infrastructures and secondary 
(or even cascading) disasters, and 




OR for response 
and recovery 
activities 
Outlets: No journal-based 
analysis 
Timeframe: 1993-2014  
Review of optimization models for relief 
delivery, casualty transportation, mass 
evacuation, and recovery operations 
Development of algorithms to handle large-
scale disaster data sets, models tackling 
recovery issues in an integrated way, 
combination of practitioner and academic best 
practices, inclusion of real-time data, and 
stakeholder coordination 
Bayram (2016) Optimization 
models for large 
scale evacuation 
planning 
Outlets: OR/MS, DM, behavioral 
sciences, and engineering-based 
outlets; models mostly from TRB 
Timeframe: 1952-2016  
Review on traffic assignment models, 
evacuation modelling, and behavioral 
studies 
Inclusion of human behavior and special-needs 
population, usage of Intelligent Transportation 
Systems (ITS), and development of stochastic, 
dynamic, and combined models 
 
Legend: COR = Computers & Operations Research; EJOR = European Journal of Operational Research; JORS = Journal of the Operational Research Society; MS = Management 
Science; OR = Operations Research; SEPS = Socio-Economic Planning Sciences; SS = Safety Science; TRB = Transportation Research Part B; TRE = Transportation Research Part 
E; TS = Transportation Science.  
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Altay and Green (2006) provide a literature survey of OR/MS applied to DM over the time 
period 1980 – 2004. The authors group all the collected papers according to several aspects 
such as deployed methodology, DOM phase, and research contribution across different 
journal categories. The following findings can be inferred from their analysis: 1) the most 
favoured methodology is mathematical programming while the least deployed are Soft OR 
approaches, also known as Problem Structuring Methods (PSMs) (Rosenhead and Mingers 
2001); 2) among the four DOM phases, the most investigated one is mitigation while the 
least enquired is recovery; and 3) the research aim is highly model-based rather than theory-
oriented or application-driven. Altay and Green (2006) propose various research directions. 
Firstly, hierarchical and multi-objective approaches need to be developed to account for the 
multi-agency nature of DOM operations. Secondly, methodologies so far underutilised, such 
as Soft OR approaches, and more advanced technologies, such as sensing algorithms, should 
be further investigated. Thirdly, more research should be devoted to the recovery phase 
given its crucial role in restoring lifeline services and normal life conditions. Finally, business 
continuity models and disruption management models that incorporate sustainability issues 
in infrastructure design are required to ensure efficient response and recovery operations. 
Simpson and Hancock (2009) focus on emergency response-related OR articles during the 
period 1965-2007. They group papers into four focus categories: urban services (e.g., police, 
fire and ambulance services); disaster services (e.g., evacuation planning); hazard specific 
(e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes or floods), and general emergency. They use this 
categorization to analyse trends in volume, focus and outlets of emergency OR research and 
observe a shift in focus over time from urban services to general emergencies. As for the 
methodologies, they confirm Altay and Green (2006) findings: mathematical programming is 
the most common methodology across all focus categories with the exception of hazard 
specific, whereas Soft OR approaches are still scarcely used in spite of their suitability to 
address the unstructured nature of emergency problems. Simpson and Hancock (2009) 
identify four main areas for further research: 1) development of Soft OR approaches as key 
tools to enable policy-maker involvement in the modelling process, encourage a sense of 
ownership, and ultimately lead to impact on policy making; 2) development of more 
sophisticated information and decision support systems (DSS); 3) inclusion of volunteer 
coordination within a multi-agency framework; 4) definition of ad-hoc key performance 




Caunhye, Nie and Pokharel (2012) review optimization models for emergency logistics 
developed during the period 1976-2011. They focus on core DOM operations such as facility 
location, stock pre-positioning, evacuation, relief distribution and casualty transportation. 
Through their analysis, the authors first observe three main gaps: optimization models 
addressing different DOM operations in an integrated manner are scarce, multi-objective 
approaches are underutilised due to solving difficulties, and more advanced algorithms are 
required. They also identify several research opportunities. Optimization models are needed 
for some operation-specific problems such as: facility siting as a post-disaster operation, 
possibly including stock transfer activities; pre- and post-disaster capacity planning; dynamic 
post-disaster inventory; casualty transportation incorporating aspects such as transportation 
time, injury severity and medical centre service load. As previously noted by Simpson and 
Hancock (2009), suitable performance measures, which go beyond timely responsiveness 
and cost-efficiency, need to be defined (e.g., multi-agency coordination effectiveness and 
relief planning robustness). Finally, the uncertainties related to human behavior in post-
disaster environments need to be addressed, for example by using robust optimization and 
chance constraints.  
Galindo and Batta (2013) continue the review of Altay and Green (2006), with the ultimate 
goal of evaluating if any changes emerged in OR applied to DM during the timeframe 2005-
2010. Their comparative analysis reveals that no drastic changes have occurred in the field. 
In fact: (1) the most favoured methodology is still mathematical programming while Soft OR 
is still underused; (2) the most investigated DOM phase is response, immediately followed 
by preparedness, but the least studied is still recovery; and (3) the research aim is even more 
model-driven and even less application-oriented. Novelties include the combination of 
different methodologies (Afshar, Rasekh and Afshar 2009), the integration of DOM phases 
(Fiorucci et al. 2005) and the development of case studies, although these mostly rely on 
unrealistic assumptions. In addition to those identified by Altay and Green (2006), they 
suggest the following research directions: improvement of the coordination among DOM 
actors; development of cutting-edge technologies (e.g., GIS-based); thorough understanding 
of DOM problems and use of statistical analysis to build realistic assumptions, define 
disruption scenarios, and deal with information unavailability; exploration of Soft OR 





Hoyos, Morales and Akhavan-Tabatabaei (2015) present a review on OR techniques with 
stochastic components in DOM during the time period 2006-2012. The authors classify the 
collected papers according to DOM phase and deployed methodology. The results of their 
analysis are: (1) the most deployed methodology is stochastic mathematical programming, 
in particular for preparedness and response operations such as facility pre-positioning, 
resource allocation, relief distribution, and casualty transportation, while the least deployed 
is queuing theory; (2) in the mitigation phase, research mostly focuses on probabilistic and 
statistical models such as logistic regression and artificial networks (e.g., for demand 
prediction); and (3) stochastic methods for the recovery phase are largely understudied. The 
authors identify several research directions: a better understanding of the features related 
to a specific disaster is needed to formulate accurate and realistic assumptions; combination 
of different methodologies should be encouraged as well as the usage of multi-period 
models to tackle the evolving aspects of disasters; several topics including inventory 
planning, search and rescue activities and especially recovery operations deserve greater 
attention; consideration and integration of issues such as infrastructure damage, secondary 
(or even cascading) disasters, multi-agency coordination and communication are needed for 
building more applicable models. 
Özdamar and Ertem (2015) review logistics models for response operations (relief 
delivery, casualty transportation and mass evacuation) and recovery operations (road and 
infrastructure restoration, and debris management). They analyse both structural (e.g., 
objectives, constraints) and methodological (e.g., solution methods) aspects of these 
problems. Moreover, they provide a brief discussion on the use of information systems in 
humanitarian logistics. The authors identify various areas for improvement, including: 1) 
development of on-line, fast optimization algorithms that are able to handle large-scale 
disasters; 2) development of integrated models that combine multiple recovery issues (e.g., 
debris clean-up, infrastructure restoration); 3) integration of practitioner and academic 
researcher best practices (e.g., user-friendly interfaces from the former, sophisticated 
mathematical models from the latter); 4) development of globally accessible databases and 
holistic commercial software for DM so as to overcome implementation issues linked to the 
lack of real-time data and stakeholder coordination.  
Bayram (2016) provides a survey of OR papers for large-scale evacuation planning. In 
particular, the author reviews traffic assignment models (e.g., user equilibrium, system 
optimal, etc.), typical objectives in evacuation modelling (e.g., clearance time minimization, 
total evacuation time minimization, etc.), and evacuee behavior issues (e.g., perceived risk, 
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ethnicity, gender, etc.). Moreover, deterministic and stochastic models tackling self-
evacuation are described, followed by those including shelter decisions and addressing mass-
transit-based evacuation. Bayram (2016) concludes the survey with some suggestions, aimed 
at making future optimization models more realistic and implementable. These include: 
better modelling of human behavior; more focus on special-needs population, mass-transit-
based and multi-modal evacuation as opposed to self-evacuation; usage of strategies based 
on intelligent transportation systems; development of stochastic and dynamic models, 
models integrating shelter location and evacuation decisions, and game-theoretic 
approaches for man-made disasters. 
 
4.2 Optimization for shelter location and evacuation routing 
Within the DM context, optimization researchers have proposed several models tackling 
shelter location and evacuation routing problems, either separately or in an integrated 
manner. As noted in (Bayram 2016), the majority of evacuation studies focus on evacuation 
with private vehicles (often referred to as car-based evacuation), whereas mass-transit-
based (or bus-based) evacuation models are more sparse.  Shelter location problems have 
also received considerable attention over time. Overall, most of the focus so far has been on 
models that address shelter location, car-based and bus-based evacuation as separate 
problems. Recently, more attention has been paid to combined shelter location and 
evacuation routing problems. Combined models can integrate 1) shelter location and car-
based evacuation decisions; 2) shelter location and bus-based evacuation decisions; or 3) 
shelter location and both car- and bus-based evacuation issues, as displayed in Figure 19.  
 
                               












As noted in (Caunhye, Nie and Pokharel 2012), only a few optimization models have 
addressed shelter location and evacuation routing in an integrated manner prior to 2011. 
Also, these early combined models only integrated shelter location and car-based evacuation 
decisions (problem category 1, Figure 19). These are briefly described below. 
Kongsomsaksakul, Yang and Chen (2005) present a bi-level program under flood 
circumstances. The upper level mimics the public authority objective (i.e., to minimize the 
total evacuation time by identifying optimal shelter locations); the lower level models the 
evacuee target (i.e., to reach a shelter facility as quickly as possible). The authors develop a 
genetic algorithm to solve the proposed optimization model and they apply it to the Logan 
network, Utah (USA). 
Alçada‐Al eida et al. (2009) develop a multi-objective optimization model for fire 
disasters. The objectives to be minimized are: (1) total traveling distance from evacuation 
zones to shelter sites; (2) evacuee fire risk while reaching a shelter facility; (3) evacuee fire 
risk while staying at a shelter site; and (4) total evacuation time from shelters to hospitals. 
The proposed optimization model is embedded into a GIS-based decision support system 
and applied to the city of Coimbra (Portugal).  
Ng, Park and Waller (2010) present a bi-level program that considers both system and 
user optimal approaches. The system optimal approach is adopted in the upper level to 
optimally locate shelter facilities while the user optimal approach is deployed at the lower 
level to identify the optimal evacuation routes. The authors solve the model with a Simulated 
Annealing algorithm and present a realistic case study for Sioux Falls, North Dakota (USA), 
under a hypothetical man-made threat. 
Li et al. (2011) introduce a scenario-based bi-level program under hurricane 
circumstances. The ultimate goal of the model is to find optimal shelter sites while 
considering the effect of this decision onto driver route-choice behavior. The authors apply 
the proposed optimization model to the state of North Carolina (USA) as a realistic case study.  
In summary, prior to 2011, the main emphasis has been on modelling shelter location and 
car-based evacuation as separate problems, with only a handful of models combining the 
two problems. In 2011, the seminal paper for bus-based evacuation was introduced (Bish 
2011), thus enabling the development of models in the other combined categories (problem 
categories 2 and 3, Figure 19). An in-depth analysis of recent combined shelter location and 
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evacuation routing models developed from 2012 onwards is subject of investigation and will 
be discussed next.  
 
4.3 Emergent challenges in optimizing shelter location and evacuation 
routing  
In this section, a brief overview of all the existing recent articles, which will be referred to as 
case studies, is provided. A structured analysis of the case studies will be then presented, 
which also includes a discussion of the responses of the authors to an ad-hoc questionnaire. 
4.3.1 Case studies overview 
The analysis focuses on the timeframe January 2012 – December 2017. The existing papers 
have been collected by exploring the INFORMS journal database, Science Direct, and the 
“p i ge  Jou al Data ase, hi h ha e ee  ue ied ith t o ai  key o ds: shelte  a d 
e a uatio . Ni e a ti les at hed the sea h ite ia hose outlet-based distribution is as 
follows: three papers in Transportation Research Part E, two in the EURO Journal on 
Computational Optimization, one in the European Journal of Operational Research, one in 
the Journal of Transport Geography, one in Transportation Research Part B, and one in 
Transportation Science. These papers are briefly discussed in chronological order to illustrate 
the temporal evolution of the field (in case of year ties, papers are ordered by first author 
surname).  
Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-Almeida (2012) define a multi-objective 
location-routing model to address the evacuation of self-evacuees. In particular, the authors 
extend the model proposed by Alçada‐Al eida et al. (2009) by optimizing the location 
decisions and including two additional criteria in the objective function. The objectives to be 
minimized are: (1) total traveling distance from evacuation zones to shelter sites on primary 
paths (i.e., best available evacuation routes); (2) evacuee risk while reaching a shelter facility 
on primary paths; (3) total traveling distance from evacuation zones to shelter sites on 
backup paths (i.e., best available evacuation routes when primary paths are unavailable); (4) 
evacuee risk while staying at a shelter site; (5) total evacuation time from shelters to an 
hospital; and (6) total number of shelters to be opened. The model is solved with an off-the-
shelf optimization software and is tested on a realistic case study for the Baixa region of the 
city of Coimbra (Portugal). 
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Li et al. (2012) tackle the evacuation of self-evacuees, who move towards either a shelter 
site or an alternative destination, under different hurricane scenarios. They present a 
scenario-indexed bi-level program where shelter location and evacuation routing problems 
are addressed conjunctively. The upper level model is a two-stage stochastic location and 
allocation problem and entails shelter decisions. The lower level deploys a dynamic user 
equilibrium model to mimic evacuee behavior and account for congestion-related issues, in 
line with a user optimal approach. The ultimate goal is to identify optimal evacuation 
planning decisions by taking into consideration how different shelter locations can influence 
evacuee route choice. The bi-level program is solved with heuristic algorithms whose 
applicability is tested on a realistic case study for the state of North Carolina (USA). 
Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014) address the evacuation towards shelter sites of both 
self-evacuees and supported evacuees through a multi-period, multi-criteria mixed-integer 
program. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only paper to address shelter location, car-
, and bus-based evacuation into a combined optimization model, called the Comprehensive 
Evacuation Problem (CEP). The authors model the dynamic aspect of an evacuation process 
and account for different planning objectives conjunctively such as the evacuation time, the 
number of shelters to be opened, and the risk exposure of the evacuees. The authors assume 
a System Optimal (SO) approach where a planning authority is in charge of both shelter and 
evacuation routing decisions. The optimization model is solved with a genetic algorithm and 
tested on two realistic case studies: the evacuation of the city of Kaiserslautern (Germany) 
due to a bomb defusion and the evacuation of the city of Nice (France) due to an earthquake 
with a subsequent flood. 
Bayram, Tansel and Yaman (2015) present a non-linear mixed-integer program for self-
evacuation towards shelter destinations. The model is based on a Constrained System 
Optimal (CSO) approach. A CSO perspective assumes that evacuees are willing to accept, to 
a certain level of tolerance, to travel routes that are not the shortest ones. The proposed 
CSO model accounts for both shelter and evacuation routing decisions while minimizing the 
total evacuation time, which is modelled through a non-linear function of the traffic volume. 
Furthermore, the authors formulate a system optimal model whose results are compared 
with the CSO one to evaluate the fairness, with respect to both routes and shelters, of the 
emergent planning decisions. They also investigate the evacuation plan efficiency. The 
problem is solved by using a second order cone programming approach and results are 
presented for both test and realistic case studies, such as the Istanbul European and Istanbul 
Anatolian networks under earthquake circumstances.  
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Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya (2015) address shelter location and self-evacuation with the 
ultimate goal of improving the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) approach. TRC considers ten 
different criteria (e.g., transportation of relief items, healthcare providers, road connections) 
to rank candidate shelter sites: each candidate area receives a score per each criterion, then 
potential areas are sorted in decreasing  order of the total score, and shelters are built in the 
areas with the highest score. The authors improve the TRC approach by developing a 
mathematical model that considers evacuation zones-to-shelters distances and shelter site 
utilization. The aim is to identify the optimal location of temporary shelter areas and match 
evacuation districts to shelter areas so as to satisfy several utilization and efficiency criteria. 
The model is solved through a commercial solver and applied to two realistic case studies 
under earthquake circumstances: the Kartal district of Istanbul and the province of Van 
(Turkey).  
Gama, Santos and Scaparra (2016) present a multi-period mixed-integer program for self-
evacuation towards shelter sites. The proposed optimization model tackles together shelter 
location, warning signals dissemination, and evacuation routing decisions under flood 
circumstances. The aim is to optimally identify, based on a flood propagation model, opening 
times and locations for shelter sites, timings for evacuation order dissemination, and optimal 
evacuees-to-shelter allocation while minimizing the total traveling time between evacuation 
zones and shelter destinations. The model is solved with a Simulated Annealing algorithm 
whose applicability is tested on a realistic case study for Wake County, North Carolina (USA). 
Heßler and Hamacher (2016) propose a sink location problem to mimic a self-evacuation 
process, where evacuees are at given nodes (evacuation zones) and shelter sites are assumed 
to be the sinks. The model objective is to minimize the opening costs of the shelters while 
guaranteeing that shelter capacities and link capacities (used to model road traffic) are not 
exceeded. The authors present different variations of the sink location problem that can be 
used in different disaster situations (e.g., bomb disposal). The models are solved through 
adaptations of source location heuristics and their applicability is tested on both random and 
realistic instances (i.e., the evacuation of the city of Kaiserslautern, Germany, under a bomb 
disposal scenario). 
Shahparvari et al. (2016) deal with evacuation under bushfire circumstances and focus on 
a specific category of supported evacuees: late evacuees who initially shelter in place 
(American Red Cross 2003) as a precautionary measure but then need to evacuate with the 
support of public authorities (hence, by buses), under short notice scenario. The authors 
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present a multi-objective integer program that identifies the best shelter location and 
evacuation routes while optimizing two conflicting objectives: maximizing the number of 
evacuees employing the least risk-prone routes and minimizing the utilization of resources 
(in terms of both shelters and vehicles). The model is solved with an �-constraint approach 
and is tested on the 2009 Black Saturday bushfire in Victoria (Australia).  
Bayram and Yaman (2017) present a scenario-based two-stage stochastic non-linear 
mixed-integer program for self-evacuation towards shelter destinations. They extend the 
work of Bayram, Tansel and Yaman (2015) by addressing the uncertainty affecting evacuation 
demand as well as potential alteration to the network structure (both roads and shelter sites) 
due to the disaster occurrence. The authors develop an ad-hoc exact solution approach 
based on both Benders decomposition and cutting plane method. Results are presented for 
both test and realistic case studies, such as the Istanbul European and Istanbul Anatolian 
networks under earthquake circumstances.  
Table 11 briefly summarises the main features of shelter location, car-based evacuation, 
bus-based evacuation as separate problems as well as shelter location and car-based 
evacuation, shelter location and bus-based evacuation and shelter location together with 
both car-based and bus-based evacuations as combined problems in terms of objectives, 
constraints and case studies. 
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Table 11. Features of shelter location, car-based evacuation, bus-based evacuation as separate problems as well as shelter location and car-based evacuation, shelter 
location and bus-based evacuation and shelter location together with both car-based and bus-based evacuation as combined problems 
Problem Objectives Constraints Case Studies 
Shelter 
Location 
Total Evacuation Time (Sherali, Carter and Hobeika 1991; 
Zhao et al. 2015), Total Travel Distance (Chen et al. 2013; 
Xu et al. 2016), Total Risk (Chowdhury et al. 1998), Total 
Shelter Cost (Zhao et al. 2015), Shelter Coverage (Xu et 
al. 2016) 
Maximum Shelter Capacity (Sherali, Carter and 
Hobeika 1991; Zhao et al. 2015), Budgetary Restriction 
(Chen et al. 2013; Chowdhury et al. 1998), Maximum 
Evacuation Distance (Zhao et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016), 
Minimum Coverage Requirement (Xu et al. 2016) 
Hurricanes (Sherali, Carter and 
Hobeika 1991), Cyclones 
(Chowdhury et al. 1998), 
Earthquakes (Chen et al. 2013; Zhao 
et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016) 
Car-based 
Evacuation 
Total Travel Distance (Cova and Johnson 2003), Network 
Clearance Time (Miller-Hooks and Patterson 2004), Total 
Evacuation Time (Xie and Turnquist 2011), Total Number 
of Evacuees (Lim et al. 2012), Total Traveling time (Ren 
et al. 2013), Network Congestion (Lim et al. 2015) 
Flow Conservation (Cova and Johnson 2003; Miller-
Hooks and Patterson 2004; Xie and Turnquist 2011; 
Lim et al. 2012; Ren et al. 2013) 
Bomb threat (Cova and Johnson 
2003), Hurricanes (Lim et al. 2012), 
Nuclear plant evacuation (Xie and 
Turnquist 2011), Terrorist attack 
(Ren et al. 2013) 
Bus-based 
Evacuation 
Maximum Evacuation Time (Bish 2011; Goerigk, Grün 
and Heßler 2013; Goerigk and Grün 2014; Goerigk, 
Deghdak a d T’Ki dt  
Maximum number of transferred evacuees with lowest 
risk (Shahparvari et al. 2017; Shahparvari, Abbasi and 
Chhetri 2017; Shahparvari and Abbasi 2017) 
Flow Conservation (Bish 2011; Shahparvari et al. 2017; 
Shahparvari, Abbasi and Chhetri 2017; Shahparvari 
and Abbasi 2017) 
Bus capacity (Bish 2011; Shahparvari et al. 2017; 
Shahparvari, Abbasi and Chhetri 2017; Shahparvari 
and Abbasi 2017) 
Bomb disposal (Goerigk and Grün 
; Goe igk, Deghdak a d T’Ki dt 
2015) 
Bushfire (Shahparvari et al. 2017; 
Shahparvari, Abbasi and Chhetri 





Table 11. Features of shelter location, car-based evacuation, bus-based evacuation as separate problems as well as shelter location and car-based evacuation, shelter 
location and bus-based evacuation and shelter location together with both car-based and bus-based evacuation as combined problems (Continued) 
Problem Objectives Constraints Case Studies 
Shelter Location and 
Car-based Evacuation 
Total Evacuation Time (Kongsomsaksakul, Yang and 
Chen 2005; Alςada-Almeida et al. 2009; Ng, Park and 
Waller 2010; Li et al. 2011, Li et al. 2012), Total 
Number of Shelters (Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão 
and Alçada-Almeida 2012) Total Risk Alςada-
Almeida et al. 2009; Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão 
and Alçada-Almeida 2012), Total Shelter Opening 
Cost (Heßler and Hamacher 2016), Total Travel 
Distance (Kongsomsaksakul, Yang and Chen 2005; 
Alςada-Almeida et al. 2009; Ng, Park and Waller 
2010; Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-
Almeida 2012; Bayram, Tansel and Yaman 2015; 
Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016; Bayram and 
Yaman 2017)   
Flow Conservation (Kongsomsaksakul, 
Yang and Chen 2005; Heßler and 
Hamacher 2016), Maximum/Minimum 
Number of Evacuees for Shelter 
Opening (Alςada-Almeida et al. 2009; 
Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and 
Alçada-Almeida 2012), Number of 
“helte s Alςada-Almeida et al. 2009; Li 
et al. 2011, Li et al. 2012; Coutinho-
Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-
Almeida 2012; Bayram, Tansel and 
Yaman 2015; Gama, Santos and 
Scaparra 2016; Bayram and Yaman 
2017), Shelter Utilization (Kıl ı, Ka a 
and Bozkaya 2015)   
Bomb disposal (Heßler and Hamacher 
2016), Earthquakes (Bayram, Tansel and 
Yaman 2015; Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya ; 
Bayram and Yaman 2017), Fires Alςada-
Almeida et al. 2009; Coutinho-Rodrigues, 
Tralhão and Alçada-Almeida 2012); Floods 
(Kongsomsaksakul, Yang and Chen 2005; 
Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016), 
Hurricanes (Li et al. 2011; Li et al. 2012) 
Shelter Location and 
Bus-based Evacuation 
Total Number of Evacuees (Shahparvari et al. 2016), 
Total Resources (Shahparvari et al. 2016) 
 
Shelter Capacity Expansion 
(Shahparvari et al. 2016), Total 
Number of Rescue Vehicles 
(Shahparvari et al. 2016) 
Bushfires (Shahparvari et al. 2016) 




Total Evacuation Time (Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler 
2014), Total Number of Shelters (Goerigk, Deghdak 
and Heßler 2014), Total Risk (Goerigk, Deghdak and 
Heßler 2014) 
Flow Conservation (Goerigk, Deghdak 
and Heßler 2014), Shelter Capacity 
(Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler 2014), 
Vehicle Capacity (Goerigk, Deghdak 
and Heßler 2014) 
Bomb disposal (Goerigk, Deghdak and 
Heßler 2014), Earthquakes (Goerigk, 




4.3.2 The analysis of the nine case studies 
The analysis of the nine case studies has been carried out according to the lifecycle 
underpinning hard OR disciplines (e.g., simulation), which is structured into four phases: 
conceptual modelling (CM), model coding (MC), experimentation (E), and implementation (I) 
(Robinson 2014). 
Several issues have been identified for each block of the optimization lifecycle for shelter 
location and evacuation routing. Aspects belonging to the conceptual modelling phase 
include: stakeholder involvement; data collection; evacuee categories, behavior and 
demographics; equity of the evacuation process; evacuation zones and shelter sites 
definition; resource availability; and communication and infrastructures. Model coding 
themes are those related to the different types of programming (e.g., multi-period, multi-
objective, scenario-based, stochastic) and solution methods (e.g., exact algorithms, 
heuristics, commercial solvers), along with the deployment of user-friendly interfaces (e.g., 
GIS-based). Realistic case studies, stakeholder involvement at both experimentation and 
calibration stages, and usage of additional data sources are aspects addressed in the 
experimentation block. Implementation consists in using the modelling approaches in real 
situations and includes aspects such as model dissemination to stakeholders and practical 
applications.  
Each case study has been analysed according to these aspects. To clarify some ambiguities 
that have arisen, an ad-hoc questionnaire was sent to all the authors of the nine case studies. 
However, in eight out of nine cases, only one author answered, mainly the corresponding 
author. In the only case where more than one author answered, results have been evaluated 
for clashes and the responses of the corresponding author are reported. The questionnaire 
was developed using Qualtrics survey software, in line with survey design principles (Saris 
and Gallhofer 2007). The questionnaire, which should be intended as a supplemental 
validation tool of the analysis, has been structured into four main blocks that mimic the four 
phases of the optimization lifecycle. An additional block of questions was added to the 
questionnaire to gain further insights, such as the kind of contribution the authors meant to 
provide. The questionnaire has undergone a pilot phase, where it has been evaluated by a 
non-profit organization member, an academic and one of the authors of the existing papers. 




Table 12.  Questionnaire 
Shelter Location and Evacuation Routing in Disaster Management 
Conceptual Modelling (CM) Block 
Q1 Has the author work been commissioned by someone?  
Q1.1 If yes, who is (are) the commissioner(s)? 
Q2 
Have stakeholders (i.e., those who have interest in the problem) been involved in the 
study?  
Q2.1 If yes, which stakeholders have been involved? 
Q2.1 
If no, explain why (more than one option is allowed): 
a) Difficult to identify relevant stakeholders 
b) Difficult to get stakeholder contact details 
c) Stakeholders too busy or not interested 
d) Stakeholders skeptical about potential study benefits 
e) Main focus of the paper is methodological 
f) Too time-consuming to involve the stakeholders 
Q3 Has any primary data (e.g., interviews, surveys, etc.) collection been carried out? 
Q3.1 If yes, which are the primary data that have been collected along with their sources? 
Q4 Has any secondary data (i.e., available from the web) collection been conducted? 
Q4.1 If yes, which are the secondary data that have been collected along with their sources? 
Q5 Has a specific type of disaster (e.g., earthquake, flood) been analyzed? 
Q5.1 If yes, which disaster? 
Q6 
Have the following evacuee categories been considered (more than one option is allowed): 
a) Self-evacuees who move towards a shelter 
b) Self-evacuees who move towards other destinations 
c) Supported evacuees who move towards a shelter 
Q6.1 
If supported evacuees have been considered, have the following aspects been included in 
the model (more than one option is allowed): 
a) Vehicle type 
b) Vehicle availability 
c) Qualified driver ability 
d) Driver willingness to expose him/herself to danger 
e) Multimodal transportation 
Q7 
How have the evacuee starting positions been defined? 
a) Centroids of evacuation zones 
b) Bus stops 
c) Others 
Q7.1 If others, please explain. 
Q8 Has the time of the day been considered when defining the evacuation starting points? 
Q9 
Has the evacuee behavior been accounted for (more than one option is allowed): 
a) Response to warning signals 
b) Individual route preference 
c) Route diversion to collect family members 
Q10 
Have the evacuee demographics (e.g., age, sex, disabilities, social class, etc.) been taken 
into account? 
Q10.1 If yes, what is (are) the demographic aspect(s) that has (have) been considered? 
Q11 
Have you considered egalitarian policies requiring that the needs of all targeted 




Table 12.  Questionnaire (Continued) 
Q12 
Have different kinds of shelters been included in your model (i.e., providing different 
services such as food, first-aid, dormitory facilities, etc.)? 
Q13 
Have the candidate sites for potential shelters been selected from the following (more 
than one option is allowed): 
a) City and/or County Owned Facilities (e.g., school sites, community centers, 
recreational facilities) 
b) Congregations (e.g., churches) 
c) Open Spaces (e.g., camping areas) 
d) Alternative sites (e.g., medical care sites) 
e) None of the above 
Q13.1 
If none of the above, please explain your assumptions on the candidate sites for potential 
shelters. 
Q14 Has resource availability (e.g., staff, shelter capacity, budget, etc.) been considered? 
Q15 
Have communication issues (e.g., warning signals, evacuation instructions) been 
addressed? 
Q16 Has road congestion been included in the model? 
Q17 Have infrastructure disruptions (e.g., communications, road, etc.) been accounted for? 
Q18 
Has the intrinsic dynamic aspect of the evacuation process been tackled (e.g., disaster 
propagation, availability of resources over time)? 
Model Coding (MC) Block 
Q19 Is the optimization model multi-period (e.g., developed over time intervals)? 
Q20 Is the optimization model multi-objective? 
Q20.1 If yes, what are the objectives that have been considered? 
Q20.1 If no, which objective has been considered? 
Q21 Has scenario-based modelling been deployed? 
Q22 Has stochastic programming been employed? 
Q23 
Which kind of solution method has been deployed (more than one option is allowed): 
a) An off-the-shelf software (e.g., CPLEX) 
b) Ad hoc exact method 
c) Ad hoc heuristic 
Q24 Has a friendly interface been developed to facilitate the use of the model (e.g., GIS-based)? 
Experimentation (E) Block 
Q25 Has any realistic case study been presented in your paper? 
Q26 Has any stakeholder been involved in the experimentation phase of the study? 
Q26.1 
If yes, in which experimentation phase of the study (more than one option is allowed): 
a) Development of the scenarios to be analyzed 
b) Sensitivity analysis to be conducted 
c) Other 
Q26.1 If other, please explain. 
Q27 Have additional data sources been used for further purposes (e.g., sensitivity analysis)? 
Q27.1 If yes, which one(s)? 
Implementation (I) Block 
Q28 Has the proposed model ever been handed over to the stakeholders (e.g., for a policy)? 





Table 12.  Questionnaire (Continued) 
Further Questions (FQ) Block 
Q30 
What is the main contribution of your paper: 
a) Theoretical/Methodological/Technical contribution to optimization modelling 
b) Practical contribution to disaster management  
Q31 
Which of the following aspects held you up the most in making your model realistic: 
a) Technical limitations 
b) Access to people and data 
Q32 
Are there any recent (January 2012 – December 2016 time frame) research articles on 
shelter location and evacuation planning that you would suggest us to look at? 
Q33 Is there any other issue this questionnaire should have included? 
 
 
Results have been critically analysed and compared across the papers and the author 
responses. This process has led to the identification of the main challenges of shelter location 
and evacuation routing in optimization at the present time, which can be grouped as follows: 
stakeholder involvement, evacuation modes, clear definition of modelling inputs, evacuee 
behavior, system behavior, and methodology. Each of these is discussed next. A summary of 
the results emerging from the analysis and the author questionnaire responses can be found 
in Table 13.  
4.3.2.1 Stakeholder involvement 
The analysis of questions pertaining to stakeholder involvement revealed that there was no 
previous agreement with any stakeholders (Q1) in any of the nine case studies. The 
responses suggest that those who engaged with stakeholders did not clearly explain the 
extent of the involvement (i.e., in which phase of the optimization process the stakeholders 
participated, what kind of contribution they provided to the study) (Q2, Q26). Evacuation  
planning operations involves a multitude of stakeholders, including e e ge y 
management practitioners, civil protection agencies, local disasters preparedness and 
response workers, disaster-affe ted a d host o u ities, a d pu li  se i e p o ide s  
(Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster 2014, p. 13). Stakeholder 
engagement is an essential component of decision-making in multi-organisation settings 
(Huxham 1991). As discussed by Edelenbos and Klijn (2005), stakeholders involved in 
interactive decision-making allow to tackle the changing aspects of the problem under study 
and to create solutions that are better than those produced in absence of engagement. 
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Li et al.,              
2012 
Goerigk et al.,    
2014 
Bayram et al.,           
2015 
Kilci et al.,          
2015 






Bayram et al., 
2017 
CM 
Q1  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Q2 - - -  - - - - -  - - - - -  - - 
Q3 - -   - - - - - - - - - - -  - - 
Q4                   
Q5 - -     -            










SE SE SES SES 
Q7 C C O C O BS O C C C C C O O O O O C 
Q8  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  
Q9 - - RP 
WS, 
RP 
- - RP RP - RP WS WS - - - - RP RP 
Q10 - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Q11 -  -  - -   - - - - - - -    
Q12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 







COF COF,OS COF COF COF,OS COF,OS - 
COF,CO,
OS 
Q14      -        -     
Q15 - - - - - - - - - -   - - - - - - 
Q16 - -       - - - -       
Q17   - - -  - - - -   - -     
Q18 - -    - - - - -   - - -  - - 
Legend: CM = Conceptual Modelling; MC = Model Coding; E = Experimentation; I = Implementation;  = Yes; - = No or No clear information; SES = Self-Evacuees who move 
towards a Shelter; SED = Self-Evacuees who move towards other Destinations; SE = Supported Evacuees (who move towards a shelter); C = Centroids; BS = Bus stops; O = 
Other; WS = Warning Signals; RP = Route Preference; COF = City/County Owned Facilities; CO = COngregations; OS = Open Spaces; AS = Alternative Sites; S = off-the-shelf 
Software; EX = EXact method; H = Heuristics; GA = Genetic Algorithm; SA = Simulated Annealing 
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Table 13. Insights achieved through critical analysis of the existing papers (left column) and questionnaire responses of their authors (right column) (Continued) 
MC 
Q19 - -    - - - - -   - - -  - - 
Q20       - -   - - - -   - - 
Q21 - -   - - - - -  - - - - -    
Q22 - -   - - - - -  - - - - -    
Q23 S S H H GA GA S S - S S,SA S,SA EX,H EX,H S S,EX,H EX EX 
Q24 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - 
E 
Q25                   
Q26 - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Q27 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -    
I 
Q28 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - 
Q29 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Legend: CM = Conceptual Modelling; MC = Model Coding; E = Experimentation; I = Implementation;  = Yes; - = No or No clear information; SES = Self-Evacuees who move 
towards a Shelter; SED = Self-Evacuees who move towards other Destinations; SE = Supported Evacuees (who move towards a shelter); C = Centroids; BS = Bus stops; O = 
Other; WS = Warning Signals; RP = Route Preference; COF = City/County Owned Facilities; CO = COngregations; OS = Open Spaces; AS = Alternative Sites; S = off-the-shelf 
Software; EX = EXact method; H = Heuristics; GA = Genetic Algorithm; SA = Simulated Annealing 
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Among the papers analysed, only three reported stakeholder participation (Q2) and use 
of primary data (Q3). Li et al. (2012) report that through the involvement of the State 
Department of Emergency Management and the American Red Cross, the modelling team 
organized focus groups with emergency managers and was provided with the set of 
candidate shelter sites for the study; they also conducted phone surveys to residents of the 
area under study. Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya (2015) state that TRC officials were aware of the 
study but did not directly contribute to it. Finally, Shahparvari et al. (2016) report some 
stakeholder engagement and primary data collection, and mention handing over their 
optimization model to stakeholders (Q28). In all the three cases, the information about 
stakeholder participation was retrieved from the questionnaire responses, but was not 
mentioned in the papers.  
A gua ly the ase studies a alysed ha e p o ided a ealisti , athe  tha  eal, 
application of the proposed models (Q25), mostly relying only on secondary data sources 
(Q4). Realistic case studies, albeit useful to prove concepts, do not translate into practical 
implementations (Q29). According to the questionnaire responses (Q31), the major barrier 
to develop realistic, and therefore applicable, models was the access to people and data. 
Moreover, most of the authors contributed either theoretically, methodologically, or 
technically to optimization modelling rather than practically to the field of DM (Q30). 
Reasons for this can be the nature of the academic incentive system, which tends to reward 
researchers based on their theoretical rather than practical work, as well as the adoption of 
an isolationist approach that does not entail engagement with communities external to OR 
(Mortenson, Doherty and Robinson 2015). 
In summary, the analysis seems to suggest that lack of stakeholder involvement leads to 
missed opportunities for primary data collection, which in turn leads to the development of 
realistic, as opposed to real, case studies and eventually to lack of real implementation of 
optimization models.  
4.3.2.2 Evacuation modes 
An evacuation process can occur in different ways: evacuees can move autonomously 
towards either a shelter or an alternative destination while public authorities can arrange 
transportation for those evacuees in need of support. Hence, it is possible to identify three 
main different categories of evacuees (Q6): self-evacuees who move towards a shelter (SES), 
self-evacuees who move towards other destinations (SED), and supported evacuees who 
move towards a shelter (SE).  
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Six case studies tackle only one category of evacuees: five focus on SES (Coutinho-
Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-Almeida 2012; Bay a , Ta sel a d Ya a  ; Kıl ı, Ka a 
and Bozkaya 2015; Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016; Bayram, Tansel and Yaman 2017) while 
only one addresses SE (Shahparvari et al. 2016). The remaining three case studies integrate 
two categories of evacuees together. Li et al. (2012) and Heßler and Hamacher (2016) deal 
with both SES and SED while Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014) address SES and SE. Hence, 
none of the nine case studies considers the three categories of evacuees in an integrated 
manner. In addition, in all the case studies evacuation takes place exclusively on road 
networks. Other types of transport or multi-modal evacuation have so far been neglected in 
combined optimization models. 
4.3.2.3 Clear definition of modelling inputs and parameters 
As observed in (Galindo and Batta 2013), a major drawback of many DOM optimization 
models is that the assumptions about the inputs for such models are often unclear, limited 
or unrealistic. This observation was confirmed in the analysis, for example in relation to 
inputs such as evacuation starting positions (Q7), candidate shelter sites (Q13) and resource 
availability (Q14). 
Evacuation starting points (Q7) are usually either area centroids (i.e., a point where the 
population of a certain evacuation zone is assumed to be concentrated) for self-evacuation, 
or bus stops (where evacuees are picked up) for supported evacuation. Seven out of the nine 
case studies did not explicitly specify the assumption concerning the evacuation starting 
positions. The questionnaire responses clarified that Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and 
Alçada-Almeida (2012), Li et al. (2012), Bayram, Tansel and Yaman (2015), and Bayram and 
Yaman (2017) consider centroids; Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014) assume bus stops; 
while Heßler and Hamacher (2016) and Shahparvari et al. (2016) consider evacuee houses 
and designated assembly points, respectively. 
Shelter candidate site categories (Q13) can be defined according to the classification 
given by Riverside County Fire Department (2011), which includes: city and/or county owned 
facilities (e.g., school sites, community centres), congregations (e.g., churches), open spaces 
(e.g., camping areas), and alternative sites (e.g., medical care sites). Assumptions regarding 
possible shelter locations were often omitted in the case studies. The questionnaire answers 
revealed that Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014) assume county-owned facilities as 
shelters to be, and Bayram, Tansel and Yaman (2015) consider all the possible shelter 
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categories, while Li et al. (2012) were provided with shelter site information by the American 
Red Cross who runs them. 
In terms of resource availability (Q14), Gama, Santos and Scaparra (2016) report a specific 
formula (Lorena and Senne 2004) for computing shelter capacities. Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya 
(2015) adopt specific realistic measures (e.g., at least 3.5 s ua e eters covered living space 
should e assig ed to ea h pe so  i  the shelte  a eas , p. 326). However, the remaining case 
studies do not mention how shelter capacities were computed. Clear definitions or 
assumptions concerning other resources (e.g., vehicles, shelter staff, shelter type or road 
availability) were also mostly neglected. In particular, Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014) 
and Shahparvari et al. (2016), who account for SE, did not consider the vehicle procurement 
aspect (Q6.1). Vehicles can be procured by public authorities as well as volunteers (e.g., non-
profit organizations). Hence, it should be clearly defined who is supplying the vehicles given 
that, if different parties are doing so, a further level of coordination may be required and it 
should be captured within an optimization model. 
In summary, what emerges in the analysis is that a limited number of authors provided 
clear specifications of modelling inputs and other relevant parameters.  
4.3.2.4 Evacuee behavior 
In the analysis of evacuee behavior, five dimensions have been identified to affect the way 
people evacuate during an emergency (Figure 20): time of day (Q8), route diversion (Q9), 
evacuee demographics (Q10), route preference (Q9), and warning signals (Q9). These are 
explored in turn next.   
 
                           












Time of day (Q8), route diversion (Q9), and evacuee demographics (Q10) are three 
extremely intertwined aspects that, according to social science studies (Liu, Murray-Tuite 
and Schweitzer 2012; King and Jones 2015; Preston and Kolokitha 2015; Preston et al. 2015) 
should be accounted for when planning for an evacuation because of their impact onto 
evacuee behavior. Despite their relevance, these elements have not been addressed in the 
case studies.  
Route preferences (Q9) play a critical role in evacuation planning and clearly affect the 
outcome of an evacuation process. Evacuation planning models embed traffic assignment 
models to simulate evacuee movements on the network. Traffic assignment models include: 
user equilibrium (UE), nearest allocation (NA), system optimal (SO), and constrained system 
optimal (CSO) approaches (Bayram 2016). A user-equilibrium (UE) approach mimics the 
selfish attitude of evacuees, who choose evacuation routes to minimize their individual 
traveling time. This approach is based on the assumption that such a behavior on the 
individual level creates an equilibrium at the system level. It also assumes that evacuees have 
full information of the network conditions, something that is not realistic during an 
emergency (i.e., potential disruptions may affect links on certain routes). A nearest allocation 
(NA) approach mimics evacuees who follow their shortest path based on geographical 
distances and free-flow traffic to move towards the nearest shelter facility. Although 
reasonable form a practical point of view, this approach may led to poor system efficiency. 
On the other side of the spectrum, a system optimal (SO) approach simulates the perspective 
of a facility planner who has full control on the route assignment and aims at maximizing the 
system benefit (including congestion reduction). This may lead to the assignment of 
evacuees to routes that are longer than their preferred ones. Although SO approaches are 
easier to model and solve, they fail to capture the evacuee route preferences. A constrained 
system optimal (CSO) approach can be seen as a trade-off between the SO and the UE/NA 
app oa hes. C“O stipulates that e a uees a e assig ed to a epta le  paths o ly i.e., paths 
whose length does not exceed the one of their shortest path by more than a given tolerance 
level).  
Among the nine case studies, only three explicitly take into account the evacuee route 
preference, by using a dynamic UE model (Li et al. 2012) and a CSO approach (Bayram, Tansel 
and Yaman 2015; Bayram and Yaman 2017).  In the remaining studies, a SO approach is 
adopted where the allocation of evacuees to shelters is done centrally using assignment, 
network flow or vehicle routing-based approaches. 
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The issuance of a warning signal (Q9) can prompt different reactions among the 
evacuees: to ignore the warning, to inform neighbours/relatives of the disaster, to start to 
evacuate immediately. Once the warning is clearly received and understood, people do not 
evacuate simultaneously but over time. The evacuation pattern often follows an S-shaped 
curve (Perry, Lindell and Greene 1981; Rawls and Turnquist 2012; Murray-Tuite and Wolshon 
2013; Li et al. 2013; Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016). Among the existing case studies, only 
Gama, Santos and Scaparra (2016) tackle shelter location, evacuation routing and warning 
signal dissemination in an integrated manner so as to model the impact of warning signals 
on the evacuation process. 
To summarize, the analysis shows that evacuee behavior aspects of an evacuation process 
have been scarcely tackled. In fact, three out of the five aspects (i.e., time of day, route 
diversion, and evacuee demographics) have been entirely neglected while route preferences 
and warning signals have been addressed only by three and one out of the nine case studies, 
respectively.  
4.3.2.5 System behavior 
The analysis of the system behavior includes dynamic aspects related to the system status 
over time and issues related to the system performance criteria. 
Dynamic aspects include shelter resources (Q14), shelter categories (Q12), congestion 
(Q16), and infrastructure disruptions (Q17). The term shelter resources captures several 
issues such as capacities (i.e., the amount of space available to accommodate evacuees), 
budget and staff (to set up the shelters), and relief supplies (to be provided to the evacuees). 
Shelter resources are considered to be a dynamic aspect of the evacuation process because 
budget, staff members, supplies and shelters are usually not readily available at the onset of 
a disaster but become available over time (Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016). Although the 
issue of shelter resources, modelled through either cardinality, budgetary, capacity or staff 
constraints, has been somehow captured in all the case studies, the availability of resources 
over time has been mostly neglected. The only exception is the dynamic model proposed by 
Gama, Santos and Scaparra (2016), which assumes that only a limited number of shelters can 
be opened in each time period of the planning horizon. The issue of considering different 
kinds of shelter facilities (Q12), which satisfy different evacuee needs over time, has also 
been largely neglected. As described in the first chapter, section 1.2.2, three categories of 
shelters can be considered, all providing different services. All the models in the case studies 
only consider one type of shelter.  
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Six of the case studies have attempted at incorporating congestion issues (Q16). Goerigk, 
Deghdak and Heßler (2014), Heßler and Hamacher (2016) and Shahparvari et al. (2016) tackle 
congestion in a simplified way by using capacitated network arcs. In Li et al. (2012), 
congestion is captured in the dynamic UE model, which computes time-dependent traveling 
times. Bayram, Tansel and Yaman (2015) and Bayram and Yaman (2017) model congestion 
through a link performance function developed by the US Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), 
according to a transportation-based approach.  
With the exception of two case studies, infrastructure disruption (Q17) has been largely 
unaddressed. The optimization model by Gama, Santos and Scaparra (2016) considers road 
disruptions during flood disasters. Specifically, the model assumes that, according to flood 
propagation, the water depth on roads changes over time, thus affecting speed and traveling 
times or making roads unavailable.  Shahparvari et al. (2016) also considers road accessibility 
over time, which depends on the propagation of bushfires on various segments of transport 
routes. Bayram and Yaman (2017) address the occurrence of potential disruptions affecting 
both nodes and arcs of the road network (i.e., shelter sites and road connections, 
respectively). 
The need to develop suitable performance criteria for DOM problems has been widely 
recognized, as discussed in this chapter, section 4.1. The models of the nine case studies use 
the following objectives as performance criteria: expected unmet shelter demand and 
expected total network traveling time (Li et al. 2012); total evacuation time, total evacuee 
risk, and total number of shelters (Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-Almeida 2012; 
Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler 2014; Bayram and Yaman 2017); total traveling time (Bayram, 
Tansel and Yaman 2015; Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016; Bayram and Yaman 2017); shelter 
opening cost (Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-Almeida 2012; Heßler and Hamacher 
2016); combination of characteristics of open shelter areas (Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya ; 
and cumulative disruption risk and shelter and vehicle usage (Shahparvari et al. 2016). 
Overall, the major emphasis has been on efficiency (evacuation time) and some measure of 
shelter/resource costs. Only three case studies have considered risks, whereas fairness, a key 
criteria to guarantee egalitarianism in emergency situations, has only been addressed in the 
CSO model by Bayram, Tansel and Yaman (2015). In this model, fairness is evaluated through 
a specific indicator, named price of fairness, which measures the difference between the 
evacuation times of a CSO and SO solutions. The authors consider two different indicators, 
normal and loaded unfairness (see Jahn et al. 2005), which are evaluated with respect to 
both routes and shelters. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is carried out to provide 
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insights on the relationship between the CSO tolerance level (used to embed fairness) and 
the price of fairness.  
To recap, system behavior aspects of an evacuation process have been tackled to 
different extents: shelter resources have been addressed across all the nine case studies 
although not in a dynamic context; congestion issues have been considered in six studies, 
sometimes through simplified models; infrastructure disruptions, risk and fairness issues are 
still largely understudied. 
4.3.2.6 Methodology 
Different modelling techniques and solution methodologies are deployed in optimization. In 
terms of modelling, three case studies propose multi-period models (Q19) (Li et al. 2012; 
Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler 2014; Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016). Multi-objective 
programming (Q20) is used in five case studies, with different combinations of objectives 
(Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-Almeida 2012; Li et al. 2012; Goerigk, Deghdak and 
Heßler 2014; Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya ; Shahparvari et al. 2016). Uncertainty has been 
explicitly modelled only in the scenario-based models (Q21) bi-level program proposed by Li 
et al. (2012), where the upper level is a stochastic program (Q22), and the scenarios 
represent different hurricane circumstances, and by Bayram and Yaman (2017).  
The mathematical models have been solved using a range of different methodologies 
(Q23), including off-the-shelf optimization solvers, exact methods and ad-hoc heuristics. In 
some cases, more than one method has been used for comparative analysis. As to be 
expected considering the difficulty of these models, five case studies developed ad-hoc 
heuristics, such as simulated annealing and genetic algorithms (Li et al. 2012; Goerigk, 
Deghdak and Heßler 2014; Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016; Heßler and Hamacher 2016; 
Shahparvari et al. 2016). In some cases, heuristic solutions have been compared with those 
of commercial optimization software (Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016) or exact methods, 
such as source location algorithms (Heßler and Hamacher 2016) and �-constraint techniques 
(Shahparvari et al. 2016). None of the nine case studies included the development of a user-
friendly GIS-based interface (Q24) as a supporting tool for using the models. 
To summarize, the analysis shows that a few case studies developed multi-period and 
multi-objective models while scenario and stochastic programming was used in one case 
only. The complexity of combined models has favoured the usage of heuristic approaches as 
solution methodology. User-friendly GIS-based interfaces have so far been overlooked. 
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4.4 Discussion and roadmap for future research 
The nine case studies (Section 4.3.1) encompass different aspects of shelter location and 
evacuation routing operations. Through their analysis, various challenges that optimization 
should tackle to embed more realism into future models have been identified so that they 
can be used to inform decision making in real disaster situations. Further research directions 
are now outlined: some of them confirm gaps identified in previous surveys (Section 4.1) 
while others newly stem from the analysis of the nine case studies.  
4.4.1 Stakeholder involvement 
Five surveys explored in section 4.1 (Altay and Green 2006; Simpson and Hancock 2009; 
Galindo and Batta 2013; Hoyos, Morales and Akhavan-Tabatabaei 2015; Özdamar and Ertem 
2015) propose research on optimization modelling that involves engaging with stakeholders 
to enable the actual implementation of optimization models (e.g., arrangements for a future 
evacuation plan). The case studies analysed in this study report limited engagement with 
stakeholders. However, the authors who did involve them report that they were able to 
collect primary data (Li et al. 2012; Shahparvari et al. 2016). Stakeholder identification and 
involvement can be achieved through Problem Structuring Methods (PSMs), such as Soft 
Systems Methodology and System Dynamics (Pidd 2003; Wang, Liu and Mingers 2015), 
whose deployment for DM problems has been explicitly advocated (Altay and Green 2006; 
Simpson and Hancock 2009; Galindo and Batta 2013). In particular, Simpson and Hancock 
(2009) propose the investigation of the combination of Hard and Soft OR/PSM techniques in 
disaster response and their deployment within a multi-methodology approach (Sachdeva, 
Williams and Quigley 2007). They put forward two main reasons: (1) the capability of PSMs 
to deal with the unstructured nature of the problems arising from an emergency response 
context, and (2) the scarcity of truly high-impact application of results emerging from Hard 
OR methodologies, mainly due to a lack of structured involvement of all the stakeholders, 
echoed by Franco and Montibeller (2010). Van Wassenhove and Besiou (2013) propose 
System Dynamics to be paired with common OR methods to capture the complex reality of 
systems such as reverse logistics and humanitarian logistics. However, to the best of my 
knowledge, PSMs have not yet been proposed to tackle evacuation planning issues, offering 
new research opportunities. Optimization could look to Discrete Event Simulation (DES) 
studies that have used PSMs to engage stakeholders in the modelling process through 
facilitated workshops (Tako and Kotiadis 2015; Kotiadis and Tako 2018). 
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4.4.2 Evacuation modes 
Among the seven surveys, only Bayram (2016), who carries out an evacuation planning-
oriented literature review, suggests to account for special-needs population (i.e., supported 
evacuees). The analysis of the nine case studies shows that three different categories of 
evacuees can be identified: SES, SED, and SE. However, these evacuee categories have been 
considered either as separate ones (Coutinho-Rodrigues, Tralhão and Alçada-Almeida 2012; 
Bay a , Ta sel a d Ya a  ; Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya 2015; Gama, Santos and Scaparra 
2016; Shahparvari et al. 2016; Bayram and Yaman 2017) or as a combination of two out of 
three (Li et al. 2012; Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler 2014; Heßler and Hamacher 2016). To be 
more comprehensive, even if undoubtedly more complex, all the three different categories 
should be considered in an integrated manner given that they share common resources. In 
fact, SES and SE share shelter facilities, which affects both shelter capacity (i.e., number of 
people who can be accommodated) and resources (e.g., relief supplies). All the evacuees 
share the road network, leading to congestion and, ultimately, affecting the evacuation time. 
Moreover, what emerges in the analysis is that optimization researchers have so far 
neglected to account for assisted evacuation and multimodal evacuation. Assisted 
evacuation, as mentioned in chapter 1, section 1.2.2, deals with evacuees who drive their 
own vehicles but are in need of advice from public authorities (e.g., directions) while 
multimodal evacuation requires different transportation modes. To model assisted 
evacuation, collateral problems should be considered such as how and where evacuees 
would be informed about the adopted evacuation strategies (e.g., contraflow lane reversal). 
For example, advanced traveler information can be provided through the deployment of 
portable Variable Message Signs (VMS), which can be opportunely located and re-located 
(Sterle, Sforza and Esposito Amideo 2016). On the other side, multimodal evacuation would 
require to investigate the optimization of different kinds of evacuation (each one related to 
a different mean of transportation) and their coordination. The use of alternative transport 
modes has been investigated for other emergency logistics operations (e.g., helicopter 
operations for disaster relief in (Ozdamar 2011). Multimodal emergency evacuation of large 
cities has been investigated in (Abdelgawad and Abdulhai 2010). However, combined 
optimization models for shelter location and evacuation planning have so far only considered 
evacuation by cars and buses. More research is definitely warranted for the development of 




4.4.3 Clear definition of modeling inputs and parameters 
Evacuation planning operations should be more application-oriented rather than theoretical 
or model-driven. Pedraza-Martinez and Van Wassenhove (2016) have recently edited a 
special issue on humanitarian operations management problems focused on collaborative 
journal articles with field practitioners or articles exploring how the research fits practical 
issues. This can be thought of as a first step to push researchers towards a more application-
oriented perspective. To foster real application, more realistic assumptions underpinning 
optimization models are needed, as already pointed out in the survey by Galindo and Batta 
(2013). The analysis reveals that there is a lack of realistic assumptions when referring to 
modelling inputs and parameters. Indeed, few authors provide a clear specification of inputs 
such as evacuee starting points, shelter candidate positions, and shelter capacities. On the 
other hand, those authors who explicitly pointed out their modelling assumptions were able 
to embed more realism into the proposed optimization models. In order to provide more 
realistic modelling assumptions, the suggestion is to favour primary data collection over 
secondary data collection. In fact, all the nine case studies relied on secondary data sources 
(e.g., government publications, websites) while only two out of these used primary data (e.g., 
personal interviews, surveys). Primary data can be collected if researchers establish a kind of 
contact with relevant stakeholders (e.g., civil protection agencies). Embedding more realism 
through the use of primary data can be fostered through stakeholder involvement (Tako and 
Kotiadis 2015; Kotiadis and Tako 2018). In addition, the uncertainty of some problem inputs, 
such as evacuee demand, arrival time at pick up location, and traveling times, needs to be 
clearly understood and reliably modelled by using probabilistic analysis, statistics methods 
and social science studies. 
4.4.4 Evacuee behavior 
Two surveys (Caunhye, Nie and Pokharel 2012; Bayram 2016) advocate the integration of 
human behavior in optimization models. Human behavior, in fact, adds an additional layer 
to the uncertainty characterising evacuation processes and should therefore be addressed, 
for example through the use of robust optimization (Caunhye, Nie and Pokharel 2012). The 
analysis of human behavior has been broken down into five main aspects: time of day, route 
diversion, evacuee demographics, route preference, and warning signals. The analysis shows 
that the former three aspects, which are extremely intertwined, have been completely 
neglected despite their impact in determining how people evacuate. To the best of my 
knowledge, in the broad field of optimization, few studies, which do not belong to the sample 
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of case studies, have attempted to consider the above issues. Alçada‐Al eida et al.  
tackled the time of day as an evacuation issue for major fires with an application to the city 
of Coimbra (Portugal). Murray-Tuite and Mahmassani (2003) propose two linear integer 
programming models in the context of emergency evacuation to account for route diversion. 
The first model defines the meeting location for the different family members. The second 
model identifies who is the one in charge of family member pick-up and how pick-up is 
scheduled. The emerging results are fed into a simulation software that allows to analyse 
traffic conditions and eventually re-schedule what has been decided previously. More 
recently, Ukkusuri et al. (2016) de elop hat they a e A-RESCUE: Agent-based Regional 
E a uatio  “i ulato  Coupled ith Use  E i hed Beha io , hi h is a si ulatio  tool that 
combines household behavior and traffic assignment issues. This may suggest to put forward 
a combination of optimization and simulation for evacuation planning where optimization 
could be deployed for shelter location decisions while simulation for evacuation routing ones. 
The criticality of the time of day, route diversion, and evacuee demographics is explored 
in a study on child pick-up during daytime emergency situations (Liu, Murray-Tuite and 
Schweitzer 2012). The authors, through more than three hundred interviews, identify diverse 
behavioral parental patterns across three diverse scenarios: a usual weekday and two 
hypothetical emergency situations (i.e., two sudden incidents at daytime). Distance between 
parents and hild e  is a u ial aspe t. Usually a othe ’s o kpla e is ea e  tha  a fathe ’s 
to schools/homes, which contributes to a gender difference in the behavior with the nearest 
parent more likely to pick the children up in an emergency situation. In addition, the study 
highlights that household economic status-related aspects, such as income, ethnicity, and 
education level (hence, demographics) are also relevant. Indeed high income households are 
more likely to pick up children in all the different scenarios. As evidenced in this study, time 
of day and demographics critically affect route diversion, eventually leading to delay and re-
routing during an evacuation process. These three aspects should be further examined from 
a social science point of view and then incorporated into optimization models at the 
conceptual modelling stage. For example, evacuee demographics can be analysed through 
the analysis of census data (Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster 
2014).  
Route preference and warning signals dissemination and perception have been partly 
addressed but their integration into optimization models still requires some enhancements. 
Two case studies adopted traffic assignment models to account for route preference (Li et al. 
2012; Bayram, Tansel and Yaman 2015). The issue with these approaches is that they do not 
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account for related aspects that can affect the evacuation process. Traffic assignment models 
could be integrated with evacuation strategies such as contraflow lane reversal (i.e., one or 
more lanes of a highway are used in the opposing traffic direction), deletion of crossing 
manoeuvres in correspondence of network intersections, traffic signals, and usage of 
shoulders (Murray-Tuite and Wolshon 2013). Recently, more advances in this area have been 
achieved through simulation-based approaches (Takabatake et al. 2017; Yuan et al. 2017). 
Route preference approaches could also take into account background traffic (i.e., the one 
generated by those who do not take active part in the evacuation), intermediate trips (i.e., 
the ones dictated by route preference as child-pick up), and shadow evacuation (i.e., the one 
put into action by those people who are not in need of evacuating but do so for own 
precautionary measure). Only one case study has addressed warning signals dissemination 
and perception (Gama, Santos and Scaparra 2016). A recent advance towards optimization 
for warning signals dissemination is due to Yi et al. (2017) who developed a bi-level program. 
The upper level is a multi-stage stochastic program that optimizes the issuance of warning 
signals across several hurricane scenarios while the lower level evaluates both cost and risk 
associated with the emerging strategy. 
Sorensen and Mileti (1988) define three main sources through which warning information 
are disseminated: official channels (e.g., police officers), informal channels (e.g., friends, 
relatives), and media (e.g., television), where different warning dissemination channels 
affect the response to a warning signal (Sorensen 1991). In particular, Camp Coordination 
and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster (2014) report that the edia plays a e y i po ta t 
a d ele a t ole i  all phases of e a uatio  (p. 35). Nowadays, clear examples are social 
media platforms such as Facebook whose Safety Check tool allows people to communicate 
their status (safe or not) if they are in a disaster-affected area. Fry and Binner (2016) address 
the role of social media in supporting emergency evacuation operations through a means of 
both mathematical modelling and Behavioral OR (BOR). For example, social media platforms 
could be deployed to manage vehicle procurement so to coordinate both original fleet and 
volunteer cars. Moreover, social media could be paired with advanced simulation techniques 
such as agent-based modelling to produce a more trustworthy estimation of the evacuation 
demand (i.e., number of people who need to evacuate). As an example, Nagarajan, Shaw and 
Albores (2012) develop an Agent-Based Simulation (ABS) model to analyse the role of 
evacuee behavior as an unofficial and implicit channel of warning dissemination. In 
particular, the authors evaluate if evacuees, who have been warned, forward their message 
to their neighbours and how this affects the overall warning dissemination.  This is different 
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from the common perspective that evacuee behavior is an output, rather than an input, for 
warning signals and could be considered in future optimization research. Hence, the 
thorough examination of social media data through machine learning, artificial intelligence 
and/or statistics-based techniques and ABS could be deployed to mitigate spatial/temporal 
evacuation demand uncertainty and, eventually, arrange a more efficient distribution of 
evacuation resources. Examples of evacuation resources include different types of vehicles, 
relief items to equip the shelters, and personnel (first responders, drivers, volunteers, clinical 
staffing and emergency officers). In conclusion, a combined social media mining-simulation 
approach to model evacuee behavior could benefit not just disaster response (i.e., 
evacuation) but also disaster preparedness (i.e., relief supply pre-positioning) and foster the 
development of integrated models which combine operations across different DOM phases. 
Undoubtedly, incorporating evacuee behavior poses significant challenges: it requires 
advanced tools to collect and analyse data and expertise in other disciplines (e.g., social 
sciences, machine learning, and psychology). It results in highly complex mathematical 
models that may be difficult to solve thus requiring novel and cutting-edge solution 
methodologies. However, the inclusion of behavioral aspects would result in models that are 
more reliable and more likely to be used in real disaster situations. 
4.4.5 System behavior 
System behavior encompasses different aspects: shelter resources, shelter categories, 
congestion, infrastructure disruptions and performance criteria. The need to address some 
of these aspects (e.g., road disruptions and more suitable performance indicators) has been 
advocated in some previous surveys (e.g., Altay and Green 2006). The analysis further refined 
the investigation into these issues. 
Firstly, shelter resources have not been tackled in a comprehensive way. In fact, while 
shelter capacities have been considered, the availability of resources over time has not. In 
addition, shelter categories (hence, evacuee needs over time) have been entirely neglected. 
This is an aspect that has been addressed from a shelter location only perspective but not in 
conjunction with routing decisions. In a recent study, Chen et al. (2013) introduce a three-
level-hierarchical shelter location model under earthquake circumstances: by considering 
different categories of shelters the model takes into account the temporal variance of 
e a uees’ eeds. “i ila  hie a hi al lo atio  odels ould e e edded i  o p ehe si e 
evacuation planning models. Secondly, congestion could be addressed more systematically. 
In fact, as in car-based evacuation routing models only (Cova and Johnson 2003; Xie and 
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Turnquist 2011), congestion can be eased through the introduction of constraints aimed at 
preventing conflicts in correspondence of road intersections as well as through contraflow 
lane reversal assumptions (Brachman and Church 2009). Such issues could be integrated into 
user optimal traffic assignment models to simulate traffic more accurately and support 
decisions for congestion reduction during the evacuation. Thirdly, future models could 
account for infrastructure disruptions which are known to occur in reality. During a disaster, 
the transport network changes over time as some roads in the affected area may become 
unavailable. Road unavailability and disaster propagation clearly affect the evacuation 
process and need to be captured through the use of stochastic and dynamic models, as done 
for other DM operations such as vehicle procurement within disaster relief routing (Rath, 
Gendreau and Gutjahr 2016). Finally, egalitarian policies guaranteeing equal treatment 
among evacuees have not been adequately addressed in optimization. Shelter location 
models only have attempted to tackle this aspect through the definition of specific 
constraints such as the distance between an evacuation zone and a shelter cannot exceed a 
specific threshold (Zhao et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016) or each shelter should provide a minimum 
level of coverage (Xu et al. 2016). In addition to the usage of specific constraints, new field-
specific performance criteria could be defined. For example, Caunhye, Nie and Pokharel 
(2012) report that performance measures such as oo di atio  effe ti e ess a d p ope  
organizational structure  (p.11) could be developed to account for the fact that humanitarian 
logistics is an environment with a plurality of actors (e.g., stakeholders, communities). 
Moreover, objectives such as risk, given the uncertain nature of disasters, and equity, to 
account for egalitarian treatment of evacuees, should be put forward. 
4.4.6 Methodology 
Three surveys advocate multi-objective models (Altay and Green 2006; Caunhye, Nie and 
Pokharel 2012; Hoyos, Morales and Akhavan-Tabatabaei 2015), with two of these suggesting 
multi-period and stochastic models (Hoyos, Morales and Akhavan-Tabatabaei 2015; Bayram 
2016). The analysis shows that multi-objective and multi-period models have been 
developed to a certain extent but there is a clear lack of stochastic models for evacuation 
planning, which supports (Hoyos, Morales and Akhavan-Tabatabaei 2015). In fact, the 
authors report that evacuation planning requires stochastic programming to address 
uncertain aspects such as evacuation demand, infrastructure disruptions, facility 
survivability, route reliability, and sudden traffic events. Hence, it is paramount to devise ad-
hoc cutting-edge algorithms, as also outlined in the surveys of Altay and Green (2006); 
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Caunhye, Nie and Pokharel (2012); and Bayram (2016). Further advances in the field would 
also be favoured by the development of user-friendly GIS-based interfaces as well as the 
usage of information systems (Hoyos, Morales and Akhavan-Tabatabaei 2015; Özdamar and 
Ertem 2015). Last but not the least, the analysis reveals that optimization may not be able to 
tackle all the aforementioned aspects on its own but may need to be paired with other 
disciplines. For example, a better understanding of the features related to a specific disaster 
(e.g., probability of occurrence, evolution over time) requires the deployment of propagation 
models (as for floods) or the usage of ground motion records (as for earthquakes), whose 
expertise belongs to different disciplines such as climatology, hydrology, meteorology and 
civil engineering. Moreover, disastrous events involve handling large data sets for which 
appropriate data mining/management techniques are required. Similarly, the study of 
human reaction when facing perilous circumstances requires social scientists as 
psychologists. Again, warning signals could be analysed through the deployment of 
simulation approaches (e.g., agent-based modelling), whereas demand and scenario 
predictions could be obtained through advanced statistics techniques. The expertise of 
transport engineers could support the development of traffic assignment models along with 
evacuation strategies (e.g., contraflow lane reversal). In essence, the development of 
efficient evacuation plans requires holistic approaches merging the expertise of different 
researchers. Hence, the final suggestion is to aim for interdisciplinarity. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
Shelter location and evacuation routing, and evacuation planning more in general, is a field 
which offers plenty of opportunities for both practitioners and researchers, belonging not 
just to the optimisation arena but also to other fields of expertise. The most recent 
optimisation models tackling shelter location and evacuation routing problems in an 
integrated manner have been critically analysed. Through the analysis of these state of the 
art models, the current challenges emerging in this research area have been identified and a 
roadmap for future research has been outlined.  
The analysis confirms some of the findings of previous DM-specific surveys. Namely, the 
following issues need to be addressed: 1) usage of Soft OR/PSMs approaches; 2) modelling 
of infrastructure disruptions; 3) development of multi-objective, combined, multi-period and 
stochastic models, along with cutting edge algorithms; 4) clear and realistic modelling 
assumptions; and 5) deployment of information systems and user-friendly GIS-based 
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platforms. In addition, what emerges in this work, which enriches and completes the 
previous surveys, are the following gaps: 1) primary data collection to embed more realism 
into optimisation models; 2) models which combine different evacuee categories; 3) models 
including assisted and multi-modal evacuation and issues such as evacuation vehicle 
procurement; 4) inclusion of issues such as time of day, route diversion, evacuee 
demographics, route preferences, and warning signals to model evacuee behaviour more 
accurately; 5) novel equity-based approaches for shelter location and evacuation routing; 6) 
integration of infrastructure disruption, congestion, and shelter categories into optimisation 
models; and 7) interdisciplinary research towards shelter location and evacuation routing. 
The ultimate scope of this dissertation is to detail the current state-of-the-art in the 
optimization field for shelter location and evacuation routing so as to identify current 
challenges and outline a roadmap for future research. This could be paired with an analysis 
of the current state-of-practice by reviewing decision-making requirements and current best 
practices in the field as offered by several disaster emergency institutions such the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the US. The above vision is quite ambitious and 
requires an interdisciplinary approach towards shelter location and evacuation routing 
operations. However, a novel scenario-based flow-location-allocation-routing model is 
introduced in Chapter 5, which aims at filling some of the aforementioned gaps such as: 
modeling of infrastructure disruptions, realistic modelling assumptions, combination of 





5. An integrated user-system approach for shelter location 
and evacuation routing 
This chapter presents a novel scenario-based mixed-integer program which integrates 
shelter location, self-evacuation and supported-evacuation decisions, namely the Scenario-
Indexed Shelter Location and Evacuation Routing (SISLER) problem. To the best of my 
knowledge, only Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014) have so far produced an optimization 
model tackling the aforementioned three aspects together. However, the approach hereby 
adopted is different, as it will be clarified in the following. The model is solved through a 
Branch-and-Cut algorithm of an off-the-shelf software, enriched with valid inequalities 
adapted from the literature. Computational results are reported for both testbed instances 
and a realistic case study.  
 
5.1 The Scenario-Indexed Shelter Location and Evacuation Routing 
problem 
The ultimate goal of SISLER is to tackle some of the current challenges in the shelter location 
and evacuation routing field that have emerged in the analysis carried out in Chapter 4. As a 
remainder, the challenges have been grouped into five macro-categories: (1) stakeholder 
involvement, (2) evacuation modes, (3) clear definition of modeling inputs and parameters, 
(4) evacuee behavior, and (5) system behavior. In particular, SISLER contributes to knowledge 
by attempting to address gaps regarding categories (2), (4) and (5). 
Firstly, SISLER combines shelter location with two different types of evacuation, i.e., car-
based evacuation and bus-based evacuation, thus addressing the need to consider different 
evacuation modes in a combined way (challenge belonging to category (2)). To the best of 
my knowledge, only another paper has recently attempted to consider the aforementioned 
three aspects together Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014), which has been described in 
section 4.3.1. 
Secondly, SISLER challenges Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014)’s assu ptio  related to 
the adoption of a SO approach where a planning authority is in charge of shelter location, 
car-based evacuation, and bus-based evacuation decisions. In fact, it may be argued that this 
assumption is not very realistic, unless paramilitary circumstances are in place, given that 
self-evacuees will always attempt to travel the shortest available route. This is the reason 
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why SISLER assumes that all self-evacuees, even the furthest ones, are able to reach a shelter 
within a traveling time threshold and, based on how strict or loose this threshold is (i.e.,  how 
much self-evacuees are willing to travel either a shorter or lengthier route), they are free to 
decide which path to take. On the other side, the system planner is in charge of opening 
shelter sites and arranging supported-evacuation. This assumption allows to tackle 
challenges belonging to both categories (4) and (5). In fact, self-evacuee willingness to travel 
either shorter or lengthier routes allows to account for evacuee behavior (4) while, imposing 
that all self-evacuees, despite their position, are able to reach a shelter within a traveling 
time threshold, attempts to address equity issues, which are system behavior-related 
challenges (5). 
Thirdly, SISLER deploys scenario-based programming, which is a modeling technique that 
has already been successfully deployed within the disaster management field (e.g., 
emergency relief supply pre-positioning (Rawls and Turnquist (2010)) as well as in the specific 
shelter location and evacuation routing research area (Li et al. (2012), as described in Section 
4.3.1). It may be argued that, during disaster response, given that the disaster has occurred, 
the specific scenario to deal with is known. However, within a restricted time frame to put 
into action an evacuation plan, it is fundamental to know in advance how to proceed. 
Therefore, under uncertain circumstances and based on disaster-specific historical data of 
the areas under consideration, a scenario-based formulation is an efficient tool to obtain a 
solution that is robust across different disastrous conditions. In particular, the scenario-
based formulation of SISLER allows to account for road network infrastructure disruptions in 
a direct way, as to be detailed in the following (Section 5.1.1), which is another system 
behavior-related challenge (5). On the contrary, Goerigk, Deghdak and Heßler (2014) provide 
a multi-objective formulation where the evacuation time, the number of shelters to be 
opened, and the risk exposure of the evacuees are combined. The risk exposure of the 
evacuees may address infrastructure disruptions indirectly however, it does not allow to 
provide a trustworthy solution across different possible disastrous circumstances. 
5.1.1 Model assumptions 
The assumptions underpinning the SISLER problem are as follows.  
1. Both self-evacuation and supported-evacuation are considered, the reason being 
to address both the majority of the evacuees (i.e., those who can autonomously 
drive a vehicle) as well as the remaining minority (e.g., the elderly, the medically-
homebound, etc.).  
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2. Self-evacuation involves people evacuating with their own vehicles towards a 
shelter (people moving towards other destinations are not considered). In the 
following, this type of evacuation is also referred to as evacuation mode (a) or 
car-based evacuation.   
3. Supported-evacuation is arranged by public authorities and relies on buses which 
are stored and dispatched from a depot. In the following, this type of evacuation 
is also referred to as evacuation mode (b) or bus-based evacuation. 
4. The area affected by the disaster is divided in different evacuation zones. Both 
self-evacuation and supported-evacuation start at the centroid of each zone. In 
fact, prior to plan for the evacuation of a certain area, a process named zoning is 
carried out, which divides the region under study in different zones. Then, for 
each zone, the point where all evacuees are assumed to depart for evacuation is 
identified, namely the centroid. 
5. The proposed model is deterministic hence, for each zone, the number of self-
evacuees and supported-evacuees (i.e., evacuation demand) is known.  
6. Both shelters and buses have a limited capacity. In fact, when planning for 
shelters, the amount of space available to each evacuee as well as to vehicles 
taking them to safe sites should be accounted for (guidelines can be found from 
agencies such as the Turkish Red Crescent (Kıl ı, Ka a a d Bozkaya 2015)). 
Similarly, buses have limited space to be allocated that needs to be considered. 
7. Split delivery of supported-evacuees is possible (more than one bus may collect 
people from the same area and bring them to different shelters). However, all 
self-evacuees from the same zone go to the same shelter. From a practical point 
of view, in fact, it would be difficult to direct self-evacuees to different shelters.  
8. The objective is to minimize the completion time of the supported-evacuation. 
9. Self-evacuees use the shortest available path to reach their assigned shelters. To 
guarantee an egalitarian allocation, even the furthest group of self-evacuees must 
be able to reach a shelter site within a given traveling time threshold.  
10. Contraflow lane reversal (Murray-Tuite and Wolshon 2013) has been assumed on 
the network arcs whose destination node is a shelter site, which means that those 
arcs can be traveled only in one direction (i.e., towards the shelter). This is an 
approach that has been already adopted in various evacuation processes in the 
US (Brachman and Church 2009). 
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11. Each bus performs a single trip to collect evacuees from the evacuation zones, the 
reason being that a flood-like disaster has been considered while designing this 
model. When a flood strikes, there is a central zone that gets affected and then 
the disaster starts to propagate in the neighboring areas. Hence, from an 
evacuation perspective, once a bus has departed from the depot, it collects the 
evacuees, takes them to a shelter and stops there, without returning to the 
dangerously affected area. 
12. Several disruption scenarios are considered, which differ in terms of road network 
arc availability, and each scenario occurs with a given probability. In particular, 
scenarios of increasing disaster magnitude have been considered, such as small-
scale, medium-scale and large-scale disruption circumstances, so as to account 
for disaster propagation. Nevertheless, different type of scenarios could be 
considered. 
5.1.2 Model formulation 
4The SISLER problem can be described as follows.  
 
Sets and indices , : directed network 
: set of network nodes 
 ( ⊆ : set of zones where evacuation mode (a) starts, indexed by   ( ⊆ : set of zones where evacuation mode (b) starts, indexed by , where  ≠∅ hence, some zones may have both evacuations (mode (a) and (b)) occurring 
 ( ⊆  : set of potential shelter sites, indexed by  
: set of network disruption scenarios, indexed by  
: set of network arcs 
 ( ⊆ : set of available arcs under disruption scenario  
: set of buses stored and dispatched from a depot node  ( , indexed by  
 
Parameters 
: expected number of mode (a) evacuees in zone  
                                                          
4 For the sake of clarity, the reader is informed that the mathematical notations hereby 
introduced are for this specific chapter and do not relate with those introduced in other 
chapters of this dissertation. 
101 
 
: expected number of mode (b) evacuees in zone  
: capacity of a shelter at site  
: amount of resources to set up a shelter at site  
: total amount of available resources 
: capacity of bus  � : traveling time from node  to node  in scenario  (for bus-based evacuation) 
: shortest traveling time from zone   to site  in scenario  (for car-based evacuation) 
: self-evacuees traveling time threshold in scenario  
: probability of occurrence of scenario  
: parameter representing the car-based evacuees willingness to travel, [ , ] 
 
Decision variables 
: bus-based evacuation maximum completion time in scenario  
: number of evacuees who travel from node  to node  with bus  in scenario  
: number of evacuees who start evacuation at node  with bus  in scenario  
: number of evacuees who end evacuation at site  with bus  in scenario  
: 1 if the evacuees in zone   are assigned to shelter  in scenario , 0 otherwise 
: 1 if bus  travels from node  to node  in scenario , 0 otherwise 





The mathematical formulation of SISLER is the following. 
 
[SISLER] ∑    (33) 
               s.t.                  ∑ �, �   ∀ ,   (34)                ∑ : , �   ∀ ,  (35) 
               + ∑ : , � = + ∑ : , �   ∀ , ,   (36) 
               ∑ : , � − ∑ : , � =   ∀ \ ,  ,   (37) 
                ∀ , , ,   (38) 
              ∑ =   ∀ , ,  (39) 
              =   ∀ \  , ,   (40)               =   ∀ \  , ,   (41)                ∑ =   ∀ ,   (42)                ∑ +   ∀ ,  (43) 
              ∑ + ∑   ∀ ,  (44) 
              ∑    (45)                ∀  (46)                 ∀ , , ,  (47)                ∀ , ,  (48)                 ∀ , ,  (49) 
              { , }   ∀ , ,   (50)               { , }   ∀ , , ,  (51) 
              { , } ∀  (52) 
 
The objective function (33) minimizes the expected bus-based evacuation maximum 
completion time over the different network scenarios. Constraints (34) guarantee that  is 
the completion time (i.e., the longest bus route) in scenario . Constraints (35) – (41) model 
the bus-based evacuation. For each bus  and scenario , constraints (35) ensure that each 
bus departs from the depot  (if it departs); constraints (36) and (37) are flow conservation 
constraints; constraints (38) impose that people travel an arc only if a bus, whose capacity 
cannot be exceeded, serves that arc; constraints (39) guarantee that all the people of zone 
 evacuate to some shelter; constraints (40) and (41) state that evacuation starts only 
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at nodes  and ends at shelter sites , respectively. Constraints (42) and (43) 
model the car-based evacuation. For each scenario , constraints (42) ensure that every 
evacuation zone  is assigned to exactly one shelter, while constraints (43) ensure that 
the evacuation time for cars does not exceed a given threshold. Constraints (44) link together 
both self-evacuation and supported-evacuation variables by imposing that the shelter 
capacity cannot be exceeded, while constraint (45) states that the total amount of resources 
available to set up shelters cannot be exceeded. Constraints (46) – (52) are non-negativity 
and binary constraints. 
Note that “I“LER’s o je ti e a  yield ultiple opti al solutio s, so e of hi h a e 
inefficient from the car-based evacuation perspective. To guarantee an efficient allocation 
of self-evacuees to shelters, a lexicographic objective function is deployed by adding a 
second term (car-based evacuation total duration time across all the scenarios) to the 
objective (33) (as adopted by Bish (2011)). In particular, the lexicographic objective 
formulation is the following: 
 ∑ + �    (53) 
 
where  � = ∑ ∑  is the total car-based evacuation duration time for scenario 
, and  =  ∑  is a lexicographic constant which ensures that the supported-
evacuation maximum completion time dominates the self-evacuation total duration time. 
An interesting feature of SISLER is that it allows decision planners to identify a trade-off 
between self-evacuation and supported-evacuation oriented solutions, by changing a 
parameter which represents the route length that car-based evacuees are willing to accept. 
This permits to balance the bus-based evacuation completion time objective and the car-





Figure 21. Self-evacuation oriented solution (a) and supported-evacuation oriented solution (b) 
 
In Figure 21, triangle, square, and round shapes represent, respectively, the depot, 
candidate shelter sites, and evacuation zone centroids. Selected shelters are marked with a 
cross and centroids are identified with the acronyms of the evacuees departing from there 
(i.e., SES = Self-Evacuees who move towards a Shelter, SE = Supported Evacuees who move 
towards a shelter, and M = mixed demand, which is a combination of SES and SE). Normal 
and dashed arrow lines represent, respectively, SES assignments and SE routes. A tighter 
threshold (a) favours self-evacuation by inducing the opening of shelters close to self-
evacuees or mixed evacuation zones; if the threshold becomes looser (b), the supported-
evacuation maximum completion time decreases while the self-evacuation total duration 
time increases. 
 
5.2 Solution Methodology 
SISLER has been solved through a Branch-and-Cut approach of an off-the-shelf software, 
which has been enriched with valid inequalities adapted from the literature.  
Branch-and-Cut approaches are exact methods that have been largely applied to solve 
various integer programming (IP) problems (Mitchell 2002). A Branch-and-Cut approach is 
the combination of two other well-known IP solution methods: the Branch-and-Bound and 
the Cutting Plane methods. A Branch-and-Cut approach consists of designing a Branch-and-
Bound algorithm where at each node of the decision tree some cuts are generated so to 
obtain either an integer solution or a bound improvement. Then, once the efficacy of these 
cuts decreases, no additional cuts are generated and the branching phase starts. In particular, 
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a Branch-and-Cut approach allows to overcome some of the drawbacks of the two 
aforementioned methods (i.e., the Branch-and-Bound and the Cutting Plane methods). 
Compared to a pure Branch-and-Bound approach, the Branch-and-Cut provides a (dynamic) 
strengthening of the model formulation. On the other side, compared to a pure Cutting Plane 
method, the branching phase allows to overcome the "tailing off" status (i.e., a long series 
of iterations where cuts are added without a significant improvement of the current model 
formulation). 
Inequalities that are generated can be valid either locally or globally. Locally means that 
cuts are valid only in correspondence of the specific node of the decision tree (as well as its 
descendants) where they have been added. On the other side, globally means that 
inequalities are valid throughout the entire decision tree. In this case, it is possible to store 
all the cuts that have been generated into a data structure that takes the name of pool of 
constraints. Given the initial model formulation, when a new node of the decision tree is 
generated, the branching conditions are imposed and the linear relaxation is computed. A 
solution is obtained which, if fractional, prompts the search for constraints that have been 
violated which are then added to the current formulation. Then, the linear relaxation is 
solved again until all the constraints within the pool are satisfied. If the obtained solution is 
still fractional, either new procedures are implemented to find new global cuts or the 
branching phase starts; otherwise, if the solution is integer and all the constraints are not 
violated, the solution is optimal. Hence, the two key components of a Branch-and-Cut 
algorithm are: 
- the pool of constraints, which stores all the cuts that are globally valid, and 
- the separation procedures, which allow to identify inequalities that are violated in 
correspondence of the current linear relaxation solution. 
The design of efficient separation procedures is a crucial point of a Branch-and-Cut 
approach. They can either be general purpose, which means that they are applicable to any 
generic IP, or ad-hoc, which means that they are implemented for a specific class of problems. 
5.2.1 Valid inequalities for SISLER 
Valid inequalities for SISLER have been identified based on the sub-problems SISLER is 
composed of which are: the Bus Evacuation Problem (BEP), the Capacitated Facility Location 
Problem (CFLP), and the Multi-Commodity Flow Problem (MCFP). 
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Firstly, the literature on the BEP is little given that this problem has been introduced fairly 
recently (Bish 2011). However, the BEP is related to the well-known Vehicle Routing Problem 
(VRP). The routing aspect of SISLER is not pure given that the buses, once they start the 
journey from the depot, stop at a shelter destination without returning to the depot. This is 
motivated by the fact that SISLER is a static model and, as such, the evacuation occurs within 
a unique period where buses drop supported-evacuees at shelter sites. Moreover, even in 
case of a dynamic model, it would be safer to assume that buses do not return to the depots 
but just to some of the evacuation nodes (in fact, bus depots were subject to flooding in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Bish (2011)).  Given the usage of buses, the following 
round-up constraints (Boccia et al. 2018) are introduced for SISLER 
 
∑ ∑: , � ∑                           ∀  (54) 
 
which impose a lower bound on the number of buses that can be used for each scenario, 
having assumed that =   ∀ .  
Secondly, the literature on inequalities for the CFLP (Leung and Magnanti 1989; Klose and 
Drexl 2005) presents three main categories of inequalities:  
- Aggregated Capacity Constraints (ACC) such as 
 
∑ ∑ + ∑   (55) 
 
which, given facilities with equal capacity restrictions (i.e., =   ∀ ), impose 
a lower-bound on the number of facilities that should be opened. 
 
- Residual Capacity (RC) constraints such as 






where , having assumed =   ∀ . These constraints identify 
the customer demand that the last available facility should satisfy. In the case of 
SISLER, evacuees are seen as customers (hence, evacuee demand as customer 
demand), and shelters as facilities.  
 
- Variable Upper Bounds (VUB) constraints such as 
   ∀ , ,  (57) 
 
which require that a customer can be assigned to a facility only if the facility is open. 
For SISLER, it means that self-evacuees move towards a shelter site in a certain 
scenario only if the shelter has been opened.  
 
Finally, the literature for the MCFP presents various inequalities however, those which 
could be easily deployed for SISLER are the Strong Inequalities (SI) introduced by Chouman, 
Crainic and Gendron (2009) for the Multi-Commodity Capacitated Fixed-Charge Network 
Design (MCND) problem, which is based on the MCFP. The concept underpinning this set of 
constraints is the following: if a network arc is deployed, then the amount of flow of a certain 
commodity traversing that arc should be less than or equal to the demand of the commodity 
itself. This set of constraints, given that the two categories of evacuees (i.e., self-evacuees 
and supported-evacuees) can be seen as two different commodities, has been adopted and 
used for supported-evacuees. The adapted valid inequalities are the following: 
 
∑: , �       ∀ , ,                               (58) 
 
Specifically, for each scenario , the amount of supported-evacuees leaving evacuation zone 
 with bus  should not exceed the total evacuation demand of that zone and travel 
only an arc ,  which is available.  
Among all the aforementioned valid inequalities, (54) and (58) have demonstrated to 
yield an improvement in the value of the linear relaxation of SISLER, when considered 
separately or in combination, while the remaining valid inequalities did not affect the value 
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of the linear relaxation of SISLER. Therefore, (54) and (58) have been embedded as valid 
inequalities at the root node of the decision tree within the IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.6 Branch-
and-Cut framework.  
It has been possible to appreciate which are the cuts that CPLEX adopts to solve SISLER 
instances and in which amount (based on average values): flow cover cuts (61%), mixed 
integer rounding (MIR) cuts (25%), lift-and-project cuts (8%), implied bound cuts (3%), cover 
and Gomory fractional cuts (both at 1%), and clique, zero-half, and GUB cuts (that together 
constitute 1%). The in-depth description of the aforementioned cuts is out of the scope of 
this dissertatio  a d the i te ested eade  a  sta t efe i g to CPLEX Use ’s Ma ual (CPLEX), 
and then proceed with relevant branch-and-cut literature (Mitchell 2002). However, an 
interesting observation can be drawn on the first two categories of cuts added by CPLEX (i.e., 
flow cover and MIR cuts, which represent the majority of the cuts) and the nature of SISLER. 
In fact, flow cover cuts are defined based on constraints containing continuous variables 
whose upper bound varies between zero and a positive value according to the corresponding 
binary variables, while MIR cuts are produced by imposing integer rounding on the 
coefficient of integer decisional variables as well as the corresponding right-hand side 
constraint. This is in line with the flow problem component of SISLER, which contribute to 
model the bus-based evacuation.  
 
5.3 Experimental Results 
SISLER is a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model which was implemented using 
IBM ILOG OPL modeling language and solved with the Branch-and-Cut algorithm of the solver 
CPLEX, version 12.6, enriched with additional valid inequalities, as described in Section 5.2.1, 
on a computer with an I tel® Co e™ i -5200U CPU @ 2.20GHz and 8.00 GB of RAM.  
5.3.1 Testbed instances generation 
Two testbed instances of different density have been deployed to test SISLER: one of 25 
nodes and 56 arcs (25X56) and another one of 25 nodes and 165 arcs (25X165). Both 
instances have been generated as follows. A 100x100 square study area like the one 
displayed in Figure 22 has been considered, where the black area represents the central zone 
of the disaster (i.e., where the disaster starts), the grey area the region where the disaster 
can propagate, and the white area the safety zone (i.e., the disaster cannot reach that area). 
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The coordinates of evacuation zones, transshipment nodes, and shelter sites were generated 
at random in the black, light grey, and white areas, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 22. Study area 
 
Specifically, evacuation zones where only self-evacuation occurs account for 25% of the 
network nodes (i.e., 6 nodes), evacuation zones where only supported-evacuation occurs 
account for 15% of the network nodes (i.e., 4 nodes), evacuation zones where both self-
evacuation and supported-evacuation occur account for 15% of the network nodes (i.e., 4 
nodes), pure transshipment nodes account for 15% of the network nodes (i.e., 4 nodes), 
shelter sites account for the remaining 25% of the network nodes (i.e., 6 nodes), and the 
remaining 5% of the network nodes constitutes the depot node. Arcs were also generated at 
random and Euclidean distances were used as a proxy for traveling times. In accordance with 
the contraflow lane reversal assumption, it has been assumed that arcs from transshipment 
nodes to candidate shelter sites can be traveled only in one direction (i.e., towards the 
shelter). Three scenarios have been considered: (1) a small disruption scenario, where all 
network arcs are available, (2) a medium disruption scenario, where some network arcs 
connecting evacuation nodes (i.e., within the black area), accounting for 20% of the network 
arcs, have been affected by the disaster, and (3) a large disruption scenario where some arcs 
connecting evacuation and transshipment nodes (i.e., from the black to the grey area), 
accounting for 10% of the network arcs, have been disrupted in addition to the arcs already 
inoperable in the medium scenario. Arcs to be disrupted were decided at random however, 
when advancing from the medium to the large scenario, within a level of proximity. This 
choice of scenarios has been motivated having in mind a specific disaster such as flooding 
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where the off-set of the disaster occurs in certain points of networks and then propagates 
from there within a certain degree of proximity. 
Results are reported for two cases: where only one of the three scenarios is considered 
(i.e., single scenario instances) and where all the three scenarios are together (i.e., combined 
scenario instances). 
In terms of model parameters, the following settings have been adopted. 
1. Evacuation demand (measured in numbers of households) was assumed to be a 
random integer uniformly distributed between 50 and 550, as in (Gama, Santos 
and Scaparra 2016). 
2. A homogeneous bus fleet was assumed  (i.e., =   ∀ ) and the number 
of buses was computed as the round-up ratio [total bus-based evacuation 
demand/bus capacity], : 
   = ⌈∑ � ⌉. 
 
3. Shelter capacities were computed as reported by Gama, Santos and Scaparra 
(2016), based on (Lorena and Senne 2004), as the round-up ratio [total 
evacuation demand/maximum number of shelters that can be opened]: 
 = ⌈∑ +� ∑ �∗� ⌉  
 
where, more specifically,  is the maximum number of shelters that can be 
opened based on the budget constraint (45) and  is a weighting parameter set 
equal to 0.8. Shelter capacities are assumed to be the same for each shelter (i.e., =   ∀ ). 
4. For each scenario and car-based evacuation zone, the shortest traveling time and 
the time threshold were computed in a pre-processing phase. Self-evacuee 
shortest travelling times for each scenario (i.e., ) were computed through a 
shortest path algorithm, while the self-evacuee traveling time threshold for each 
scenario (i.e., ) was computed through an auxiliary capacitated p-center 
model. In particular, the p-center model aims at minimizing the self-evacuee 
maximum traveling time to reach shelter sites. In this case, shelter capacities are 
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still computed as based on (Lorena and Senne 2004) however, only the total self-
evacuee evacuation demand is considered (i.e., ∑ ) to compute the 
reduced shelter capacity. 
5. A decreasing probability distribution was used to combine the three different 
scenarios ( = . , = . , and =  . ). This choice is based on the 
assumption that a large-scale disastrous circumstance (i.e., scenario 3) is less 
likely than a medium-scale one (i.e., scenario 2), which in turn is less likely than a 
small-scale disruption leaving transport links unaffected (i.e., scenario 1).   
5.3.1.1 Computational results for the 25x56 network 
The network with 25 nodes and 56 arcs was used as a proof of concept to demonstrate the 
validity of the problem and to preliminary test the SISLER formulation. Given its dimensions, 
even without adding the inequalities found for SISLER, both single and combined scenario 
instances were solved in a matter of few seconds.  
The results for the 25x56 network are displayed in Table 14, 15, 16 and 17 for the small, 
medium, large scenarios, and their combination, respectively. The tables report the bus-
based evacuation maximum completion time, the car-based evacuation total duration time, 
and the open shelters for different values of  ranging from 0 to 1 (note that the potential 
shelter sites for the 25x56 network are nodes 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24).  
 
Table 14. Computational results for the 25x56 network – Scenario 1 (Small) 











0 212 282 {19,20,23,24} 
0.1 212 282 {19,20,23,24} 
0.2 143 301 {19,21,23,24} 
0.3 143 301 {19,21,23,24} 
0.4 143 301 {19,21,23,24} 
0.5 138 323 {19,22,23,24} 
0.6 138 323 {19,22,23,24} 
0.7 138 323 {19,22,23,24} 
0.8 138 323 {19,22,23,24} 
0.9 138 323 {19,22,23,24} 





Table 15. Computational results for the 25x56 network – Scenario 2 (Medium) 











0 175 347 {19,21,23,24} 
0.1 175 347 {19,21,23,24} 
0.2 175 347 {19,21,23,24} 
0.3 175 347 {19,21,23,24} 
0.4 175 347 {19,21,23,24} 
0.5 168 427 {20,22,23,24} 
0.6 168 427 {20,22,23,24} 
0.7 168 427 {20,22,23,24} 
0.8 168 421 {19,20,22,24} 
0.9 168 421 {19,20,22,24} 
1 168 421 {19,20,22,24} 
 
Table 16. Computational results for the 25x56 network – Scenario 3 (Large) 











0 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.1 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.2 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.3 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.4 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.5 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.6 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.7 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.8 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 
0.9 211 447 {19,20,22,24} 





Table 17. Computational results for the 25x56 network – All Scenarios (Mix) 











0 216 322.4 {19,20,23,24} 
0.1 216 322.4 {19,20,23,24} 
0.2 166.2 361.2 {20,21,23,24} 
0.3 166.2 361.2 {20,21,23,24} 
0.4 166.2 361.2 {20,21,23,24} 
0.5 161.6 415.2 {20,22,23,24} 
0.6 161.6 415.2 {20,22,23,24} 
0.7 161.6 415.2 {20,22,23,24} 
0.8 161.6 415.2 {20,22,23,24} 
0.9 161.6 415.2 {20,22,23,24} 
1 161.6 415.2 {20,22,23,24} 
 
From the analysis of the tables, it is possible to infer the trade-off between the bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration time.  
For example, in the small scenario (i.e., Table 14) when  increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the 
supported-evacuation maximum completion time drops by nearly 33% (from 212 to 143), 
while the self-evacuation total duration time increases by around 7% (from 282 to 301), 
which also implies a change in the shelter location decisions (from node 20 to node 21). 
Another change in both evacuation times and shelter locations can be observed when  rises 
from 0.4 to 0.5. In this case, the bus-based evacuation maximum completion time decreases 
by nearly 3% (from 143 to 138), while the car-based evacuation total duration time raises by 
around 7% (from 301 to 323), and node 22 is open instead of node 21. A visual representation 
of the trade-off between the bus-based evacuation maximum completion time and the car-
based evacuation total duration time when  varies between 0 and 1 for the small scenario 





Figure 23. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – 25x56 network – Scenario 1 
(Small) 
 
Other examples can be appreciated from the analysis of the medium scenario (i.e., Table 
15). When  increases from 0.4 to 0.5, the supported-evacuation maximum completion time 
drops by nearly 4% (from 175 to 168), while the self-evacuation total duration time increases 
by around 23% (from 347 to 427), leading to a shift in shelter location decisions (two nodes 
are changed among four, specifically, nodes 20 and 22 are preferred over nodes 19 and 21). 
Conversely, when  rises from 0.7 to 0.8, the bus-based evacuation time does not change 
however, the car-based evacuation completion time decreases by nearly 1%  (from 427 to 
421) and there is a change in shelter location decisions (from node 20 to node 19). This is 
motivated by the fact that the more  increases, the more the self-evacuation traveling time 
threshold becomes looser, thus allowing allocations that were infeasible for lower values of 
. A visual representation of the trade-off between the bus-based evacuation maximum 
completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration time when  varies between 0 





























Figure 24. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – 25x56 network – Scenario 2 
(Medium) 
 
Differently from the small and medium scenarios, no trade-off between the bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration time can 
be appreciated for the large scenario (i.e., Table 16). In this case, the solution is always the 
same, irrespective of the value of . However, the trade-off can still be observed when 
combining the three scenarios (i.e., Table 17). In fact, when  increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the 
supported-evacuation maximum completion time drops by nearly 23% (from 216 to 166.2), 
while the self-evacuation total duration time rises by around 12% (from 322.4 to 361.2), and 
this implies a change in the shelter location decisions (from node 19 to node 21). Another 
change in both evacuation times and shelter locations can be appreciated when  raises 
from 0.4 to 0.5. In this case, the bus-based evacuation maximum completion time decreases 
by nearly 3% (from 166.2 to 161.6), while the car-based evacuation total duration time rises 
by around 15% (from 361.2 to 415.2), and node 22 is opened instead of node 21. A visual 
representation of the trade-off between the bus-based evacuation maximum completion 
time and the car-based evacuation total duration time when  varies between 0 and 1 for 






























Figure 25. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – 25x56 network – All Scenarios 
(Mix) 
 
Moreover, the comparison of the results across all the tables highlights the importance 
of considering multiple scenarios. The solutions found when all the three scenarios are taken 
into account can differ quite significantly from the solutions obtained for a single scenario. 
For example, the optimal set of shelters in the solution obtained when  = 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4, 
which is composed of nodes 20, 21, 23, and 24, is different from the optimal set selected in 
the single scenario instances for the same values of  (i.e., 19, 21, 23, and 24 for both the 
small and medium scenarios and 19, 20, 22, and 24 for the large scenario), and so are the 
bus routes and self-evacuee to shelter allocations. 
Table 18 reports the values of the linear relaxation of SISLER without any inequality (LR), 
with the addition of inequalities (54) (LR+BUS), with the addition of inequalities (58) 
(LR+FLOW), and with the addition of both inequalities (54) and (58) (LR+BUS+FLOW) for the 
small (S), medium (M), large (L) scenarios, and their combination (MIX), respectively. 
 
Table 18. Computational results for the 25x56 network – Linear relaxation values 
Scenario LR LR+BUS LR+FLOW LR+BUS+FLOW 
S 103.83 111.83 113.9 120.83 
M 113.18 121.98 137.9 145.9 
L 117.98 132.38 141.7 153.57 




























From the analysis of the table, it is possible to appreciate the improvement in the value 
of the linear relaxation of SISLER due to the addition of the inequalities. The presence of 
inequalities (54), (58), and their combination increases, respectively, the value of the linear 
relaxation by around: 8% (from 103.83 to 111.83), 10% (from 103.83 to 113.9), and 16% 
(from 103.83 to 120.83) in the small scenario; 8% (from 113.18 to 121.98), 22% (from 113.18 
to 137.9), and 29% (from 113.18 to 145.9) in the medium scenario; 12% (from 117.98 to 
132.38), 20% (from 117.98 to 141.7), and 30% (from 117.98 to 153.57) in the large scenario; 
and 9% (from 109.47 to 118.99), 16% (from 109.47 to 126.66), and 23% (from 109.47 to 134.9) 
in the combined scenario. The value of the linear relaxation is the same whichever value of 
 hence, it seems that the choice of  is not relevant to this matter. Usually, an improvement 
in the value of the linear relaxation allows to solve instances in a shorter amount of time. As 
mentioned previously, it was not possible to appreciate these benefits of the additional 
inequalities in terms of computational performance on the 25x56 network. However, the 
positive contribution of the additional inequalities will be demonstrated through the analysis 
of the experimental results of the 25x165 network, specifically when it comes to combined 
scenario instances. 
5.3.1.2 Computational results for the 25x165 network 
Following the same scheme for instance generation, computational results are now reported 
for a more dense network with 25 nodes and 165 arcs. In particular, it is demonstrated how 
the inclusion of the ad-hoc inequalities within the IBM ILOG CPLEX Branch-and-Cut 
framework  makes a clear difference and allows to always obtain an integer solution, which 
would have not been possible otherwise, within the pre-fixed computational time limit set 
equal to 3600 seconds. The reason for this tight time limit is due to the fact that, in order to 
effectively deploy SISLER during the DOM response phase, it has to provide solutions in a 
reasonable amount of time.  
Results are displayed in Table 19, 20, 21 and 22 for the small, medium, large scenarios, 
and their combination, respectively. The tables report the CPU time spent at the root node 
in seconds (Time at the root node) and the total CPU time spent to solve an instance in 
seconds (Total CPU time) without any inequality (I), with the addition of inequalities (54) 
(I+BUS), with the addition of inequalities (58) (I+FLOW), and with the addition of both 
inequalities (54) and (58) (I+BUS+FLOW) for different values of  ranging from 0 to 1. The 
tables also report the solution details in terms of bus-based evacuation maximum 
completion time (Bus max time), the car-based evacuation total duration time (Car tot time) 
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and the open shelters (note that the potential shelter sites for the 25x165 network are nodes 
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24) for all the different values of . 
Table 19. Computational results for the 25x165 network – Scenario 1 (Small) 
Scenario 1 (Small) 



























Bus      
max 
time 





0 2.17 120.28 3.20 22.23 1.53 144 1.17 27.22 133 402 {20,21,24} 
0.1 2.90 20.28 4.15 13.28 1.56 108.5 1.59 23.24 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.2 1.70 18.22 2.25 44.73 1.31 28.39 1.00 28.27 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.3 2.40 90.26 2.46 43.35 1.28 40.83 1.20 34.45 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.4 2.11 16.04 2.56 17.72 1.45 25.49 1.04 22.11 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.5 2.56 75.75 1.86 81.79 1.31 134.88 1.67 23.17 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.6 2.07 57.6 1.84 33.74 1.28 30.11 1.62 37.21 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.7 2.04 11.61 1.61 18.39 1.64 33.82 1.22 26.57 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.8 2.37 12.23 1.29 27.24 1.47 37.28 1.06 23.6 132 407 {20,23,24} 
0.9 1.62 15.79 2.17 12.39 1.69 33.17 1.51 39.42 132 407 {20,23,24} 
1 2.06 16.05 1.76 12.51 1.56 34.62 1.75 43.41 132 407 {20,23,24} 
AVG 2.2 41.3 2.3 29.8 1.46 59.2 1.4 29.9 132.1 406.6 N/A 
 
Table 20. Computational results for the 25x165 network – Scenario 2 (Medium) 
Scenario 2 (Medium) 


























Bus      
max 
time 





0 6.26 7.79 3.63 4.34 0.84 2.04 0.95 12.85 133 402 {20,21,24} 
0.1 3.54 5.73 4.24 8.35 1.16 5.12 1.28 7.24 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.2 3.28 5.93 2.01 5.3 1.14 3.68 1.08 1.7 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.3 2.11 3.95 2.76 3.17 1.33 4.84 0.80 1.73 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.4 2.18 2.53 1.82 4.87 0.83 9.2 1.22 5.41 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.5 1.73 3.77 1.89 10.45 1.15 4.59 1.04 7.13 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.6 1.19 3.65 2.06 6.54 0.73 5.07 0.56 1.39 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.7 1.90 2.59 1.87 3.57 1.11 10.97 0.83 3.39 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.8 1.54 3.52 1.67 5.26 0.84 6.71 0.55 1.47 133 401 {20,23,24} 
0.9 0.84 1.76 0.76 3.04 0.81 13.73 0.73 5.29 133 401 {20,23,24} 
1 0.91 1.67 0.76 2.34 0.97 13.46 0.79 6.01 133 401 {20,23,24} 





Table 21. Computational results for the 25x165 network – Scenario 3 (Large) 
Scenario 3 (Large) 


























Bus      
max 
time 





0 4.88 5.57 4.90 5.41 2.45 6.69 1.00 6.3 139 409 {20,22,24} 
0.1 4.66 9.7 5.80 13.62 2.40 3.43 1.51 3.2 137 416 {22,23,24} 
0.2 1.81 3.01 1.97 9.84 1.04 5.97 0.81 5.91 133 420 {20,21,24} 
0.3 3.81 5.48 1.89 3.2 1.00 8.61 0.73 8.75 133 420 {20,21,24} 
0.4 2.21 4.57 1.36 9.48 0.73 27.71 0.84 6.33 133 420 {20,21,24} 
0.5 2.04 4.45 0.89 5.66 1.16 42.89 0.64 7.08 133 420 {20,21,24} 
0.6 1.45 36.57 1.48 9.58 0.83 13.48 0.75 7.69 133 420 {20,21,24} 
0.7 1.12 6.99 1.01 12.64 0.69 49.37 1.67 6.36 133 420 {20,21,24} 
0.8 1.69 7.29 1.45 7.83 0.98 9.11 0.94 14.88 133 420 {20,21,24} 
0.9 1.86 8.02 0.97 8.85 1.00 24.48 0.42 17.14 133 420 {20,21,24} 
1 1.14 20.23 1.00 26.16 1.11 10.31 0.50 6.54 133 420 {20,21,24} 
AVG 2.4 10.2 2.1 10.2 1.2 18.4 0.9 8.2 133.9 418.6 N/A 
 
Table 22. Computational results for the 25x165 network – All Scenarios (Mix) 
All Scenarios (Mix) 


























Bus      
max 
time 





0 - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.1 4.04 3600* 5.41 3600* 2.06 143.69 2.18 522.67 135 395.3 {22,23,24} 
0.2 3.32 3600* 4.04 3600* 3.06 623.74 2.50 474.41 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
0.3 3.60 3600* 2.93 3600* 3.38 736.04 2.54 2769.05 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
0.4 3.32 3600* 4.74 3408 3.11 3600* 2.31 282.14 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
0.5 3.09 3600* 3.12 3600* 3.95 947.85 2.89 1922.12 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
0.6 3.84 3600* 4.15 3600* 2.80 630.01 2.68 855.87 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
0.7 3.32 3600* 3.21 3600* 3.34 1194.53 2.25 253.8 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
0.8 3.14 3600* 3.56 3600* 2.42 1707.12 2.28 534.18 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
0.9 5.23 3600* 5.04 3600* 2.96 2409.87 2.34 418.72 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
1 3.48 3600* 3.20 3600* 3.31 3600* 2.62 440.56 132.5 411.2 {20,23,24} 
AVG 3.6 3600 3.9 3580.8 3 1559.3 2.5 847.4 132.8 409.6 N/A 
 
Legend: - = No solution has been found; * = Instance not been solved to optimality within the pre-





Similarly to the 25x56 network, it is possible to infer the trade-off between the bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration time. For 
example, in the small scenario (i.e., Table 19) when  increases from 0 to 0.1, the supported-
evacuation maximum completion time drops by nearly 1% (from 133 to 132), while the self-
evacuation total duration time increases by around 1% (from 402 to 407). This entails a 
change in the shelter location decisions where node 23 is open instead of node 21. A visual 
representation of the trade-off between the bus-based evacuation maximum completion 
time and the car-based evacuation total duration time when  varies between 0 and 1 for 
the small scenario is displayed in Figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – 25x165 network – Scenario 1 
(Small) 
 
Another example can be appreciated from the analysis of the medium scenario (i.e., Table 
20). When  increases from 0 to 0.1, the bus-based evacuation maximum completion time 
does not change however, the car-based evacuation total duration time decreases slightly 
(from 402 to 401). This is motivated by the fact that the more  increases, the more the self-
evacuation traveling time threshold becomes looser, thus allowing allocations that were 
infeasible for lower values of . This also entails a change in the shelter location decisions 































Further examples emerge in the analysis of the large scenario (i.e., Table 21). When  
increases from 0 to 0.1, the supported-evacuation maximum completion time drops by 
nearly 1% (from 139 to 137), while the self-evacuation total duration time increases by 
around 2% (from 409 to 416), and there is a change in shelter locations (from node 20 to 
node 23). Another change in both evacuation times and shelter sites can be observed when 
 rises from 0.1 to 0.2. In this case, the bus-based evacuation maximum completion time 
decreases by nearly 3% (from 137 to 133), while the car-based evacuation total duration time 
raises by around 1% (from 416 to 420), and the optimal set of shelter locations changes from 
22, 23, and 24 to 20, 21, and 24. A visual representation of the trade-off between the bus-
based evacuation maximum completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration 
time when  varies between 0 and 1 for the large scenario is displayed in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – 25x165 network – Scenario 3 (Large) 
 
Finally, the trade-off can also be inferred when the three scenarios are combined together 
(i.e., Table 22). In fact, when  rises from 0.1 to 0.2, the supported-evacuation maximum 
completion time decreases by around 2% (from 135 to 132.5), while the car-based 
evacuation total duration time rises by nearly 4% (from 395.3 to 411.2), and node 20 is 
opened instead of node 22. A visual representation of the trade-off between the bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration time 































Figure 28. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – 25x165 network – All Scenarios (Mix) 
 
Table 23 reports the values of the linear relaxation of SISLER without any inequality (LR), 
with the addition of inequalities (54) (LR+BUS), with the addition of inequalities (58) 
(LR+FLOW), and with the addition of both inequalities (54) and (58) (LR+BUS+FLOW) for the 
small (S), medium (M), large scenarios (L), and their combination (MIX), respectively. 
 
Table 23. Computational results for the 25x165 network – Linear relaxation values 
Scenario LR LR+BUS LR+FLOW LR+BUS+FLOW 
S 64.86 68.36 86.86 90.30 
M 64.86 68.36 95.36 98.61 
L 64.86 68.36 95.36 98.61 
MIX 64.86 68.36 91.11 94.46 
 
Further observations can be drawn from the combined analysis of Tables 19, 20, 21, 22, 
and 23 that concern the value of the linear relaxation of SISLER, the total CPU time spent to 
solve an instance, and the number of instances that have not been solved to optimality 
within the pre-fixed time limit (this applies exclusively to combined scenario instances). Table 
23 shows that the addition of inequalities (54), (58), as well as their combination, leads to an 
improvement of the value of the linear relaxation of SISLER by around, respectively: 5% (from 






























scenario; 5% (from 64.86 to 68.36), 47% (from 64.86 to 95.36), and 52% (from 64.86 to 98.61) 
in both the medium and large scenarios; and 5% (from 64.86 to 68.36), 40% (from 64.86 to 
91.11), and 46% (from 64.86 to 94.46) in the combined scenario. These values are correlated 
to the time spent at the root node as well as the total CPU time spent to solve an instance 
and, specifically in case of combined scenario instances (i.e., Table 22), to the number of 
instances that have been solved within the pre-fixed time limit of 3600 seconds. The 
presence of additional inequalities entails an increase in the time spent at the root node by 
around 8% (from 3.6 to 3.9) when adding inequalities (54), while a decrease by nearly 16% 
(from 3.6 to 3) when adding inequalities (58), and 32% (from 3.6 to 2.5) for their combination, 
based on average computed values (AVG). On the other side, the total CPU time decreases 
by around 3% (from 3600 to 3508.8), 57% (from 3600 to 1559.3), and 76% (from 3600 to 
847.4) for inequalities (54), (58), and their combination, respectively, based on average 
computed values (AVG). These results are in line with the increase in the value of the linear 
relaxation previously reported. Furthermore, the presence of inequalities allows to solve 
instances to optimality within the pre-fixed time limit and to reduce the average gap for 
those that were not solved to optimality, as displayed in Table 24. In particular, Table 24 
reports the lower bound value (LB), the upper bound value (UB), which is the best found 
integer, and the resulting gap (GAP) for combined scenario instances without any inequality 
(I), with the addition of inequalities (54) (I+BUS), with the addition of inequalities (58) 
(I+FLOW), and with the addition of both inequalities (54) and (58) (I+BUS+FLOW) when  
varies from 0 to 1. 
Table 24. Computational results for the 25x165 network – All Scenarios (Mix) – Gap analysis 
  I I+BUS I+FLOW I+BUS+FLOW 
α LB UB GAP LB UB GAP LB UB GAP LB UB GAP 
0 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
0.1 131.54 137 3.99% 131.17 137 4.26% 135 135 0% 135 135 0% 
0.2 113.09 133 14.97% 129.14 133 2.90% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.5 132.5 0% 
0.3 126.63 133 4.79% 123.94 133 6.81% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.5 132.5 0% 
0.4 123.99 133 6.77% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.24 132.5 0.20% 132.5 132.5 0% 
0.5 132.5 133 0.38% 123.64 133 7.04% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.5 132.5 0% 
0.6 123.04 133 7.49% 132.5 133 0.38% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.5 132.5 0% 
0.7 125.13 133 5.92% 127.87 133 3.86% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.5 132.5 0% 
0.8 125.43 133 5.69% 129.13 133 2.91% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.5 132.5 0% 
0.9 128.54 133 3.35% 130.83 133 1.63% 132.5 132.5 0% 132.5 132.5 0% 
1 128.74 133 3.20% 126.54 133 4.86% 130 132.5 1.89% 132.5 132.5 0% 
AVG 125.86 133.4 5.65% 128.73 133.35 3.46% 132.474 132.75 0.21% 132.75 132.75 0 
 
Legend: - = No solution has been found; N/A = Not Applicable 
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The addition of inequalities (54), which yield the lowest increase of the linear relaxation 
value, did not allow to solve any of the combined scenario instance to optimality. Conversely, 
the addition of inequalities (58), to which corresponds a higher increase of the linear 
relaxation value, allowed to close to optimality eight out of ten combined scenario instances. 
Finally, the combination of inequalities (54) and (58), to which corresponds the best 
improvement in the value of the linear relaxation, yield to close to optimality all the 
combined scenario instances. Moreover, a decrease in the average gap by around 39% (from 
5.65% to 3.46%) and 96% (from 5.65% to 0.21%) can be appreciated for inequalities (54) and 
(58), respectively. 
5.3.2 Case study: Sioux Falls network 
5.3.2.1 Case study description 
In addition to testbed instances, SISLER has also been tested on a realistic case study, which 
is the Sioux Falls network (network data are available at Transportation Network, which is a 
network repository for transportation research (Transportation Network for Research Core 
Team)). The Sioux Falls network has been quite used in the transportation literature, 
including evacuation planning studies (Ng, Park and Waller 2010). The network is composed 
of 24 nodes and 76 arcs and it is displayed in Figure 29. 
 




For experimentation purposes: node 4, 7, 8, 14, 19, and 21 are assumed to be car-based 
evacuation only zones; node 3, 9, 15, and 22 are assumed to be bus-based evacuation only 
zones; node 5, 11, 16, and 23 are assumed to be mixed-evacuation zones (i.e., both car-based 
and bus-based evacuations can occur); node 1, 2, 13, 18, and 20 are assumed to be candidate 
shelter sites; node 12 is assumed to be the depot; and the remaining network nodes are 
assumed to be pure transshipment nodes. Note that, based on SISLER assumptions, arcs 
whose final destination is a candidate shelter location are travelled only towards the shelter 
(hence, the arc that is travelled in the opposite direction is not considered) and, given that 
buses are not returning to the depot, all the network arcs originally having node 12 as a 
terminal point have been discarded. This has led to a reduced version of the Sioux Falls 
network with 24 nodes and 58 arcs, as reported in Figure 30. 
 
 
Figure 30. Sioux Falls network under SISLER assumptions – Scenario 1 (Small) 
 
Network nodes are categorized in Figure 30 as follows: blue, red, and brown round shapes 
represent car-based only, bus- based only, and mixed-evacuation demand zones, 




Evacuation demand and traveling times have been computed based on the Sioux Falls 
network data that have been found (Transportation Networks). Model parameter settings 
(e.g., bus fleet, number of buses, shelter capacity, self-evacuees traveling time threshold, 
and scenario probability distribution) are computed exactly as described for the testbed 
instances. The three different scenarios have been designed as follows: for the small scenario 
(Scenario 1), it is assumed that all network arcs are available, which is the network displayed 
in Figure 30; for the medium scenario (Scenario 2), it is assumed that arcs (4,5), (5,4), (8,16), 
(14,15), (15,14), and (16,8) are disrupted; and for the large scenario (Scenario 3), it is 
assumed that arcs (10,11), (10,17), (11,10), (17,10), (21,24), and (24,21) are disaster-affected, 
in addition to the arcs already unavailable in the medium scenario. Figure 31 and Figure 32 
display the Sioux Falls network under Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 circumstances, respectively. 
 
 





Figure 32. Sioux Falls network under SISLER assumptions – Scenario 3 (Large) 
 
5.3.2.2 Computational results 
The results for the Sioux Falls network are displayed in Table 25, 26, 27, and 28 for the small, 
medium, large scenarios, and their combination, respectively. The tables report the bus-
based evacuation maximum completion time, the car-based evacuation total duration time 
and the open shelters for different values of  ranging from 0 to 1 (remember that the 




Table 25. Computational results for the Sioux Falls network – Scenario 1 (Small) 






evacuation        
total time 
Open Shelters 
0 25 83 {2,18,20] 
0.1 25 83 {2,18,20} 
0.2 25 74 {13,18,20} 
0.3 25 74 {13,18,20} 
0.4 25 74 {13,18,20} 
0.5 25 74 {13,18,20} 
0.6 25 74 {13,18,20} 
0.7 25 74 {13,18,20} 
0.8 25 74 {13,18,20} 
0.9 25 74 {13,18,20} 
1 25 74 {13,18,20} 
 
 
Table 26. Computational results for the Sioux Falls network – Scenario 2 (Medium) 






evacuation        
total time 
Open Shelters 
0 41 75 {1,18,20} 
0.1 41 75 {1,18,20} 
0.2 41 75 {1,18,20} 
0.3 31 79 {13,18,20} 
0.4 31 79 {13,18,20} 
0.5 31 79 {13,18,20} 
0.6 31 79 {13,18,20} 
0.7 31 79 {13,18,20} 
0.8 31 79 {13,18,20} 
0.9 31 79 {13,18,20} 





Table 27. Computational results for the Sioux Falls network – Scenario 3 (Large) 






evacuation        
total time 
Open Shelters 
0 44 88 {1,2,20} 
0.1 44 88 {1,2,20} 
0.2 44 88 {1,2,20} 
0.3 44 88 {1,2,20} 
0.4 44 88 {1,2,20} 
0.5 44 88 {2,13,18} 
0.6 44 88 {2,13,18} 
0.7 44 88 {1,2,20} 
0.8 44 88 {2,13,18} 
0.9 44 88 {2,13,18} 
1 44 88 {2,13,18} 
 
From the analysis of the tables, it is possible to infer the trade-off between the bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration time.  
For example, in the small scenario (i.e., Table 25) when  increases from 0.1 to 0.2, the 
supported-evacuation maximum completion time does not change while the self-evacuation 
total duration time reduces by around 11% (from 83 to 74). This is motivated by the fact that 
the more  increases, the more the self-evacuation traveling time threshold becomes looser, 
thus allowing allocations that were infeasible for lower values of  and, in this specific case, 
it also implies a change in the shelter location decisions (from node 2 to node 13). A change 
in both evacuation times and shelter locations can be observed from the analysis of the 
medium scenario (i.e., Table 26). When  increases from 0.2 to 0.3, the bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time drops by nearly 23% (from 41 to 31), while the car-
based evacuation total duration time increases by around 5% (from 75 to 79), leading to a 
shift in shelter location decisions (node 13 is opened instead of node 1). A visual 
representation of the trade-off between the bus-based evacuation maximum completion 
time and the car-based evacuation total duration time when  varies between 0 and 1 for 




Figure 33. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – Sioux Falls network – Scenario 2 
(Medium) 
 
Moreover, regarding the large scenario (i.e., Table 27), neither the supported-evacuation 
maximum completion time nor the self-evacuation total duration time change however, 
there are some changes in the shelter location decisions (e.g., when  increases from 0.4 to 
0.5). The reason for this can be the presence of multiple optimal solutions. In fact, the 
objective function considers the supported-evacuation maximum completion time and the 
self-evacuation total duration time in its lexicographic form however, the shelter location 
decisional variables are not present in the objective function.  
Single scenario instances were solved in matter of few seconds. Results of combined 
scenario instances are reported in Table 28. The table reports the CPU time spent at the root 
node in seconds (Time at the root node) and the total CPU time spent to solve an instance in 
seconds (Total CPU time) under four different circumstances which are without any 
inequality (I), with the addition of inequalities (54) (I+BUS), with the addition of inequalities 
(58) (I+FLOW), and with the addition of both inequalities (54) and (58) (I+BUS+FLOW) for 
different values of  ranging from 0 to 1. The tables also report the solution details in terms 
of bus-based evacuation maximum completion time (Bus max time), the car-based 


























Table 28. Computational results for the Sioux Falls network – All Scenarios (Mix) 
All Scenarios (Mix) 


























Bus      
max 
time 





0 1.25 949.75 1.28 800.71 1.58 2099.81 1.39 267.28 36 73 {1,18,20} 
0.1 1.20 3002.2 1.29 2797.32 1.76 783.81 1.45 826.6 36 73 {1,18,20} 
0.2 1.20 344.19 1.26 512.7 1.69 638.98 2.06 817.54 36 73 {1,18,20} 
0.3 1.09 105.19 1.11 65.26 1.78 94.71 1.97 52.88 33 75.4 {1,18,20} 
0.4 1.23 66.69 1.36 60.79 1.95 58.41 1.70 141.8 31 81.9 {1,18,20} 
0.5 1.01 337.77 1.34 130.96 1.53 401.61 1.33 349.96 31 76.9 {13,18,20} 
0.6 1.31 175.19 1.29 186.03 1.34 595.89 1.42 433.37 31 76.9 {13,18,20} 
0.7 1.34 369.83 1.11 214.92 1.64 229.43 1.39 433.64 30.6 83.1 {2,18,20} 
0.8 1.11 229.73 1.14 119.47 1.67 144.77 1.62 80.09 30.6 83.1 {2,18,20} 
0.9 1.00 143.32 1.19 401.25 1.39 92.56 1.37 326.09 30.6 83.1 {2,18,20} 
1 1.19 338.47 1.08 233.19 1.68 128.5 1.53 75.49 30.6 83.1 {2,18,20} 
AVG 1.17 551.12 1.22 502.05 1.64 478.95 1.58 345.85 32.4 78.4 N/A 
 
From the analysis of Table 28, it is possible to infer the trade-off between the bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time and the car-based evacuation total duration time. For 
example, when  increases from 0.2 to 0.3, the supported-evacuation maximum completion 
time drops by around 8% (from 36 to 33) while the self-evacuation total duration time 
increases by around 3% (from 73 to 75.4) however, this does not entail a change in shelter 
location decisions. Another example can be observed when  rises from 0.3 to 0.4, in fact, 
the bus-based evacuation maximum completion time decreases by around 6% (from 33 to 
31) while the car-based evacuation total duration time increases by around 1% (from 75.4 to 
76.9). Differently, when  increases from 0.4 to 0.5, there is no change in bus-based 
evacuation maximum completion time however, the car-based evacuation total duration 
time drops by around 6% (from 81.9 to 76.9). This is motivated by the fact that the more  
increases, the looser is the self-evacuation traveling time threshold thus allowing self-
evacuees to shelter allocation that were not allowed for previous values of . Moreover, this 
leads to a change in the shelter location decisions, in fact, node 13 is opened instead of node 
1. A further example of trade-off between bus-based evacuation and car-based evacuation 
that does also require a shift in shelter location decisions can be appreciated when  rises 
from 0.6 to 0.7, where the supported-evacuation maximum completion time drops by 
around 1% (from 31 to 30.6) while the self-evacuation total duration time increases by 
around 8% (from 76.9 to 83.1), and node 2 is opened instead of node 13. A visual 
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representation of the trade-off between the bus-based evacuation maximum completion 
time and the car-based evacuation total duration time when  varies between 0 and 1 for 
the combined scenario is displayed in Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34. Evacuation times trade-off for different values of � – Sioux Falls network – All Scenarios 
(Mix) 
 
Moreover, the comparison of the results across all the tables highlights the importance 
of considering multiple scenarios. In fact, the solutions found when all the three scenarios 
are taken into account can differ quite significantly from the solutions obtained for a single 
scenario. For example, the optimal set of shelters in the solution obtained when  = 0.7, 0.8, 
0.9, and 1, which is composed of nodes 2, 18, and 20, is different from the optimal set 
selected in each individual scenario for the same values of  (i.e., 13, 18, and 20 for both the 
small and medium scenarios and 2, 13, and 18 for the large scenario), and so are the bus 
routes and self-evacuee to shelter allocations. 
Table 29 reports the values of the linear relaxation of SISLER without any inequality (LR), 
with the addition of inequalities (54) (LR+BUS), with the addition of inequalities (58) 
(LR+FLOW), and with the addition of both inequalities (54) and (58) (LR+BUS+FLOW) for the 


























Table 29. Computational results for the Sioux Falls network – Linear relaxation values 
Scenario LR LR+BUS LR+FLOW LR+BUS+FLOW 
S 19.31 19.31 19.57 19.57 
M 19.82 19.82 20.09 20.09 
L 24.42 24.42 24.68 24.68 
MIX 20.48 20.48 20.75 20.75 
 
Further observations can be drawn from the combined analysis of Tables 28 and 29 from 
a computational perspective. A slight improvement in the value of the linear relaxation of 
SISLER can be appreciated due to the addition of the inequalities. The presence of 
inequalities (54) does not yield any improvement while inequalities (58) increase the value 
of the linear relaxation by around 1% in each single scenario (from 19.31 to 19.57 in the small 
scenario, from 19.82 to 20.09 in the medium scenario, and from 24.42 to 24.68 in the large 
scenario). The combination of inequalities (54) and (58) does not produce any improvement. 
The reason for this result may be due to either the specific network under consideration or 
the scenario settings. The presence of additional inequalities entails an increase in the time 
spent at the root node by around 3% (from 1.17 to 1.22), 39% (from 1.17 to 1.64), and 33% 
(from 1.17 to 1.58), for inequalities (54), (58), and their combination, respectively, based on 
average computed values (AVG). Inversely, the total CPU time decreases by around 9% (from 
551.12 to 502.05), 13% (from 551.12 to 478.95), and 37% (from 551.12 to 345.85) for 
inequalities (54), (58), and their combination, respectively, also based on average computed 
values (AVG). This is in line with the increase in the value of the linear relaxation (from 20.48 
to 20.75) that can be appreciated for both inequalities (58) and combination of both (54) and 
(58). Hence, this demonstrates the positive contribution deriving from additional inequalities. 
Obviously, there are some instances for specific values of , where the addition of 
inequalities may actually delay the completion of an instance however, the above statements 





This chapter has introduced a novel scenario-based mixed-integer program to optimize 
shelter location and evacuation routing decisions simultaneously. In particular, to the best 
of my knowledge, this is the second model that attempts to address together shelter 
location, car-based evacuation, and bus-based evacuation. The model integrates both user 
and system perspectives, in fact, the former is still in charge of his routes and the latter 
arranges shelter sites and evacuation for special-needs populations. Trade-off solutions 
between the two perspectives can be appreciated through the willingness of self-evacuees 
to travel paths that are lengthier than their shortest ones. The model has been solved 
through a Branch-and-Cut algorithm of an off-the-shelf software which has been enriched 
with additional inequalities based on the study of the literature of related problems. 
Experimentation has been carried out on both testbed instances and a realistic case study. 
Results have shown user-system trade-off solutions and have also highlighted the 
importance of considering different disruption scenarios. In fact, in some cases, the solution 
obtained for combined scenarios can be quite different from the solutions of the related 
single scenario instances. Moreover, it has been proven that the addition of further 
inequalities has positively contributed to the model solution from a computational 
perspective. In fact, for the larger testbed network, it has allowed to solve instances within 
the pre-fixed time limit and has sped up the total CPU time needed to close instances on an 
average basis (this has been appreciated also for the realistic case study). Hence, the 
obtained results demonstrate that the approach is able to find robust and efficient 
evacuation plans, thus providing local governments and emergency planners with a valuable 
decision support tool.  
Nevertheless, SISLER is not exempt from limitations based on its underpinning 
assumptions. Firstly, SISLER is a deterministic model because assumes that the evacuation 
demand is known. However, evacuees may not be willing to leave their own houses despite 
warning signals thus requiring adjustments to the evaluation of the evacuation demand. This 
shortcoming may be tackled through the development of a formulation based on robust 
programming so as to account for uncertainties in the evacuation demand. Secondly, SISLER, 
is a static model and, given that disasters are intrinsically dynamic, a further research step 
would be to develop a time-dependent formulation so as to account for several aspects: 
disaster propagation (whichever the choice of disruption scenarios), traffic evolution (so as 
to include also congestion), and resources availability (both in terms of shelters to be 
equipped and vehicles to be used). Thirdly, the usage of the Euclidean distance as a proxy for 
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travelling times may not be correctly representative of a real network. From a mathematical 
perspective, the Euclidean distance is a norm 2 while the Manhattan distance is a norm 1: in 
order to account for real-like distances, a norm between 1 and 2 shall be used. Finally, from 
a computational perspective, SISLER has been tested on networks whose node cardinality is 
around 25 and whose arc cardinality ranges from 56 to 165; also, only three possible 
scenarios have been considered (i.e., small-like disruption, medium-like disruption, and 
large-like disruption). With these settings, the proposed Branch-and-Cut approach with 
additional inequalities has proven to be successful however, an increase in the number of 
disruption scenarios and/or network dimensions will require the development of new ad-
hoc cuts (to be identified through polyhedral theory) and/or to devise other approaches 
(such as applying Benders decomposition or deploying some forms of relaxation to obtain 
bounds to speed up the resolution process). Hence, despite the successful and encouraging 
results so far obtained, enhancements of SISLER from both a modeling and an algorithmic 
perspectives will have to be considered in order to increase its potential as a realistic model 







This chapter summarizes the contributions of this dissertation and offers some further 
research directions towards the two research fields this doctoral activity has dealt with: 
critical information infrastructure protection and shelter location and evacuation routing.   
 
6.1 Research summary 
This dissertation has focused on operations belonging to the mitigation and response phases 
of the DOM. In particular, on the mitigation side, the attention has been devoted to the field 
of critical information infrastructure protection, while, on the response side, two key 
evacuation planning operations have been investigated, shelter location and evacuation 
routing. 
Within the CIIP context, the following research questions have been answered: CIIP.1) 
what are the most critical elements of a system that, if disrupted, would interrupt or 
sig ifi a tly deg ade the syste ’s o al fu tio i g; CIIP.2) how can such an interruption 
be prevented or mitigated by resource allocation plans aimed at hardening system elements; 
and CIIP.3) is it possible and worthwhile to design and establish infrastructures that are 
intrinsically able to resist service failure when a disruptive event occurs? Questions CIIP.1), 
CIIP.2), and CIIP.3) have been answered by reviewing survivability-oriented interdiction, 
resource allocation strategy, and survivable design models. From the review process, it has 
emerged that resource allocation strategy models to protect CII constitute a research area 
so far overlooked. Hence, the focus has then be narrowed to the resource allocation strategy 
models category, and a survey of multi-level programs that have been developed for 
protecting other CI (i.e., supply chains, transportation systems, and utility networks) has been 
produced so to identify some aspects that could be adapted for CIIP.  Moreover, a novel bi-
level program, namely the Critical Node Detection Problem with Fortification (CNDPF) 
problem, has been introduced. In particular, the ultimate goal is to minimize the negative 
impact on network connectivity due to worst-case disruptions, affecting the system nodes, 
through mitigation strategies finalized at the installation of additional network arcs. A SVI 
decomposition method and a Greedy Constructive Local Search (GCLS) approach have been 
developed to solve the model. Two real telecommunication networks (Sterbenz et al., 2010b) 
have been used to test the model and the corresponding solution methodologies. 
Experimental results have proven that the SVI decomposition algorithm is a quite successful 
exact method however, it can encounter difficulties when problem dimensions increase, 
137 
 
which motivates the need to develop an alternative (or auxiliary) heuristic approach. The 
Greedy Constructive and Local Search heuristic with a one-to-one swap policy (GCLS1) has 
proven to be a valid alternative to the SVI decomposition algorithm when applied to a small 
network, while The Greedy Constructive and Local Search heuristic with a two-to-two swap 
policy (GCLS2) has performed satisfyingly on a larger network, and proved to be better than 
GCLS1. Nevertheless, results have highlighted that a reasonable expenditure of protection 
resources can yield significant improvements in the network connectivity. 
Within the shelter location and evacuation routing context, the following research 
questions have been answered: SLER.1) what are the current challenges emerging in the 
shelter location and evacuation routing field from an optimization-based perspective; SLER.2) 
when planning for efficient evacuation plans: how many shelters should be opened and 
where should they be located, how should self-evacuation be addressed in the planning 
framework, and how should supported-evacuation be organized in order to assist people 
belonging to sensitive categories (e.g., disabled, elderly)? Question SLER.1) has been 
answered by reviewing specific optimization-based disaster management surveys and 
critically analysing the most recent optimization models tackling the two aforementioned 
problems in an integrated manner. Through the analysis of these state of the art models, the 
current challenges emerging in this research area have been identified. These include: 
stakeholder involvement, evacuation modes, clear definition of modelling inputs, evacuee 
behavior, system behavior, and methodology. In addition, a roadmap for future research has 
been outlined. Furthermore, based on some of the identified challenges, question SLER.2) 
has been answered by defining a novel scenario-based location-allocation-routing model to 
optimize evacuation planning decisions. The proposed model, called the Scenario-Indexed 
Shelter Location and Evacuation Routing (SISLER) model, integrates shelter location and 
evacuation routing decisions, while considering both a user perspective (self-evacuation) and 
a system perspective (supported-evacuation). It also addresses the uncertainty of the 
infrastructure availability after a disaster by optimizing evacuation plans across several 
disruption scenarios. It has been demonstrated that the model can be used to identify user-
system trade-off solutions on both testbed instances and a realistic case study. 





6.2 Further research directions 
6.2.1 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
The research on CIIP issues aimed at hedging against potential physical attacks is still evolving. 
The demand for such work has been prompted by disasters of diverse nature, with 9/11 
being a seminal one.  
On a general note, the survivability optimization models that have been reviewed in this 
dissertation are basic models that can be extended in a number of ways. For example, 
interdiction and protection models could be extended to tackle both physical and logical 
survivability issues by incorporating routing and arc capacity assignment decisions. In 
addition, most of the optimization models developed so far are deterministic. However, 
failures and disruptions are random events, often difficult to predict. The probabilistic 
behavior of complex CII under disruptions would be better modelled by using stochastic 
models, including uncertain parameters (e.g., uncertainty on arc/node availability, extent of 
a disruption, etc.). Alternatively, the uncertainty characterizing disruptions could be 
captured in scenario-based models which incorporate robustness measures for the 
identification of solutions which perform well across different disruption scenarios.  Future 
models could even combine the optimization of protection and restoration strategies in a 
unified framework so as to distribute resources efficiently across the different stages of the 
DOM cycle (protection plans belong to the pre-disaster stage while recovery plans refer to 
the post-disaster stage). Other resource allocation models could consider identifying trade-
off investments in physical protection and cyber-security to mitigate the impact of both 
physical and logical attacks. The models discussed in this dissertation have been solved by 
using a variety of optimization algorithms, including exact methods (e.g., decomposition) and 
heuristics (e.g., evolutionary algorithms). The development of more complex models, such 
as stochastic, bi-level and multi-objective models, would necessarily require additional 
research into the development of more sophisticated solution techniques, possibly 
integrating exact and heuristic methodologies into a hybrid heuristic framework. Another 
possible line of research could be to investigate hyper-heuristics, which can be defined as 
learning mechanisms that either choose or generate heuristics to solve complex 
combinatorial problems and whose final aim is to find the best sequence of heuristics to be 
used rather than solving the problem just with one method (Burke et al. 2013).  
On a more specific level, critical information infrastructure protection can be achieved 
through the optimal allocation of protective resources among system components. 
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Alternatively, CIIP can be achieved through network design operations (i.e., network 
extension aimed at increasing system redundancy). The CNDPF belongs to the latter category. 
Some possible research directions are described as follows. Firstly, from a modeling 
perspective, the option of partial interdiction as proposed by (Aksen, Akca and Aras 2014) 
could be considered. Partial interdiction means that the disruption of a network node does 
not necessarily imply its total inoperability. This could be eventually linked with the concept 
of level of service or recovery time, as introduced by Losada, “ apa a a d O’Ha ley . 
The CNDPF has been formulated as a deterministic bi-level program however, given that the 
failure of a system component is an uncertain event, a stochastic version could be defined 
(Liberatore, Scaparra and Daskin 2011; Losada et al. 2012). To this end, a probability could 
be associated to the failure of a specific network node. Moreover, it would also be interesting 
to incorporate different interdiction models at the lower level, as those described in 
(Faramondi et al. 2017; Faramondi et al. 2018). These i lude: the β-Vertex Disruptor 
problem, which aims at identifying the smallest set of network nodes whose removal would 
degrade the network connectivity to a pre-fixed level, or the Cardinality Constrained Critical 
Node Detection Problem (CC-CNP), which aims at identifying the smallest set of network 
nodes to be disrupted so that the size of the largest connected component is within a 
predefined acceptance threshold.  Secondly, from a methodological perspective, alternative 
swap policies for the local search phase (e.g., one-to-many) in combination with different 
ordering (e.g., increasing rather than decreasing) for the greedy constructive procedure 
could be investigated for GCLS. Moreover, other different local search-based heuristic 
approaches could be tested in order to assess how to tackle some of the shortcomings 
emerged in the application of GCLS. These include Greedy Randomized Adaptive Search 
Procedure (GRASP), Iterated Greedy Local Search, and Variable Neighborhood Search (VNS). 
Eventually, these models could also be tested on network with specific topologies (i.e., full 
mesh, star, etc.) so as to identify any connection between the algorithm suitability and the 
network topological structure. 
Finally, the ultimate challenge when developing optimization approaches for increasing 
CII survivability is to consider the interdependency among multiple CI and the potential 
cascading failures across different lifeline systems. As noted by (Sharkey et al. 2015), 
information sharing and coordination among infrastructures significantly improve the 
effectiveness of survivability strategies, as opposed to decentralized decision making. 
However, existing models that address network interdependencies are either overly 
simplistic or too theoretical. This line of research certainly warrants further investigation. 
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6.2.2 Shelter location and evacuation routing 
Shelter location and evacuation routing, and evacuation planning more in general, is a field 
which offers plenty of opportunities for both practitioners and researchers, which still 
requires in-depth investigation given that their combination has not yet been tackled 
comprehensively.  
On a general note, the following issues should be addressed: adoption of Soft OR/PSMs 
approaches; development of multi-objective, combined, multi-period and stochastic models, 
along with cutting edge algorithms; clear and realistic modelling assumptions; deployment 
of information systems and user-friendly GIS-based platforms; primary data collection to 
embed more realism into optimisation models; combination of different evacuee categories; 
inclusion of assisted and multi-modal evacuation and issues such as evacuation vehicle 
procurement; addressing of issues such as time of day, route diversion, evacuee 
demographics, route preferences, and warning signals to model evacuee behaviour more 
accurately; adoption of novel equity-based approaches for shelter location and evacuation 
routing; integration of infrastructure disruption, congestion, and shelter categories into 
optimisation models; and interdisciplinary research towards shelter location and evacuation 
routing. 
On a more specific level, this dissertation introduced a scenario-based location-allocation-
routing model to optimize evacuation planning decisions, namely SISLER. SISLER is still far 
from being comprehensive and could be further extended to include other complicating 
aspects, such as a time perspective (through a time-dependent formulation), congestion 
issues, multiple objectives, demand uncertainties, evacuation modes (i.e., inclusion of SED) 
and evacuee behavior. Decisions about the timing of evacuation orders and the distribution 
of relief supplies to shelters could also be integrated into the model. The model needs to be 
tested on larger networks, for different probability distributions and with different disruption 
scenarios. Undoubtedly, solving larger problems with many disruption scenarios will require 
to further improve the solution method that has been proposed (through the definition of 
ad-hoc valid inequalities and separation procedures), to be eventually paired with ad-hoc 
heuristic approaches. Moreover, advanced methods for generating realistic scenarios, even 
in a different way from the one proposed, and solving large-scale stochastic programs (e.g., 
Sample Average Approximation) should be developed; robust optimization approaches could 
be adopted to account for evacuation demand uncertainties and different targets (e.g., 
evacuation time, evacuee risk, network congestion, shelter coverage) could be considered 
through a multi-objective optimization framework. Furthermore, it could be also 
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investigated how to improve the current lexicographic objective function formulation so as 
to also account for the optimization of the bus routes directly into the objective function. 
Obviously, this requires more research into identifying values of the lexicographic constants 
so that not just the main objective is dominant but the first lexicographic component 
dominates over the second one. 
Hence, the research proposed in this doctoral dissertation has got potential to 
practically improve mitigation and response operations in Disaster Management and could 
serve to emergency management decision-makers such as public authorities, NGOs as well 
as humanitarian operators. Eventually, the integration of operations belonging to different 
DOM phases should be put forward. For example, preparedness and response phases could 
be treated together by combining relief supply pre-positioning, shelter opening operations 
and evacuation. In fact, shelters need to be equipped with different resources (e.g., first-aid 
kits, food) prior to be operative. Mitigation and response operations could also be addressed 
together. During a disaster, in fact, the dissemination of warning signals and the evacuation 
itself heavily rely on critical infrastructures (e.g., communication and transport systems). 
Da age to these i f ast u tu es ay ha e di e t effe ts o  the affe ted populatio s’ a ility 
to evacuate. Hence, models to evaluate the impact of critical infrastructure protection 
(mitigation) on the evacuation process itself (response) could be developed. Obviously, this 
ambitious vision requires developing ad-hoc sophisticated algorithms, able to deal with the 
complexity of comprehensive mathematical models and large scale real-time data. This 
would not only lead to advances in the OR discipline towards the challenging and 
interdisciplinary nature of DM problems but also help to bridge the gap between the 
development of optimization tools and their practical application in disaster situations so as 
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